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INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem of the Dissertation. 
The problem of this dissertation is to discover the 
fundamental issues whic:h ultimately divide the various the-
ories concerning immortality set forth in the Ingersoll Lec-
tures.1 Nearly every important belief about immortality ever 
held by men appears somewhere in these lectures, either as the 
view of a lecturer, as a theory which is opposed, or merely 
as a historically signU:icant teaching.2 The present inquiry 
will therefore, if succEissful, disclose the basic postulates 
in which are grounded the principal historical and present be-
liefs concerning immortality. The approach, however, will be 
made through the Ingersoll Lectures, and from them will be 
drawn most of the illustrations of the various points of view. 
B. Previous Investigations in This Field. 
1. Many Works on Similar Themes. 
There have been many works on immortality. Apparently 
no previous study of this problem has been based on the 
1 Delivered at Harvard University, beginning in 1896. The 
lectures to and i ncluding the one for 1934 are included in 
this study. 
2 E. g., in such historical surveys as Reisner, ECI or 
c. H. Moore, PI!. These and similar abbreviations refer to 
books listed in the bibliography. 
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series of Ingersoll Lectures as a whole. There have, however, 
been a number of criticisms of individual lectures in the 
series, and these have been taken into account in the present 
investigation. 3 There are also some works which attempt to 
discover the ultimate postulates which logically determine 
judgments concerning Dnmortality. Their essential problem is 
sw1ilar to the subject of this inquiry, even though their 
data are, in the main, drawn from different sources. Some of 
the Ingersoll Lectures themselves, especially Edgar S. Bright-
man's Lmmortality in Post-Kantian Idealism, are concerned, in 
part, with this problem. These previous studies have been a 
welcome aid. 
2. Lamont's Issues of Immortalitl. 
More use than is apparent from direct citations has been 
made of Corliss Lamont's Issues of Immortality. The statement 
of problem in that work is so much like the one given above 
that an important difference is likely to be overlooked. La-
mont's purpose is 
to analyze certain definitions and descriptions of 
innnortali ty together with some of the supporting ar-
guments. The aim is to trace the implications of 
these descriptions and arguments; to discover their 
full and exact logical consequences.4 
Accordingly, he has set out to trace the logical implications 
of beliefs and arguments affirming the truth of immortality, 
3 See below, bibliography of articles. 
4 Lamont, IOI, ix. 
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but not of those denying it. This is unfortunate, for he has 
thus been led to see the burdens which logic lays on affirma-
tive belief, while ignoring the corresponding impedimenta of 
disbelief. The result is a presentation of objections to be-
lief rather than a delineation of the issues of the problem. 
Moreover, Lamont's classification of the possible views of the 
relation between body and mind as Platonic and Aristotelian 
is a surprising ex~iple of oversimplification. And when he 
defines the Platonic view as an ultimate dualism5 and the 
Aristotelian theory as an epiphenomenalism essentially opposed 
to belief in the soul's survival of the body,6 the conclusion 
is almost assured. There remains for him only to point out 
the unsatisfactory character of metaphysical dualism and to 
draw the clear inference that Aristotelianism is true, and the 
nega~1ve decision concerning ur~ortality may be safely left to 
his reader. 7 Despite these limitations, however, Lamont's 
book has been found highly stimulating, and by no means always 
through the impact of judgments to me inacceptable. 
5 Ibid., 4. The author does not claim that the view de-
scribed is that actually held by Plato. Cf. IOI, 11-12 N. 8. 
6 Ibid., 4-5. 
? On page 52 Lamont epitomizes his argument thus: "In spite, 
however, of such dissenters as McDougall, Bergson, and Driesch 
there can be no doubt that in modern times there has been on 
the whole, a growing trend away from Dual ism to Idealism, 
Naturalism, or ~aterialism. Scant comfort can believers in 
the immortality of the soul {or, for that matter, any other 
sort of personal survival) rind in these latter metaphysical 
positions, all of which premise a monistic or Aristotelian 
psychology." 
CHAPTER OIJE 
THE DEFINITION OF IMMORTALITY 
A. A Provisional Definition of Immortality. 
Despite the range of viewpoints comprehended in this 
series of lectures, t h ere seems to be a universal agreement 
concerning the initial definition of the word "immortality." 
The problem discussed by most of the lecturers concerns the 
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everlasting duration of human personality. And even the few 
lecturers who finally defend concep tions of bnmortality incon-
sistent with this one invariably begin with it.l This is, 
after all, what one would have a right to expect, not only 
from well-established usage, but also from the phraseology of 
the will establishing the lectureship. For it is stated that 
the subject of these lectures was to be "the Immortality of 
:Man. n2 The conceptions of man's imrnortali ty may vary widely 
within the limits thus assigned. The body may be assigned 
f . . t 3 roles o var~ous ~mpor ance. The possibilities of change in 
the categories of experience may be emphasized little or much. 
The individual's isolation or his social nature may be stressec 
as essential to the life of the self. 4 But these differences 
1 E . g., see Bixler, IPM, 1-3, 54; Ostwald, IAI, 4-5, ?4. 
2 Gordon, INT, v. 
3 Cf. below, 24, 20?-208, 220-228 
4 cr. below, 22-24, 189-191. 
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arise¢ from the varied interpretatiens of man's ess ential bein& 
One lecturer 1·inds the essence of the person to be one thing, 
and his successor may find it to be another. But whatever the 
personality may be, that is . what endures if immortality is 
true. The question which is central in the Ingersoll Lectures 
is, then, about as follows: Is the essential human personality 
everlasting?5 
B. Other Conceptions Appearing in the Lectures. 
In spite of the unanimity just described, the Ingersoll 
Lectures do not fail "tO reflect the fact that the word "immor-
tality" is sometimes used to convey the most diverse meanings.6 
Some of these conceptions will be indicated in the following 
paragraphs . 
1. The Minimum Definition of Ostwald. 
The most attenuated conception appearing in the Lectures 
is probably one suggested by Ostwald. He says, 
5 In many Lectures no definition is stated but the above 
conception is implied. In others it is explicit. Cf. Gordon, 
INT, 6-7; James, HI, 7; Wheeler, DAI, 6-7; Royce, CI, 2; · 
Fiske, LE, 15-16; Osler, SAI, 3; Crothers, EL, 3; Ostwald, 
IAI, 4-5; Dole, HOI, 3; Bigelow, BAI, 8; Dickinson, IID, 53, 
N. 1; Reisner, ECI, 3; Palmer, ISS, 3; G. F. Moore, MET, 1, 2; 
c. H. Moore, PII, 1; Brown, LA, 6-7• 9; Fenn, IAI, 32; Lake, 
llTh{ , 1, 6-7, 26-27; Horr, CFTI:, 2-3; Cabot, SOI, 5; Brightman, 
IPK, 2; Krtiger, IOM, 1-7, 38-39; Fosdick, SV, 2-6; L:rnan, M:OS, 
1· Mackenzie, MCI, 1-3, 83-84; Falconer, DNC, 1-3; 3~xler, 
IPM, 1-3, 54; Montague, CSD, 1-6; Mathews, ICP, 3, 50; Clark, 
ICI, 6-7, 12-13, 46. 
6 Cf. G. F. Moore, J!ET, 1-3; Dickinson, IID, 15. 
When we turn to human bumortality we can only 
ask, Is there in man anything more permanent than his 
body?? 
This definition of immortality-would so reduce its scope as 
to dismiss the problem altogether. For who could doubt the 
17 
truth of an affirmative answer to such a question? It is not 
even necessary to point out any such intellectual inheritance 
as that which Ostwald so delights to contemplate.8 For there 
are certainly atoms, if nothing else, in man, which are more 
permanent than the organism in which they temporarily partici-
pate. But no intelligent person would count the conservation 
of matter the equivalent of the immortality of man. 
2. Biological Reproduction. 
The conception of immortality as the biological conti-
nuity of the individual with his offspring arises frequently 
in the Lectures,9 but usually to be speedily dismissed as no 
immortality. 1° Certainly biological continuity is not the 
historic meaning of the term, but is related to that meaning 
only by a remote analogy . 11 ]fl:athews is apparently the only 
Lecturer who takes this conception seriously and his meaning 
is far from clear. Probably he means to suggest that some 
fut ure members of the race may attain endless personal life. 12 
7 Ostwald, IAI, 49. 
8 Ibid., 74. 
9 E . g., see Ostwald, IAI, 12-14 ; G. F. Moore, MET, 67; 
Bixler, IPM, 25. 
10 Cf. Ostwald, IAI, 17, 57, 58-59; Fenn , IAT, 28; Bright-
man, IPK, 2-3; Bixler, IPM, 25. 
11 Cf. Lamont, IOI, 10. 
12 See :Mathews, ICP, 41-42. Cf. ibid., 5. 
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3. Social Influence. 
It is odd that Ostwald, who sees clearly that biological 
continuity is no immortality, 13yet fina l ly adopts t he perpe-
tuity of personal influence on society as the true t heory.l4 
For if, as he points out, 15 a universal catastrophe may extin-
guish the life of the race, then a man 's influence, as well as 
his descendants, would come to an end, so f a r as life on the 
earth is concerned. J\{oreover, Ostwald seems to see also that 
even while the mark of one's influence remains in the world, 
t hat fact does not constitute even a temporary immortality, for 
after a man's death the heritage he leaves behind loses "indi-
viduality a nd the possibility of being distinguished."l6 When 
the great chemist says of the perpetuity of influence, "I must 
confess that I can think of no grander perspective of i mmor-
tality than this, n17 t he pr0per conclusion seems to be that his 
use of the word 11 immortality" is a mere rhetorical device .18 
Certainly the p roblem of immortality is not concerned with 
such ~ trite platitudes.ul9 
13 See Note 10, ab ove. 
14 Ostwald, IAI, 63-65. 
15 Ibid. • 17' 58. 
16 Ibid., 57. 
17 Ibid., 74. 
18 For a discussion, in a similar connection, of mere rheto-
ric as a comforter, see Larnont, IOI, 83 N. 8. Cf. Bixler, 
IPM, 4. 
19 Brightman, I PK, 3. Cf. 1\.[ontague, CSD, 7-9; :Mathews, ICP , 
5; Fal coner, !WC, 50; Fosdick, SV, 38-39; Horr, CFE, 32-33; 
Dickinson, IID, 35-37; Dole, HOI, 33. 
19 
4. The Eternity of Value. 
A conception worthy of more serious thought is that sug-
gested by KrUger, in his interpretation of Shaftesbury's 
thought: 
Life is worth living for those only who by a 
sort of heroic effort free themselves from that which 
means inward death. Such a life is immortality in 
itself. They who lead it have need of no other.GU 
Somewhat similar is the quotation from Schleiermacher by the 
same Lecturer: 
Immortality is not to be hoped for except as it 
is to us a problem which we have solved. To become 
one with the infinite in the midst of finiteness, and 
to be eternal at th~f very moment, that is the immor-
tality of religion. 
More precise is the statement of Bixler: 
For spirit survival is irrelevant; its ideals 
are ends in themselves, justified by their own na-
ture whether or not they endure through time ... Per-
haps immortality should stand not for an unending 
existence but for the realization in mortal life of 
that by which mortality is transcended. In the 
place of endless quantity we may have to put belie~2 in a quality which temporal limits cannot confine. 
But beautiful as are these rhetorical expressions of 
noble sentiment, they only serve to intensify the problem of 
immortality and not at all to describe a possible solution. 
Montague fittingly says, 
The conviction that the quality of a life rath-
er than its quantity is what should count is one very 
20 Krdger, IOM, 22. 
21 Ibid • .t 37. 
22 Bixler, IPM, 49, 54. 
good and ancient substitute, which, however, is no 
substitute at all; for if a life is made, as it can 
be made, regardless of its length, high and fine in 
quality, there is more rather than less reason for 
grief at its destruction.23 
Bixler seems to conceive of human life as emerging into a 
level where value and not tmaporal consciousness is its 
essence. But where and how do these ntimeless 11 values have 
their being, if not in consciousness? And if all conscious-
ness in the universe is to be finally extinguished, is there 
any reason to boast of a "quality which temporal limits can-
not confine"? The cold fact would seem to be that the quali-
ty is as much confined as the existents which bear it. These 
considerations will arise again. 24 Perhaps enough has been 
said to make it clear that the high quality which life some-
times bears is one of the reasons for ~~ortality being a 
problem; it is not immortality itself. 25 
5. Tranamigration. 
Transmigration has much more historical evidence to 
favor its classification as a kind of immortality than have 
any of the other ideas thus far examined. It is commonly 
treated among the religious doctrines of ~ortality. 26 But 
obviously i mmortality and transmigration are not equivalent. 
lmny beliefs in immortality are not beliefs in transmigration. 
Moreover, if a doctrine of transmigration affirms only a 
23 Montague, CSD, 6. 
24 See below, 170-198. 
25 Cf. Crothers, EL, 15, 55; Fosdick, SV, 39-40. 
26 Cf. G. F. Moore, ~~T. 1-6; Clark, ICI, 22. 
20 
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causal relation between one incarnation and another, it is-
no more a doctrine of immortality than is the concep tion of 
biological reproduction. liamortality does not mean the 
supplanting of one person by others, even if the series be 
endless. And more than a causal nexus is required to consti-
tute personal identity. 2 7 On the other hand, any belie!· in 
transmigration as the continuous existence o!· one individual 
person in various episodic lives is a belief in immortality.28 
6. Impersonal ]Jlonisms. 
G. F. Moore tells us that 
Aristotle's psychology made the "active intel-
lect" essentially eter:o~l, but admitted no individual 
existence after death.G 
Another notion o!· immortality which may be classed with this 
one as an impersonal monism is the idea of "absorption in 
'cosmic will,' 11 an idea in which 
humanity is •.• likened to a waterfall which contin-
ues although its component drops of water disappear.30 
"Such facts," says Ma. thews, "may by a. ~;:~or"t of metonymy be 
called imrnortality,"31 but few of the Ingersoll Lecturers 
would take the identification literally. I,ake seems to be 
an exception. Certainly the "Immortality of Life" which he 
envisages as the "tendency of modern life,"32 is quite as 
impersonal and empty as the absorption to which Mathews denies 
27 For a discussion of the question what is required, see 
below, 63-66. 
28 Cf. below, 63-72. 
29 G. F. ];{oore, lt!IET, 36. The correc~ness of this interpre-
tation of Aristotle is, of course, not here in question. 
30 Mathews, ICP, 5. 31 Ibid. 32 Lake, I:Ml.r , 26-27. 
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the name of immortality. The engrossed interest of the worker 
in his w~rk, of the artist in his art, of friend in friend, 
and of the mystic in His God may be pathways to immortality, 
but if they cease at death they can hardly be called immortal. 
When Lake says, 
I think that I know that the work which I have 
to do is life and that it is mine, in spite of the 
limitations of an individuality which hampers and 
thwarts quite as often a~. ~ it helps and forwards, and 
that it will still be m~~· when the barrier of those 
limitations is removed, 
I confess that I do not know what he means. \Vhat can be the 
meaning of a ta.s.k that is "mine" when there is no "I" is a 
mystery indeed. But only by some such rhetorical contradic- . 
tion of terms can an impersonal monism be called immortality. 
7. Spiritual Monisms. 
Not all conceivable monisBs, however, are clearly im-
personal . A pantheist may say that through individual human 
beings, 
as through so many diversified channels of expression, 
the eternal Spirit of the ugiverse affirms and real-
izes its own infinite life. 4 
Or the idealistic philosopher may declare 
the whole world of natural e:h.-perience, as we get it, 
to be but a time-mask, shattering or refracting the 
one infinite Thought which is the sole reality into 
those millions of finite streams of consciousness 
known to us as our private selves.35 
William James, from whose interpretations these two passages 
33 Lake, I MU , 37. 
34 James, HI, 42. 
35 Ibid .• 16. 
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are quoted, is not often charged with being either a pantheist 
or an absolute idealist, but he concedes that his own view 
11might lead" in the "direction" of a monistic conception of' 
immortality. 36 But in all these concep tions, including that 
of' James, the being which endures is consciousness or Thought 
or Spirit. Now the notion of' my consciousness breaking over 
the bounds of my present individuality and continuing to 
exist in an unorganized state or as organized about a new 
center now unknown to me is a difficult notion. But such con-
cep tions are con~on in the history of philosophy and frequently 
appear in the Ingersoll Lectures. For convenience we shall 
classify such ideas as spiritual monisms. These theories 
vary widely. Some emphasize so strongly the difference be-
tween the permanent One and the personality of present ex-
perience as to become almost indistinguishable from impersonal 
monism.37 Others emphasize the continuity between present ex-
perience and t h e life of the Eternal Being and thus imply the 
perpetuation of the essential personality of the present indi-
vidual as a part or phase of a greater Whole. 38 The 
36 James, HI, 58, N. 5 . 
37 For the discussion of a borderline conception, see 
Brightman, IPK, 52-56. Sometimes Lake's doctrine seems to 
vacillate between wholly impersonal and spiritual concep-
tions. E. g., see Lake, D~IM , 24-27. A similar ambiguity 
in Aristotelian thought appears conspicuously in t he history 
of the Renaissance. Cf. also Clark, ICI, 31-33. 
38 Cf. Dickinson, IID, 44-45; Brightman, IPK, 44-45, 59; 
G. F. Moore, ItJLET, 39; Bigelow, BAI, 15, 61, 67-69, 74-75; 
LyiDan, MOS, 37-39; Montague, CSD, 98. 
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difficulties of s uch a conception as descriptive of the truth 
do not now concern us. 39 It is s ufficient for the present to 
say that any conception of the endless life of the essential 
personality is a conception of bM1ortality, and that unless 
the facts of personality demand it, such a conception need 
not be individualistic. 
8. Physical or Quasi-Physical Survival. 
In s harp contrast with the spiritual monisms is the 
notion of the everla sting life of man in the phys i cal body. 
In traditional Christian belief the doctrine of the future 
life of the soul is combined with the doctrine of the resur-
r ection of t he body. 40 Vlhile, according to such beliefs, the 
soul is supposed to maintain some sort of existence from 
death until the resurrection, the conception of that exist-
ence is generally vague and unsatisfactory. Only when rein-
carnated in the risen body will the soul truly live again. 
Some other historic relig ions have affirmed the continued 
existence of a shadowy substance like the body in form but 
highly attenuated and only quasi-physical. 41 Montague offers 
a highly original description of the p ermanent self in terms 
derived from physics. The self so described is not to be 
identified with the body, however, nor is it more than super-
ficia l ly similar to the conception of s hades.42 Now a theory 
39 Cf. below, 63- 66. 
40 Cf. Lake, D.fM, 9-12; KrUger, IOM, 4-5; Clark, ICI, 12. 
41 See c. H. Moore, PII, 9-10, 50-51; Horr, CFE , 5-8 . 
42 For a discussion of Montague's theory, see below, 22 0-23Q 
asserting that the self lives forever, incarnated in a body 
of some sort, is obviously a theory of immortality. On the 
other hand, if the physical or quasi-physical substance is 
conceived to be all that survives, such a conception may or 
may not fall within our provisional definition, the decisive 
question being, in each case, whether or not the essential 
personality is identical with that which survives. 
9. The ]!ere Survival of Death. 
G. L. Dickinson is the only one of the Ingersoll Lee-
turers who defines immortality, even provisionally, as mere 
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personal survival of death. And he sees clearly that survival 
is not the equivalent of immortality, but that the question of 
survival is highly relevant to the problem of immortality. He 
says, 
I have used the word Immortality •.• to cover 
any prolongation of the life of the individual beyond 
death. The survival of death is not, of course, 
identical with, a nd does not imply, iF~ortality, in the 
proper sense of the term. But if it were known that 
survival of death were a fact, the principal argument 
against bmnortality would disappear. For our only rea-
son for supposing th~! we do not live forever is our 
experience of death. 
43 Dickinson, IID, 53, N. 1. The last statement is, I think, 
an exaggeration. Cf. ibid., 48; also Clark, ICI, 12-13. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOUE INDECISIVE COUSIDERATIOlifS 
Some of the arguments which appear in the Ingersoll Lec-
tures, as elsewhere, do not lead to t he clear delineation of 
any fundamental issues in the problem. They rest either on 
confusions1 or on postulates more clearly defined and effec-
tively employed in other arguments. 2 
A. Consensus Gentium. 
1. The Traditional Argument. 
The most famous of the arguments to be considered in the 
present chapter is that based on the supposed universality of 
belief in immortality. A belief. held by all men everywhere 
and in all time, it has been argued, must oe true. Usually 
the argument has been employed oy theists who have attributed 
the belief to the divine agency. How else, it has been urged, 
can one explain such unanimity among peoples not only without 
means of inter-communication, but also belonging to widely 
separated levels of development? Sometimes the reasoning 
takes a somewhat different turn, as when Mackenzie says, 
1 Cf. below, 41-42, 48-50. 
2 E. g., the argument e consensu gentium. 
The be~ief in Rersonal immortality is found to 
hav~ been un2v~rsal 2n human history, which would seem 
to 1mply that 2t arose sp ontaneously and inevitably 
from ~he very structure and operation of the hmaan 
mind. 
2. The Q.uestion Whether :Belief Is Universal. 
Now the question is frequently raised whether belief 
is so universal as the argument e consensu gentium would re-
quire. Osler says, "The belief is less widely held than is 
usually stated,"4 and as an illustration of disbelief de -
clares that :Buddhism"is based, not on the hope of eternal 
life, but of complete annihilation. n 5 c. H. Moore t el .ls of 
considerable Roman skep ticism. 6 Many of the Lecturers com-
2? 
ment on the growing disbelief in our own day. Montague says, 
Belief in the immortality of the soul is proba-
bly less widely held today than at any tbne in histo-
ry. . .. -The belief in survival has now been abando ned 
by a decisive ma,j ori~y of those who are often referred 
to as intellectuals. 
such objections are confronted with l~ckenzie's rejoinder that 
the exceptional disbelievers, whether intellectual or other-
wise, are abnormal, as are men who have seriously treated the 
whole world as illusion, and he still insists that "faith in 
a future life is a normal function of the human mind."8 G. F. 
Moore says flatly, "The belief that man somehow survives death 
3 14ackenzie, MCI, 5. 
4 Osler, SA!, 9. 
5 Ibid., 10. 
6 C. H. Moore, PII, 26-2?. 
? Montague, CSD, 3. Cf. Dole, HOI, 1; Osler, SAI, 8; Fal-
coner, IWC, 35; Lake, I~~ . 9; Ostwald, IAI, 36-38. 
8 Mackenzie, MCI, ?. 
is universal." 9 Fiske speaks of 
the profoundly interesting fact that the notion of an 
Unseen World beyond that in which we lead our daily 
lives is coeval with thi earliest beginnings of Hu-
manity upon our planet, 0 
and he declares that this notion "is also coextensive with it 
in all its subsequent stages of development. 1111 These strik-
ing differences of opinion seem to result in part from the 
various conceptions of what constitutes a belief in immortal-
ity among primitive peoples. Few uncritical doctrines are 
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self-consistent and many fall so far short of the intellectual 
and axiological demands of cultivated minds as to cause a 
revulsion of feeling against classifying them with beliefs now 
or recently held dear. Consequently what appears to one 
critic as an unbelief which "harrows us with fear and wonder"l2 
is to another a glorious faith in immortality. 13 
The fact is that innumerable replies that have been made 
to the question what lies beyond death. There is a surprising 
unanimity of questioning, but a bewildering diversity of 
answers. There seems to be evidence of sufficient belief and 
doubt about immortality to suggest, as Fosdick puts it, "the 
presence of an unescapable problem. n14 It is doubtful whether 
a more definite universal generalization from actual histor-
ical beliefs is justified. The universal persistence of the 
9 G. F. Moore, MET, 1. 
10 Fiske, LE, 32-33. 
11 Ibid., 37. 
12 ~uoted from Jowett, by Osler, SAI, 9. 
13 Bigelow, BAI, 3-4, 15, 74-75. 
14 Fosdick, SV, 12. 
problem is sufficiently "impressive, n15 if impressiveness is 
what is wanted. But the c1uestion yet remains what evidence 
this fact provides for the truth of any particular solution. 
If l~ckenzie were justified in saying 
that all man's life has been hitherto based upon the 
belief in immortality, and that being man he could not 
think otherwise,l6 
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then we might dismiss the main question here and now, or rather 
it could not be a problem for us while we remain men. But, in 
sober fact, he is not justified, for some men do think other-
wise, and probably most men who believe sometimes doubt. To 
call belief normal and doubt exceptional does not alter this 
fact. 17 
3. Can the Mere Existence of Belief Prove Its Truth? 
The mere existence of a belief is not in itself proof of 
its truth. The fantastic inconsistency of many beliefs actual-
ly held should make this fact sufficiently clear. -~d if the 
belief is held by great numbers of persons, the existence of 
the belief still does not prove its truth. It may be conceded 
that the prevalence of a belief is in some instances due to the 
presence of highly cogent and universal evidences in its favor. 
But such prevalence may be due merely to psychological forces 
universally operative but worthless as evidence.l8 And we 
15 Mackenzie, !W I, 6. 
16 Ibid., 82. 
17 Much of l~ckenzie's argument nominally e consensu gentium 
is actually pragmatic. Cf. below, 131, 133. 
18 The general belief in a geocentric physical universe in, 
say, the year 1000 A. D., may be cited as an example. 
ought not to ignore the observation of C. H. Moore that 
at all times the convictions of the majority of men 
are founded not on the arguments which thinkers can 
supRly, buf9on hopes, intuitions, and emotional ex-perJ.ences. 
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Actual belief is logically worth only so much as the grounds 
which support it. 20 The existence of belief in immortality 
is evidence for the truth of the belief only if it is assumed, 
1) that the belief is based on reason, or 2) that the belief 
is based on an intuitive apprehension of reality. The first 
of these two assumptions is the subject of the entire investi-
gation in hand, while the second will be evaluated in a spe-
cial chapter. 21 
B. The Psychological Causes of Belief. 
1. Psychological Cause and Logical Ground. 
The cause of a belief and its logical grounds are often 
quite different. For a belief may be caused by early training, 
personal likes and dislikes, or other factors partially or 
wholly irrelevant to the question of truth. 22 Nevertheless, 
the question of psychological cause does frequently throw 
light on the logical or metaphysical issue. For often the 
cause is also the logical ground, as, e. g., when the sound of 
another person's voice causes me to believe that he exists. 
19 C. H. Moore, PII, 30. For a more flattering estimate of 
humanity, see Brown, LA, 12-13. 
20 Cf. below, 30-42. 
21 See below, 94-116 . 
22 Cf. above, 26-30, and especially N. 18. Cf. also 
Pringle-Pattison, IOI, 3-4; Crothers, EL, 16-18. 
But the value of the cause must not be taken as proof of the 
value of the resulting belief. Often false and immoral be-
liefs cause true and good ones, while, on the other hand, 
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true and otherwise valuable doctrines become the psychological 
causes of false and vicious theories. We ought to be some-
what skeptical, then, when psychologists or anthropologists 
offer to demonstrate the truth or worthlessness of a belief 
by detennining its origin. Yet we should listen attentively, 
for psychological causes are sometimes data for logic and 
metaphysics. 
2. Two ~uestions Concerning Psychological Cause. 
There are two questions frequently raised concerning 
the psychological causation of belief in immortality. They 
are: ·1) Vfuat caused the belief to arise in human society? 
and 2) What desires affect the belief in individuals today? 
Let us examine some answers to these questions appearing in 
the Ingersoll Lectures, and evaluate their worth as premises 
tor inference concerning our main logical problem. 
3. The Origin of Belief. 
a. Dreams. 
1) Their Influence on Belief. 
Reisner states that the primitive man's 
plain simple belief in the persistence of t he life of 
a man as distinguished from the body ... is probably 
perfect~~ explicable psychologically by means of 
dreams. 
23 Jieisner, ECI, 11-12. 
Similarly, Fiske says, 
It is not at all unlikely that the savage's no-
tion of ghosts may have originated chiefly in his ex-
perience o!" dreams, and !his is the explanation at 
present most in favour.2 
How this may have happened he proceeds to explain: 
The s l eeping warrior ranges far and wide over 
the country, while he chases t he bu.t'falo and joins 
in t h e medicine dance with comrades known to have 
died yet now as active and voluble as himself, but 
s uddenly the scene changes and he is back in his fa-
miliar hut surroWlded by his people who can tes1-i!y 
t.nat he has not for a moment left them. It is not 
unlikely, I say, that tne notion of one's conscious 
self as something which can quit the material body 
and return to it may have started in such oft-repea ted 
humble experiences. It can hardly be doubted, how-
ever, that this savage conception of the detachable 
conscious self is simply the primitive phase of the 
Christian conception of the conscious soul wh ich 
dwells within the perishable body and quits it at 
death. Through many stages of elaboration and refine-
ment t he se~uence between the two conceptions is un-
mistakable. 5 
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None of the I ngersoll Lecturers deny the important role played 
by t h e experience of dreams in the origin of primitive belief 
in i nwortality. 26 Vfuat is the logical significance of this 
psychological theory? 
2) The ~uestionable Significance of This Origin. 
"At this ·point, 11 says Fiske, 
the materialist interposes with an argument which he 
regards as crush i ng. He reminds us that if we would 
estimate the value of an idea, as of a race-horse or 
a mastiff, it is well to take a look at its pedigree. 
What, then, is to be said--he scornfully asks--of a 
24 Fiske, LE, 21. 
25 Ibid., 21-22. 
26 Cf. Dole, HOI, 13-14, 28-29; Fosdick, SV, 6. 
doctrine of personal immortality which when reduced 
to its lowest terms is seen to have started in a 
savage's misinterpretation of his dreams? What more 
is needed to prove it unwvvorthy of the ~~rious atten-
tion of a scientific student of nature? 7 
But Dole is not so certain that the savage's theory is a 
"misinterpretation." He hints that even drearas must have an 
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origin and that they may be divine messengers when they convey 
ideas which seem so incongruously spiritual in a savage mind 
just emerging from the animal level.28 This evaluation of 
savage faith is open to Dole, it may be observed, because for 
other reasons he thinks the belief in immortality to be true. 
And in a similar strain, Fiske reminds us that even within the 
savage mind, which is admittedly a "mere farrago of grotesque 
fancies, ..• nevertheless, some kernels of truth are here and 
there embedded. 1129 
3) Reason Must Test Hypotheses Suggested 
by Dreams or Otherwise. 
Even the dreams of a savage may, whether by chance or by 
divine artifice, contain some clue to truth. The problem of 
determining whether any particular hypothesis suggested by a 
drearu or attributable to any other psychological cause is actu-
ally worthy of acceptance can only be solved, ir~ofrar as it can 
be solved at all, by rational criticism. And the rational 
criticism of various beliefs concerning immortality by the 
27 Fiske, LE, 22-23. 
28 Dole, HOI, 13-14, 27-29. 
29 Fiske, LE, 23. 
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tracing of their ultiffiate logical implications is, of course, 
the subject of this entire investigation. The theory that be-
lief in ~ortality originated in dreams leaves us, then, where 
we began. 
b. Traditional Associations of Belief. 
1) Some Are Discredited. 
Bixler, in the course of his explanation wby, today, 
"the drift of our thinking is towa rd a negative view"30 of 
i mmortality, makes the following observations: 
One feels the presence further of a distrust of 
categories be~ueathed from another age or suggesting 
a different intellectual climate. The word "immor-
tality" itself connotes Greek ways of thinking. Its 
meaning f or most people bears traces, also, of a 
Palestinian cosmogony. But nei t ll.er G~eek nor Pales-
tinian ideas will fit our case today.~l 
2) No Belief Disproved by Attacks on Its 
Less Reasonable Forms. 
As examples of the factors which have made our intellec-
tual climate inhospitab l e to the modes of thought connoted by 
the word "immortality," Bix ler mentions astronomy, biology, 
and psy.ch.o.logy. 32 Now if "the word 'immortality' itself con-
notes Greek ways of thinking," what shall we say of these 
honored names of our sciences ? This is not a mere ad hominem 
reply. For either Bixler or anyone else would have a diffi -
cult task to find any branch of p resent human thought or other 
30 Bixler, IPM, 4-5. 
31 Ibid., 7-8 . 
32 Ibid., 8. 
I 
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achievement which did not bear the traces of labors by our 
distant ancesto-rs. It would, indeed, be impossible. For all 
that we do is built upon the past. :But as there was some 
truth in the ancients' theories about the stars, so there may 
be some truth in their theories about man's survival of death. 
The fact that our forefathers sometimes gave bad reasons for 
their doctrines does not prove the doctrines wholly false.33 
No judgment can be disproved by criticism of its accidental 
associations, nor by analysis of its less reasonable for.ms. 
The prophets and philosophers of Palestine and Greece taught 
much that more recent investigation and thought have confirmed. 
Certainly we have no reason to disbelieve a judgment on the 
ground that it was first uttered in ancient Palestine or 
Greece. Vfuether the errors of ancient thought are accidental 
or essential to the belief in human immortality cannot be de-
termined by any mere etymological or historical investigation. 
4. The Effect of Desires on Belief. 
The belief in i mmortality is frequently attacked on the 
ground, not of unworthy historical associations, but of moti-
vation in contemporary minds by irr~oral or irrational desires. 
a. Is Belief Selfish? 
It is son etimes charged that the belief is selfish. 
Crothers observes that 
There is a mere greed of existence which is pronounced 
33 Cf. Fosdick, SV, 6-7. 
unworthy, as if when one had partaken of a feast, he 
refused to give way to others, claiming as of right 
that which had been granted him by grace.34 . 
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But he does not find all belief in i~nortality to be of this 
kind. Crothers would agree with Ostwald35 that humanity at its 
best is not self-centered, is not living for personal reward. 
The well-disciplined soul does not claim im-
mortality as a reward for services done here ...• 
Having dQne our part, we may not linger asking for 
payment. 36 
But Crothers describes another and very different kind of de-
sire for immortality: 
The good cause is the creation of a spiritual 
kingdom. It is the glad cooperation of great souls. 
It is furthered. not by suicide, but by service. 
Call it self-sacrifice if you will; that means not 
self-destruction, but the offering of one's self as · 
a necessary power to do a work. And there must be a 
self to offer,--and the larger and fuller the self 
the better. This is the word of disinterested devo-
tion, "Here am I, send me." 
A hundred times the good man has said that he 
.has gone forth not knowing whither he went. It is 
not the weakness of selfishness, it is the soldierly 
spirit, that makes him at the utmost verge of the 
earthly life long for new opportunity. He asks for 
no reward for things done, only the wages of going 
on. 
In all t his there is not the egotistic cling-
ing to a personal possession, thz~e is rather the 
devotion to spiritual realities. 
1) It Is Not Essentially Selfish. 
There is nothing essentially more selfish in wishing to 
continue life on the day when one must die than in wishing to 
live today, nor in desiring to live forever than in desiring 
34 Crothers, EL, 20. 
35 Ostwald, IAI, 43-46, 64-65. 
36 Crothers, EL, 20. 
37 Ibid., 27-28. 
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to live this hour. If the ends to which a life is devoted are 
selfish, then the will to live, whether for a day or for eter-
nity, . is selfish, but it· the purposes of a man are unselfish, 
then for him the will to live is unselfish. Hocking says 
truly, 
One who loves lire at all is forever becoming 
more deeply involved in it; and the self-conscious 
lover of life cannot g~herwise than will his own 
continuous existence. 
And surely, for him who views life as an opportunity f"or loyal 
cooperation in the creation of high social values, the love of 
life cannot be called selfish. We must conclude, then, that 
while belief in immortality may be psychologically supported by 
selfish des ires, such support is not essential to it. 
2) If It Were It Mi ght Yet Be True. 
Moreover, i1· the will to believe in imrnortali ty were 
essentially selfish, the belief might yet be true. The ob,jects 
of many selfish desires actually exist.39 
b. Wishful Thinking. 
1) The Contention That Feeling Favors 
~Vhile Reason Opposes Belief. 
Other critics of belief in immortality, instead of 
dwelling on the supposed ilmnoral character of desires support-
38 Quoted by Mackenzie, MCI, 85-86. Cf . . ~Jfa thews, ICP, 7-10; 
Bixler, IPlii, 26; Falconer, IWC, 54-60; and Brown, LA, 51-53. 
39 If belief were proved essentially selfish, the argument 
from values would, however, be seriously weakened. See 
below, 188-195. 
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ing it, insist on the irrational character of those desires, 
while assuming that they constitute the only important ground 
for maintaining belief. Osler, e. g., declares, 
There have always been two contending principles 
in human affairs, an old-tbne antagonism which may be 
traced in mythology and in the theologies, and which 
in philosophy is represented by idealism and realism, 
in every-day life by the head and the heart .... Novr 
on t h e question of the immortality of the soul, the 
only people who have ever had perfect satisfaction are 
the idealists, who walk by faith and not by sight .... 
Narrow, prejudiced, ..• mystics, idealists, with no 
strong reason for the faith that is in them, yet they 
compel admiration and imitation by the character of 
the life they le~8 and the beneficence of the influ-
ence they exert. 
Cabot, while not sympathizing with Osler's uncomplimentary de-
scription of the apostles of feeling, 41 does agree that "faith 
begins in the heart and not in the head," and testifies further, 
Certainly in my case faith began in the region of 
the emotions as a non-rational thing, and prog~eded 
thence to my head to get itself rationalized. 
~ Bixler believes that "It is t he old struggle of heart against 
head. n43 
2) Is the Belief Actuated by Desire? 
Some of the Lecturers insist that in many lives the 
heart is either neutral or hostile to belief in immortality. 
Fosdick says, 
40 Osler, SAI, 34-46. 
41 Osler does have some good things to say for them from a 
pragmatic point of view. Cf. especially ibid., 39-42. 
42 Cabot, SOI, 6. 
43 Bixler, IPM, 3; but cf. ibid., 51. Cf. also Kr~ger, IOll , 
23; Dole, HOI, 1; Brown, LA, 12-13. Cf. the tu quoque urged 
against disbelief, e. g., in Gordon, INT, 33-35, and Fiske, LE, 
51-52. 
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It is important to note the fact, commonly 
forgotten, that the majority of humankind have not 
at all believed in life after death because they 
wished to. Of all folk who believe in immortality 
today, the larger number, notably in India, are 
filled with fear and misery at the thought of it . 
... They believe in life after death, not because 
of their wishes, but in spite of them ..•. What we 
commonly forget is that, were a poll taken of all 
human beings on earth today as to whether continu-
ance of individual consciousness after death is de-
sirable,4~he possibility is that a majority would 
vote lifo. 
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Other Lecturers believe that most men are comparatively indif-
ferent to the question. Osler, e. g., says, 
Nowhere will you see any evidence of an over-
whelming, dominant, absorbing passion regulating 
the life of man because he believes this world to 
be only the training-ground for another and a bet-
ter one .•.. The great bulk of the people are luke-
warm Laodiceans, concerned less with the future 
life than with the price of beef or coal.45 
Likewise, Dickinson thinks, 
It cannot ... be said that most men desire 
immortality; rather they are, in their normal mood, 
and e~en ~5 the point of death, indifferent to the 
questJ.on. 
Dickinson seems to believe, however, that such men would not 
all be indifferent to the issue between extinction and ever-
lasting life "if the question were pressed," but they prefer 
not to think about the matter at all. 47 Of those who "do 
reflect upon the subject and have conscious and definite de-
sires about it," Dickinson says, 
44 Fosdick, SV, 10-11. 
45 Osler, SAI, 20-21. 
46 Dickinson, IID, 11. 
47 Ibid., 9-11. 
not all desire imrnortality; and some are so far from 
desiring it that they passionately crave for extinc·-
tion, and would receive the news that they survive 
death not with exultation, but with despair.48 
Such hostility or indifference to unmortality may be 
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due to horrible or colorless conceptions of the future life,49 
or to skepticism concerning its reality, 50 or to other fac-
tors.51 But from whatever causes, many persons do not strongly 
desire iniDlortality, 52 some actively fear it, and many of these 
who are indifferent or fearful yet believe in it. 
3) Feeling No Criterion of Truth. 
If feeling were the sole support of belief in immortal-
ity, we should do well to heed the warning of Osler: 
Unfortunately, with the heart man believeth, 
not alone unto righteousness, but unto every pos-
sible !3gary, from Apollonius of Tyana to Joseph 
Smith. 
It is true that though feeling and striving give rise to a 
vast plethora of absurd hypotheses, mere reason, on the other 
hand, abstracted from the faith which feeling and striving 
compel man to introduce into his thought, must fall into com-
plete and barren skepticism. 54 But a tu quoque of feeling 
48 Dickinson, IID, 12; cf. ibid., 48, 63 N. 15, 18-19. 
49 Cf. :Montague, CSD, 4-6 . 
50 Cf . ibid., 3-4; Lake IMM, 9, 20-21; Mathews, ICP , 9; 
Clark, ICI, 3-4, 7. 
51 Cf. Falconer, TivC, 4, 35; I.ake, ImJ , 5. 
52 Although Samuel McComb is probably right in his co nten-
tion that the desire is implicit in many minds not explicitly 
aware of it. See McComb, TFL, 48-49. 
53 Osler, SAI, 38. 
54 Cf. Santayana, SAF, 106. 
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to reason is a poor reply. The fact remains that feeling is 
an exceedingly unsafe guide when one's quest is for truth. 
41 
Issues concerning truth must be decided by rational criti-
cism of all available hypotheses in the light of all available 
data. 55 If, in relation to imraortality, the "head 11 is all. 
against the "heart," there is no problem for discussio n . But 
the mere fact that any belief is strongly supported or opposed, 
psychologically, by emotion, neither proves nor disproves its 
truth. There are believers ready to maintain that the doc -
trine is no mere product of "wishful thinking," but "a neces-
sary and integral element in any comprehensive world-view."56 
such a position is vulnerable, if at all, only to rational 
criticism. The claim that a belief is rational cannot be re-
futed by pointing out that it is accompanied by desire or 
fear. 
5. Psychological Causation Not Immediate 
Evidence Concerning Truth. 
The conclusion now seems warranted that the question of 
psychological causation cannot provide a solution of the 
logical problem with which we are concerned. Some related 
issues often confused with the mere p roblem of psychological 
causation, must, however, be co nsidered l ater. Some of these 
issues have to do with desirability. Now the question whether 
immortality is desired is a psychological problem. But the 
55 Cf. Brightman, IPK, 15-17. 
56 Fosdick, SV, 5. 
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question whether immortality is desirable is ethical, or, 
more precisely, axiolog1cal, and is not to be confused with 
the problem we have been considering. 57 Again, if it be con-
tended that the belief in immortality is desirable for its 
contributions to optimistic and successful living in this 
world, the issue of pragmatism is raised, and that issue must 
be carefully examined at the proper time. 58 Finally, the de-
mand may be made for some coherent, rational meaning in the 
life of desire itself. This, too, is a problem which 11 eri ts 
careful consideration, and transcends the limitation of the 
present indecisive considerations. 59 In the discussion of 
these deferred problems, psy chological causes will be reintro-
duced as data 1·or rational interpretation. Only by the media-
tion of reason, however, can ~hey be made to bear upon our 
essential problem. 
c. Is the Future Life Describable? 
"Before the view ... that consciousness survives the 
dissolution ot the uoa.y," says Bixl er, "our imagination 
falter~." 6 ° For him this difficulty seems to make impossible 
any definite belief in immortality. Various factors conspire 
to make the description of the future life seem more diffi-
cult for modern men than for some of their predecessors. 
57 See Dickinson, IID, passim; and below, 111-126. 
58 Cf. below, 126-142. 
59 Cf. below, 189-195. 
60 Bixler, IPM, 51. 
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Among these reasons a re the more critical view of t h e self,61 
more exacting moral demands, 62 and the p ersistent refusal to 
tolerate unp roved elaborations. Lamont states "the dilemma 
of the ~ odern i nm10rtalist" as follows: 
How are the descriptions of immorta lity to be 
sufficiently specific to make the hereafter imagina-
tively real and emotionally desirable without at the 
same time becoming ig~ellectually Wlacc ep table and 
spiritually profane? 
So enthusiastic a believer as Cabot seems disposed to admit 
the impossibility even of defining i mmortality, and also to 
take sophistical advantage of the vague outlines of the con-
ception he is consequently privi l eged to offer for hostile 
criticism. He says, 
Even in skilful hands, definitions may kill the 
subject they define. A dead faith is not of much serv-
ice to you, and, therefore, it is clear to me that he 
who wo uld defend his faith in immortality must avo~a 
killing it at the outset by chopping off its head. 
But however convenient in sophistical debate an ambiguous 
judgment may be, it certainly cannot be of any assistance in 
a quest for truth. If it is impossible to describe i mmor-
tality even in the lu1ited sense of conceptual definition, 
without inconsistency, a belief in it cannot hold a place in 
the t hought of a man who tries to be reasonable. But just 
now we are concerned, not with the reasonableness of the es-
sential conception itself, but with some difficulties which, 
61 The traditional soul theory, e. g., is now untenable. 
Cf. Lake, IMM, 17-18. 
62 Cf. Brown, LA, 27; Dick inson, IID, 22, 27; Gordon, I NT, 
63-89; James, HI, 34. 
63 Lamont, IOI, 46. 
64 Cabot, SOI, 5. 
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it is charged, the believer confro nts when he tries to elab-
orate the conception and describe the future life in detail. 
1. The Magnitude of Society. 
The first difficulty is one which appeared much more 
perplexing at the time when the Ingersoll Lectures began than 
it does today. The first r.ecturer says, 
The advent of the doctrine of evolution has done 
much to discredit old notions of the relation of God 
to mankind. The vista of humanity which it has opened 
to the mind of our time is so vast and bewildering 
that religious thinkers everywhere have felt compelled, 
as in the light of a fur~ger revelation of God, to 
reinterpret old beliefs. 
The problem which this newly discovered multitude thrust into 
Gordon's mind was the problem of extending the divine provi-
dence to reach so many lives. At most, of course, the prob-
lem could only be an obstacle in the path of belief in immor-
tality as combined with theism. But in fact it is not, as 
such, worthy of serious consideration. It may stagger the 
hwnan i magination to think of a God whose love is so far-
reaching, but, as Gordon clearly sees, the obstacle should 
only serve as an occasion for ennobling the theist's concep-
tion of God. 66 A similar ob,j ection is discussed by William 
James, 
relative to the incredible and intolerable number of 
beings which, with our modern imagination, we must be-
lieve to be immortal, if immortality be true.67 
65 Gordon, I~T, 81. 
66 Ibid., 82. Cf. Jrunes, HI, 34, 42-43. 
67 James, HI, 31. 
It is not clear why this number is not equally "incredible 
and intole!'able" as the count of htunan beings who have actu-
ally lived and who will yet live in success ive generations 
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on earth. At any rate, it s~ould have been sufficiently ob-
vious without Ja~mes's delightful explanation,68 that the 
difficulty is simply the misshapen product of a singularl y 
limited social i magination, "a purely subjective and illusory 
notion, a sign of htunan i ncapacity. n69 "The heart of being 
can have no exclusions akin to those which our poor little 
hearts set up.n70 
2. Space and Time. 
a. Space. 
Shailer Mat hews states the modern man's problem of 
space a nd immortality as follows: 
Persons who take our present view of the uni-
verse s eriously are unable to think of any such tran-
scendental geography as that which is involved in the 
traditional belief in immortality. But if heaven is 
not a p lace, where do the dead go?71 
Mathews' query is an interrogatio multiplex. If the person-
ality is not essentially a spatial ob j ect, but conscious-
ness, t h e question implies a falsehood. 72 But one ma y still 
ask wheth er, after death, p ersons continue to use material 
68 James, HI, 31-45. 
69 Ibid., 43. 
70 Ibid., 44. Cf. Dole, HOI, 10-11. A discussion of the even 
more ridiculous objection that s ufficient space could not be 
found for so many persons, is to be found in F. Palmer, WOI, 
121-123. 
71 Mathews, ICP, 12. 
72 The question of the ess ential nature of the perso nality 
is discussed below , 63-66 . 
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media of social exchange, and if so where the media so em-
ployed exist. But unless one is a materialist there seems no 
good reason for believing that persons are essentially limited 
to spatial means of communication, 73 or to spatial objects of 
conscious thought and volition. Falconer illustrates the 
idealistic view of the self, holding that the essential cate-
gories of p ersonality are feeling, will, and reason, none of 
which are spatial. He continues, 
That being so, questions as to where the life 
will be spent are irrelevant. Even the world of the 
present is not "real" 7as the average man counts real-ity for the physicist 4 tells us: "The physical world 
is entirely abstract a nd without 'actuality' apart 
from its linkage to consciousness." Whether or not a 
local habitation may be found for us in our future 
state among the vast spaces of the Universe, it is 
reasonable to hope that there is a Realm in which the 
company of those who have sought to know, to pursue 
goodness, and to love their fellows and all things 
pure and beautiful, will find scope for the realiza-
tion of those desires in such7~easure as transcends our present power to imagine. 
b. Time. 
The relation of personality to time is quite different. 
In present experience, while some objects represented in con-
sciousness are spatial, consciousness itself is not. States 
of consciousness do not possess length or breadth. But they 
do have duration. Vfuat could be meant by a non-temporal per-
73 Cf. below, 230-232. Even if so limited in this world, we 
have no proof that they must always be so. For a discussion 
of materialism, see below, 234-239. 
74 It is Eddington the idealistic philosopher, rather than 
Eddington the physicist, who is responsble for the doctrine 
Falconer cites. 
75 Falconer, IAC, 60-61. 
sonality, a self in description of which duration and change 
would be meaningless, is to me incomprehenaible. 76 Keyser-
ling finds the temporality of the self an insurmountable ob-
stacle to belief in individual immortality. "Das Leben," he 
says, "ist also ein Werden, ein Werden ohne Endziel. 1177 Then 
he draws his inference: 
In der Tat: wenn die Zeit die spezifische Daseins-
form des Lebens ist, dann kann das Leben nur "sein," so-
fern es verfliesst. Wie die Flamme nur brennt, inso-
fern sie8verbrennt, so w~rt das Leben nur im Unter -gehen. u'l 
But the personality is time-transcendent as well as temporal. 
By memory it links its past with its present and by purpose 
it lays hold on its future even now. The flame of Keyser-
ling's figure is related to its successors only by relations 
of proximity in space and causality in time. But a state of 
consciousness7 9 is related to its s uccessors in the same per-
sonality by the possibility of recall, by continuity of pur-
pose, and by self-recognized identity. Probably no one who 
believes in immortality anticipates the changeless persist-
ence of his present state of consciousness80 which is the 
76 Cf. Royce, CI, 64-66, 76, 80; Dickinson, IID, 45 ; Brown, 
LA, 28-29; Fenn, IAI, 05; Brightman, IPK, 8, 43. 
77 Keyserling, UNS, 275. 
78 Ibid., 278. 
79 "State of consciousness" is a term used for want of a · 
better, but lil<:ely to be misleading. Only by arbitrary ab-
straction can tem.poral boundaries be set for any portion of 
consciousness. Cf. Bergson, LEC, 4-5. 
80 Cf. Iv1ontague, CSD, 97. In t his passage Montague de-
scribes the possibility of a man's uast and present being 
forever p reserved without change "within the greater memory 
of the universe itself." 
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being that rrverfliesst," "verbrennt," or "untergeht." He 
believes that this state will be succeeded by an infinite 
number of others linked to it by the unique relations of 
self-conscious identity. 81 The objection to belief in non-
temporal immortality on the ground that personality is ess en-
tially temp oral would seem, then, to be well-founded. But the 
objection to a temporal conception on the ground that the 
change of the self is its destruction appears to overlook the 
unique power of personality to maintain identity through 
change. 82 
3. Imagination and Conception. 
a. The Faltering of the Imagination Before Immortality. 
Believers in immortality generally admit the impossi-
bility of imagining in detail the character of the future 
life. 83 But they insist that this is no argument against its 
reality. Dole, e. g., says, 
We a&nit that no one can see how the transition 
can be made into any other life than this which we 
here know--a life involved at every breath and thought 
with the senses and physical conditions. This ele-
ment of utter mystery is already contained in t he 
present life ••.. The question of the "how," pushed 
far enough, would seem no more to threaten the sp l en-
did possibilities of an i mmortal life than it threat-
ens to destroy t h e actuality of our present exist-
ence .... If it tthe future lifeJ means little,--the 
playing of harps and pianos and endless gossip,--we 
might be told by one of its messengers what it is like. 
But the more it means, the less could anyone--even God 
81 Cf. Bigelow, BAI, 15; also Bergson's phrase, "un en-
semble d'experiences," Bergson, LDS, 283. 
82 Cf. below, 63-66. Cf. also Bergson, LEC, 4-5. 
83 Cf. Fosdick, SV, 35-36; Falconer, TilfC, 60-61; Mathews, 
ICP. 1 5 ; Osler, SAI, 15; Bixler, IB!, 51. 
himself--tell us in advance what or how it may be. In 
this respect it would only follow the analogy of the 
profoundest experiences of the present life. Who 
could have made known to us beforehand the mysteries, 
and yet the indisputable facts, of friendship, of 
fatherhood g~ motherhood, of the high joys of art 
and poetry? . 
A man blind from his birth but promised his vision could not 
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imagine what sight would be like nor even the character of his 
inner consciousness when once he had learned to think in visual 
terms. Yet many a man in such circmastances has found the hope 
which he conceived, but could not imagine, actually realized. 
b. A Conception and Not a Picture the 
Subject of This Inquiry. 
It may be true, as Osler suggests, that a reason "for 
popular indifference is the vague mistiness of the picture of 
the future life.n85 For a vivid imaginary picture making a 
strong appeal to the senses is more alluring to popular fancy 
than a restrained conception supported by sober argument. But 
such considerations have nothing to do with the logical issue 
concerning the truth. The proverbial "man on the street" may 
believe in his "hunch" that he will win the first prize in 
the Irish Sweepstakes, the "hunch" resulting simply from the 
fact that he has entered sympathetically into the experiences 
of recent actual winners as described in the press. On the 
other hand, he would not have found convincing the figures 
by which the astronomer proved his prediction of the terres-
84 Dole, HOI, 7-9; cf. ibid., 29-31. 
85 Osler, SAI, 15. 
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trial course of a solar eclipse. But, in truth, there is 
less than one chance out of two hundred thous~nd t hat he will 
actually win the sweepstakes prize, whereas the margin of 
possible error in the astronomer's prediction is exceedingly 
small. The truth of a conception is to be judged by its rea-
sonableness in the light of all the data available, not by the 
vividness of the imaginary perceptions with which it may be 
illustrated. 
CHA:PTER THREE 
THF.! PLATONIC ARGUNiEUTS~ 
The most famous philosophical arguments for immortality 
are those of Plato. C. H. Moore's estimate of their histor -
ical importance in the non-Christian world is probably not 
exaggerated: 
On the question of the immortality of the soul, ... 
the later mystics brought forward no new arguments. 
Plotinus, the greatest of the Neoplatonists, virtually 
repeats the proofs adduced by the founder of the Acade-
my .•.. Plato had once for all in antiquity, supplied 
the philosophic grgunds for confidence. Only in mod2rn 
times have new arguments of any weight been adduced. 
J!oore also notes that Plato's teaching concerning i :nJID.ortali ty 
"was of immense service to primitive Christianity. n 3 Ivfore-
over, some of the Platonic arguments have been recently re-
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vived in altered form, and so are of more than historic inter-
est.4 
A. The Generation of Opp osites. 
1. The Argument of Plato. 
In the Phaedo, Plato rep resents Socrates as arguing that 
1 All the arguments considered in this chapter are discussed 
in the Ingersoll Lectures. But the expositions in the Lectures 
are so fra@uentary that the implications of the arguments do 
not fully appear. For this reason, the present investigation 
is based principally on t h e original sourcea. 
2 C. H. Moore, PII, 41. Cf. Rohde, PCS, 464. 
3 C. H. Moore, PII, 18. 
4 Cf. below, 70-72. 
all things which have opposites generate them and in turn are 
generated by them. Then he concludes, 
CO;Jo}.o'{ElT0.1 tXft:l( n}JrV Kod "[o<VT'? "[ovs )WY7o(5 
EK nJv "[Ec9Vewrwv YEYoV~Vv\1 avc)€v )i"rrov n Tovs 
rc-t9vEw<o<s EK Twv ~~vrwv.S 
2. The Argument Unsound. 
However interesting this argument may be as an ancient 
forerunner of the Hegelian dialectic, it cannot be taken se-
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riously as a rational ground for belief in immortality. When . 
a winter camper lights his fire, the cold wood generates a hot 
fire. But when the fire goes out and the ashes are cold, they 
do not again generate heat. If opposites do often generate 
one another, the ability to do so is an accident and not a 
property of opposites. There is no such universal law as 
Socrates tries to demonstrate. He tries to ground the sup-
posed law on a priori as well as empirical considerations. He 
reasons that ii' there is no such law in operation, then 
o11-a' Ot1 7{~vro< TE;\f.vi:-iJvTo<! ro o~.{;riJ o-xfjtJOi. ~v &xoin ~~ 
ro o<vro 7(t:f<~Jos O( y rrc:KJol Kod 7[dll/trC71./TO YlYY~/J€Yo<..;lo 
But it may be replied 1) that this very thing may, for all we 
know, actually occur, and 2) that the generation by a thing 
5 Phaedo, 72. ("So by this method also we reach the conclu-
sion that the living are generated from the dead, just as much 
as the dead from t he livi ng. 11 ) 
6 Ibid. ("You know, in the end, all things would have the 
same form and be acted up on in the same vvay and stop being 
generated at all.") 
of the ~ contrary which preceded it is not necessary to 
prevent such stagnant homogeneity as Socrates envisions. Fi-
nally, Socrates asks, 
Ei .. . E/< ).JEV "[[jy ~/.,Awv- · r~ ~iJy(o( yfyYoi(O) r:X 
6E. !I.Vyro<. 8v7Ja-Kol) Tis fll?.xcx», Jl~ ov ?TzXvrt?~ Kcxrc<yo<.~wtJif­
r-cx 1 Eis -co t"E8~vo<1 j 7 
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But again it may be argued that such a consuw~ation is not in-
conceivable, but that i .t is not necessarily implied by the 
pr~1ises, unless it be presupposed that the number of human 
beings possible of generation is limited to a fixed quantity. 
J3. Life a Property of the Soul. 
Another argument is based on the fact that life is a 
property of the soul:8 
'A7roKf'fvov 6>?1 f7 8' 05 4J h<v Yf EyyE-vl''([O(I rrclJjJo<T.I) 
swv ~o-r01 1; '<{). Olv lfYX-1 E¢r/ . . . <H lfvxY, ~Po< cfr1 6<y-o(~ri? ko<t~d"..XJ,1 1 6<E1 ifK~l ~/~7r' EKE)Yo ¢.ePovo;C7\ :>wflY; uHko 
f! E. Yc01) t-¢J?. l[Ot:E:f'OV {)' Etr'CI t7 :rwfi E.V~Y(JOV ;?' ov8E.v-; 
'/Ea-nv, £~'?· Tf; 8 0\vo< 'tos. OvJ<ovv yv_x~ ro evo(vrfov if; 
(){Vc~ ~1Tt¢8-f'& l dfe] OV jJft ?TOTE S6'§'?tt?<1.9 
Plato has here adduced good reason for not .believing in the 
? Phaedo, 72. ("If the living were generated from any other 
things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is there 
any escape from the final result that all things would be 
swallowed up irt death?") 
8 The word "soul 11 (?fvx~) is used by Plato to designate the 
conscious experience of the individual and not an u1~nowable 
substance underlying that experience. See Phaedo, 114-115. 
The word is accordingly used as synonymous with "person" 
t h roughout the present chapter. Cf. Lotze, ~m. 245. 
9 Phaedo, 105. ("'Now answer, ' said he. ' Vlha t causes the 
body in which it is to be alive?' 'The soul,' he replied ..•. 
' Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings 
life to it?' 'Certainly,' he said. 'Is there anything that is 
the opposite of life?' 'Yes,' said he. ' What?' 'Death.' 
' Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will never admit the 
opposite of that which it brings with it.'") 
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existence of dead souls, but he has not given a shred of evi -
dence to prove that a living soul may not cease to exist. 
Indeed, he makes this fatal admission when he uses the phrase, 
" J / ,, < f1 10 ClTroA.itv,.ue Yo( 17 ?nret{_Xwf'o YTc:(.t• 
C. The Eternity of Ideas.ll 
A third ground for belief in immortality, according to 
Plato, is the affinity of the soul with the timeless Ideas. 
Aitn? >1 oira-fq fls 1\~yov SfJopEv ro eTvoo l(o<t Ef'w-
........ ' J / ~ ( ' ) ' )I \ 
'Lw"YT'ES /{<1(1 or..rro/ff')Vo_p€Voz, rtort::f'ovwo-a<vt'ws b(El EXE1 l(o<TOC 
'(oC/Jcd( l.' b(A,~o(' c!{~;lW5"·~- q'vro CO '/crov, o()_}r-(l "Lo l(o(~o"Y, 
) ' ~ (-\ )/ ) ' (} / ' 
o,vro t:/lo<crroY o E.h"1Y) ro or-, ,VF7. rroy:-t: t<)E-ro<;3o/ln¥ Koo 
J?y't'?Yoilv Ey~Ex_E"tCX?)' h' ~e-1 4V'lc()y Ef(o(O"lOV o' EtrrJ tJ~vo­El~·f.s )o'v <Xilro Ko<B-'q-vrO') c.IJ~ro(v-rws ,fo(-c-d< 10<J·n:( E;(~l l(o<~ 
ovlJhror:G ovJ.,<jJ~ ()VJO..}Jc.JS d<~)OlWtr1V OV¢€-1/lo<.'Y f.r-~f=XE--to<l 
('v'l-tro(frws) E¢>?, Jx.yrf..yl()l) 0 KiAJns, /(O(To<· TO( ~1:~ EX€11)' w r Wl(fo~.T~.'..2. 
With these changeless essences, he contrasts the many temporal 
things which embody them, but which continually come and go. 
Then he continues: 
Qv!(of}y TOV'l:WY per- ,t;.(v ~oUS ~y ztfcns l(~y "["a(/5 
J()M 75 o<'l<rc9fttrcfrl Y Of.'{tr.Y-tn S, "'[tiJv oE /(o<rdi.. 't'.ot'h-~ extfvTwr 
ov K /fo-r' v '&rt:J ?ro"l' ~ y ~Acy bn::WBcn 0 n "Lip T'i!S J 70\ YO 1?..s 
~oj' I trpfJ1 b(,ip,' J:a-Ti' Y d<_ t-7J n 'l~ To la\Vr?.. K.o<.l' ov;.t J fO( reK._;I3 
10 Phaedo, 104. ("perish or withdraw") 
11 Cf. Fosdick, SV, 9, 12. 
12 Phaedo, 78. ( 11 !l:s the ab'solute essence, which we in our 
dialectic process of question and answer call true being, al-
ways the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, 
absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being--do they 
ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute es-
sence, since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the 
same and never in any way admit of any change?' 'It must,' 
said Cebes, 'necessarily remain the same') · Socrates. '" 
13 Phaedo, 79. ( "Jmd you can see these and touch them and 
perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are 
always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are in-
visible and not to be seen? 11 ) 
Thereupon he decides to classify all things as visible or 
invisible, and to point out that the former are changing com-
pounds, while the latter are indivisible and changeless. The 
body of man belongs to the realm of the visible, both because 
it is itself seen and because it is in intercourse with visi-
ble things. On the other hand, the reason belongs to the in-
visible realm, for it is unseen and in corr~unication with in-
visible Ideas. The body, then, should be expected to change 
and decay, as, we see, it does. But the reason must be indi-
visible and changeless. The imagination and perception are 
connected closely with the senses, and the soul which is 
strongly attached to them is, vn1ile not perishable, yet pre-
vented from freeing itself from the pains and vanities of the 
visible world. But the soul which realizes the superiority 
of the rational life and deplores the influence of the senses 
must be freed from them at death, to enjoy untrammelled com-
munion with the eternal Ideas. 
Now the fallacy of this argument seems to be obvious. 
When Plato attributes to all invisible beings the quality of 
changeless simplicity which he has found in Ideas, he comraits 
the fallacy of accident. Ideas are changeless because they 
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are timeless. In them there is no before and after. They are 
simple in the sense that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. 
But this is not true of human minds. 14 Here there is ceaseless 
14 Cf. Plato's Laws, 904, where he admits that the soul is 
not eternal in the-s-ame sense as are Ideas, but fails to note 
the ruinous effect of this a&nission upon the argument now 
under discussion. 
flow. 'I'he mind claims one Idea, then another, for its own. 
However pure of sensation the reason may be conceived as be-
coming, it will continue to be a succession of appropriated 
Ideas or it ceases to exist. The quality of changeless sim-
licity upon which the immortality of the soul is grounded, 
then, is not a property, nor even an accident of the soul. 
Mind is incurably tempora1, 15 hence changing and complex.l6 
The consciousness of a given moment, in cross-section, as it 
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were, is complex also, but its temporality is enough to refute 
Plato's argument.l7 
D. The Self-Motion of the Soul. 
1. Plato's Argument. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato argues that the soul is immortal 
because it is a self-mover: 
lyv.J<Ji 7Tc<a-o<. ~1.9q.vO(ros ·ra Y~F ~EJJ{ 7 v>rroy- ~<9d(v01-c-ov· 
f \ ) /' ' ( Jl , C" (...0 d"' O(~ i) o fOyoVv Ko<l vrr' o<j\1\ov X.?YOVj.JE.'YtJV, 7rc(v)\O(Y 
l£.xov Il l yh_trEc.JS, tr~V)v::'(y ey:E~ :rwJ?s· jJbVov oh_ LO o<.~To 
Kz vovY, ~rE oiltr Cx1fo/1Ei7ror eo{vr6, ov 1ro-c-~ 1\nYE~ lovou-
;<JE.'Yov: ~i'\/1~ If~] roTs Ut)~ol5 ({<!"o< KIYc-Tr:o<, rovr:o Jr-n,Y.>1 
/fp( l lx~xn !f1 yftrews . Ct..e.xh. 6£ d{yeYJ?.Tov. EJ«Pxfis y~f otnX_y-
1o1 rrti?v -rb -yzyvt,vcvoY !iyvt'tr.9~?.) o(vrJ,v a€- JJJ'i.a' Ef evo.s · 
[ ' )/ } ' / ) J' ' ' / t! )'o!.f' €K "COV <?IP_lh 'JlYYtnr:-o, OVJ( OCY E_5 <>\f'.XJfS /!fYO?To. 
E-TrE 1§n 6'€ 6<Jev;rr6v €a--n, ~foe} c!Ao2~¢:J-oPov- ofi;ro ~vo<yK)1 
eTYo-.1 . OcPXYi5 y~f oi? Cx.-rr--oJio;<JgYJ75 ai/r:e:o e>\V'th JfOlE Ek (oV 
o-lh:::e: ~J~o E.5 ei{E{YJ75 ye-vna--e:'to<1} E.'-f1T6P ~_5 d..PXlf5 bET 
'L~ 7T~YT<7{ 7i yye:trJcA7 . o {frcv ~ Kl v4o-ews ,.VEY J<P.Xn 'Lo od/<o 
15 Cf. above, 46-48. 
16 Cf. Brightman, I PK, 39-40. 
17 If Plato had said that the soul must be everlasting be -
cause its contents are of eternal significance, but these con-
tents cannot exist save in mind, and the eternally significant 
mea ning of the universe must therefore be only temporary and 
accidental if all mi nds p erish, then he would have ap12roximated 
t h e modern argument from values. (See below, 196-197 .) But 
he does not seem to have said this. 
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2. Ultimate Self-Motion Unproved. 
If the human self is ultimately a self-mover, if the 
power of the will to initiate activity is absolutely i nde-
pendent, itself having never received an Dnpulse from the 
not-self, then the argument is valid. But even the most hardy 
18 Phaedrus, 245-246. (''Every soul is immortal. For that 
which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves some-
thing else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to 
move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it 
does not leave itself, never cea ses to move, and this is also 
the source and beginning of motion for all other things which 
have motion. But the beginning is ungenerated. For every-
thing that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but 
the begim1ing is not generated from anything; for if the begin-
ning were generated from anythi ng, it would not be generated 
from a beginning. And since it is ungenerated, it must be also 
indestructible; for if the beginning were destroyed, it could 
never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, 
since all things must be generated from a beginning. Thus that 
which moves itself must be the beg inning of motion. And this 
can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the 
heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never 
again have any source of motion or origin. But since that 
which is moved by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who 
says that this self-motion is t he essence and the very idea of 
the soul, will not be disgraced. For every body which derives 
motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion 
within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul; 
but if this is true,--that that which moves itself is nothing 
else than the soul--then the soul would necessarily be ungener-
ated and immortal.") Cf. Hegel's argument, Brightman, IPK, 50. 
contemporary exponent of free will would be unlikely to go so 
far. And no partial indetenninism will suffice here. If the 
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self receives or ever has received any i mpulsion from the not-
self, whether from the world or from a Creator or from a World-
Soul of which it is a part, the argument is invalidated. For 
then it is possible that without such impulsions the power of 
the individual will may immediately perish or gradually run 
down like a neglected clock. The argument implies an ulti-
mate metaphysical doctrine of personalistic pluralism. The 
mere appeal to the spontaneous initiation of action by the 
will, even if such spontaneity be conceded, is insufficient 
evidence for s uch a doctrine. 
3. Self-Motion and Pre!xistenae. 
It will be noted that this argument implies the pre-
existence of each individual human soul throughout the infi-
nite past, and is, in turn, a reasonable, though not a neces -
sary deduction from the belief in such pre!xistence.l9 Plato 
believes that he has empirical proof of preexistence, and 
this evidence must now be evaluated. 
19 Not a necessary deduction because individual souls may 
conceivably have been eternally generated by some other ever-
lasting but ultimately substantial being. 
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E. Pre@xistence. 
1. Some Implica tions of Pre@xistence 
and of Non- Pre@xistence. 
a. Pre@xistence and Self-Motion. 
We have just seen that if the temporally infinite pre-
ex istence of the human soul could be established it would lend 
support, though not final proof to Plato's doctrine of self -
motion a nd hence to the belief in i mmortality. But the prob-
lem has other implications also. 
b. Existence Before Birth a nd Existence After Death. 
If i t could be demonstrated that the individual soul 
lived previous to the birth of its present body, t hat proof 
would refute all those objections to immortality which a ssume 
the necessary dependence of the soul on the body. And if it 
were known that the self had lived b ef ore its p resent body 
came into existence, it would certainly be much easier to be-
lieve that it would continue to live after the body ceased to 
ex ist. 
c. Does Beg inning Imply End i ng? 
1) The Argument Against Immortality. 
It is somet imes argued conversely that if pre@xistence 
is not true, t hen i mmortality must likewise be false. For, 
it is urged, what beg ins must end. Arnold , e. g. J says, 
We think of "eternal life" as something which 
begins but does not end; but the f allacy of t h is be-
comes evident if we try to think conversely of some-
thing "eternal" which ends though it does not begin.20 
Similarly, but with better reas oning, McTaggart argues, 
I do not see how existence in future time could 
be shown to be necessary in the case of any being 
whose existence in past time is admitted not to be 
necessary. If t h e universe got on with out me a hun-
dred years ago, what reason could be g iven for deny-
ing that it might get on without me a hundred years 
hence? Or if it is consistent with my eternal nature 
that its temp oral manifestation should beg in at some 
point in time, could we find any reason for supposing 
that the cessation of that manifestation at some 
poin t in time would be inconsistent with that nature?21 
It should be noted t hat McTaggart thinks t h is argument valid 
if belief in immorta lity is based on what he calls "metaphys-
ical" grounds, and irrelevant if it is based on ethical 
g rounds. 22 
2) Some Series Vfuich Begin But Do Not End. 
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Arnold's argument seems to be s ufficiently well answered 
by t h e consideration that there are s eries which begin but 
do not end. By the nature of t h e cas e we cannot know the out -
come of any temporal series, so it is imp ossible to cite such 
a series by way of illustration, whether it ex ists or not. 
But some series, such as t hat of the whole integers, certainly 
have definite beginnings but no endings. Now whoever would 
maintain that temporal series differ from other series in t hat 
20 Arnold, DAA, 65. 
21 McTaggart, IAP , 74; cf. McTaggart, SHC, 48. 
22 McTaggart, IAP , 73-75. The ethical arguments he believes 
to be refuted by the evil in our present experience. Cf. 
G. F. Moore, MET, 67-68 , 83 N. 74; a nd below, 160-16 9 . 
the for.mer cannot have beginnings without endings, must as-
sume the burden of proof, and no proof is forthcoming. 
3) But Beginning Does Imply Dependent Existence. 
But while begiru1ing in time does not necessarily imply 
ending in time, it does imply that what begins is dependent, 
for its existence, upon something else. If it were supposed 
to be metaphysically independent substance, then it must be 
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conceived as coming into being wholly without cause or reason. 
McTaggart is right in saying that ·if the soul did not exist 
before birth it cannot be an ultimately independent substance. 
The argument of Heinrich Scholz on this point seems irre-
fragable: 
Es kommt hinzu, dass der Gedanke der Postexist-
enz ohne ausdrUckliche Voraussetzung des Gottesglau-
bens23 eigentlich nur im Zusammenhang mit der plato-
nischen Pr&existenz zu denken ist, fftr die jedenfalls 
die konstitutive Forderung der ~rhaltung des Selbst-
bewusstseins nicht erffillt ist; denn das hat Plato 
sehr scharf gesehen, dass bei Einklammerung des Got-
tesglaubens der Unsterblichkeitsglaube ohne die Pr~­
existenz eigentlich in der Luft schwebt. Die Reihe 
der positiven ganzen Zahlen, die mit Eins beginnt 
und ins Unendliche fortgeht, kann deshalb nicht wahl 
zur Erl&uterung herangezogen werden, weil sie das Re-
sultat einer reinen Gedanksch6pfung ist.24 
23 Or, it may be tentatively added, the belief in some other 
ground of our existence, the nature of which ground would 
somehow guarantee the preservation of human personality as 
deuendent existence. CI. below, 73-74. 24 Scholz, DU, 92. 
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4) Beginning Also Implies a Temporal Uode of Existence. 
Beginning in time also implies a temporal mode of 
existence. But present experience provides more convincing 
reasons for believing in the essential temporality of the ; soul 
than for disbelieving in its pre@xistence, so that the ques-
tion of pre@xistence has not a crucial bearing upon the ques-
tion of temporality.25 
2. Does Personality Begin in Time? 
Lotze's dismissal of the pre~xistence of human perso ns 
because it is "like the innnortali ty of the souls of animals, 
strange and improbable,"26 seems to be typical of the occi-
dental attitude toward the problem. But it is not universal 
even in the West, 27 and is confronted by the wid~espread belief 
of the Orient28 as well as of Plato and many western Plato-
nists of the past.29 The evidences for and against it ought 
to receive 'SOme consideration. But the investigation of this 
problem cannot be carried far until we have determined some 
criteria for deciding whether any given states of conscious-
ness are those of the same person at different times or those 
of distinct persons. 
25 It may be well to add that temporality neither proves nor 
disproves pre~xistence. 
26 Lotze, ~m. Section , 245. Lotze gave some more serious ob-
jections to infinite pre~xistence, however, and brought them 
to bear also against irnmortality. 
27 Cf. McTaggart, IAP , and Bigelow, BAI. 
28 Cf. McTaggart, IAP, 71-73. 
29 Cf. KrUger, IOM, 17-18. 
a. Vfuat Unity ~s Essential to Personality? 
1) Successive Lives in Metempsychosis. 
If a person now living existed previous to his birth, 
how are we to know that he is now the same person that he was 
then? \Vhat must Qe the connection between these successive 
lives if we are to be warranted in calling them episodes of 
one person's existence? 
2) Some Possible Explanations. 
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A mere relation of cause and effect cannot be sufficient, 
else a man's descendants must all be co nsidered one p erson, 
identical with himself, but also one identical with other an-
cestors. On the other hand, unity of purpose would not seem 
to be the kind of connection demanded. For a man's purp oses 
frequently change radically , yet, when speaking literally, we 
should not think of denying that he remains the same person. 
::!,'lore over, two men may adopt purposes as nearly identical as 
one man's purpose can remain after, say, an interval of f ·i ve 
years. Yet we are quite certain that they are two persons 
while he is one. If it be insisted that the habitation of one 
body ought to be made by definition essential to the identity 
of personality, then we confront the problem of multiple per-
sonality. The mere bodily relations of Miss Beauchamp and 
"Sally"30 do not make them one in any sense significant enough 
30 See Prince, DOP in toto. 
to be worthy of much concern. If pre~xistence or i mmortality 
meant that one's present body had been or would be inhabited 
and used by a conscious life so completely cut off from his 
own present exp erience, he could hardly be more interested 
than h e would be at having his books, tools, and home fall 
under equally alien control. 
3) Memory Linkage. 
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In practice, we usually acknowledge as our own experi-
ences those which we remember, or could, with adequate stimuli, 
remember. If I am asked whether I have ever pondered the 
meaning of Shakespeare's Fifteenth Sonnet, I may, while not 
doubting that some persons have had t hat experience, yet be 
undecided whether any one of those persons was myself. I am · 
undecided because I cannot now remember the experience, but 
think possibly I might remember it if t he right association 
should somehow be established in my t hought. My friend and I 
may both try to stimulate my mind in such a way as to pro-
duce such as sociations. If we succeed, so that I remember, 
then I say with assurance that the experience was mine.. If we 
do not succeed, I am more me~~nearly convinced than before 
that the experience was not mine, but I am probably still in 
doubt. The reason is that I think there may be a memory link-
age between my present experience and the one in question, and 
that I am now merely unable to recall. If my friend, who is a 
trustworthy witness, tells me that I once confided to him my 
interpretation of the Sonnet, then I shall be nearly as certain 
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that the experience was mine as I can be of anything. The 
behaviorist may consider this fact proof that the unity of the 
body is the unity of the person. But there is another ex-
planation which seems truer to all t he facts. In my experi-
ence the activities of my body which were so evidently con-
trolled by conscious t h ought as was the speech to my friend 
about the meaning of the Sonnet, have always been subject to · 
recal l soon aft er, and usually also a long time after, if 
onl y t h e right path of association, could be f ound. I have 
thus come to have confidence in the existence of memory link-
age in all such cases. Morton Prince's Miss Beauchamp would 
not have been convinced by such testimony because she had not 
equal reason to bel i eve t hat expres s ions of thought heard to 
issue from her lips vvould be subject to reca l l by her. 
Such doubt as we· may still be inclined to entertain con-
cerning the question whether "multiple perso :'lalities" are 
really ultimately multiple, is due to our faith in the p ossi-
bility of recall wherever there is a continuous bodily history. 
In spite of all t he evidenc e of complete separation between 
the " selves" in one body, we are still p rone to believe that 
by t h e use of t he p roper methods of recall, one "self" could 
relJ.lember the experiences of the "other, " and so t he "two" 
proved finally to be one. Th e h istory of abnormal psychology 
lends considerable supp ort to t h is belief.3l 
The question or t h e part played by the body in memory 
31 Especially in t he cas e of Rev. Thomas C. Hanna, for whi ch 
see Sidis and Goodhart, Ji;IP , 81-226. Cf. Franz, POT, passim. 
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and other mental activities must be exrunined later. 32 That 
problem must not be confused with the present one. The point 
being urged now is simply that t he esse ntial unity of t he self 
is the unity of a memory-system, whatever may be the character 
of t he proces s es involved. It would be absurd to say t hat my 
p ersonality includes onlythe experiences which I actually re-
member at the present moment. It seems more true to exp erience 
itself to say that my p ers onality includes all that could pos-
sibly be recalled, under the most f avorable circumstances, 
~long with my present experience, as moments o1· -che same mem-
ory system. 
b. This View Mak es Pre~xistence Possible 
·Though Improbable. 
If the view of personal unity just stated be true, then 
tne p ossibility of a person's existence before birth into his 
present life must b·e so far admitted. For though one can now 
remember no experience before his birth, the possibility must 
be allowed that at some future time, in another life, he may 
be able to recall both the exp eriences through which h e is now 
passing and the experiences of a p revious life, as moments of 
one memory-system, one . essentially continuous arid only super-
ficially divided stream of personal exp erience. If this were 
to occur, should we not admit that the d ifferent lives thus 
united in memory wer e episodes in one p ersonal history? Yet 
32 See below, 199-263. 
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it must be admitted that the non._existence, so far as we know, 
of any distinct memory of events previous to birth is presump-
tive, though inconclusive, evidence against the pre~xistence 
of human beings. 
c. Does Growth of Personality From Infancy 
Disprove Pre~xistence? 
1) The Objection. 
Again, it may be argued that the growth of the human 
personality from vague, incoherent, and confused co nscious-
ness in infancy to genuine self-conscious experience in later 
years proves that t h e personality begins after birth. Does 
not a mother watch eagerly for the first signs of awaking 
consciousness in her child? And are not these signs clearly 
t h e marks of a personal existence in its beginning stages? 
2) A Possible Reply. 
But perhaps, it may be replied, the personality of the 
child is not beginning, but only awaking. Suppose, e. g., 
that he has lived before in a non-spatial medium, plainly 
impossible for us to imagine, yet not inconceivable. Perhaps 
he has gained a high degree of co ntrol over the conditions of 
that existence. Is it not possible that he would yet be unable 
to understand his new environment, a nd unable to give any evi-
dence of intelligence, either by speech or any other activities 
of his new and utterly strange body? And would not a person 
who had experienced such different forms of consciousness find 
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it ex ceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to recall, under 
p resent conditions, any specific memor i es of the former ones ? 
It would seem that he might recognize certain general prin-
ciples exemplified in t h is world, wh ich he had hitherto dis-
covered in the one formerly known. But the recognition might 
not go bey ond a stronger sense of certainty that t he p rinciples 
were true t han the facts of t h is life would explain, and a 
vivid but confusing feeling that they had been met before in 
some intere s ting experience now beyond recall. This highly 
speculative hypothesis brings us back to Plato, for it is not 
far removed from his own theory, for which he believed there 
was strong emp irical evidence.33 
d. Plato's Evidence for Pre~xistence: 'A v~~Y~~ 15.34 
1) M~& J? ~ ? s is ' A rd,yvryrn 5 . 35 
Plato believed t here was evidence to prove that personal-
i t ies now living as men previously existed as intelligent 
being s without bodies.36 Cebes is made to express the thought 
as follows: 
t:i ltv! nt9hs ED'n V7 o' y tTV EYw&Ois ()cY,;J(x 1\ (; e ?Y.) ~t 7 
33 A striking exposition of a similar hypothesis is to be 
found in Kant, TEG, 26-27. The footnote, ibid., contains 
also an astonishing anticipation of recent p sy chological the-
or i es concerning dreams. 
34 (Recollection) Phaedo, 72-77. 
35 (Lea rning is Recollection.) Cf. Phaedo, 73: " ex7n a-u.Ts yO<_ p 
o~ ?rwS ft. /A.<t(ft ollfl E. YY( yd..9rens b<y/<JlY l{.rr f s f.trl: > y; " ("You are incred-
urbus, are you not, how t hat which is called learning can be 
recollection?") 
36 Note his descrip tive phrase, "_xwp ~) 1Tv.J)J 6c.Yw r 1 /(o(l rp p[vJ?. « l r t.Txoy" (Ibid., 76). (" ... apart from bodies, and they had in-
telligence.") 
n;J I Y h/!ct..Jno-75 oil!( ~M 0 [1 h ~Yd.,UVJ70(5 LVYI(d<yfl uVc-t?<, 
/(<7\l ko( "L'~ to v "tov J,..y,i<.:y /fn 'JrOV f(pd.S EY 7TPoTEPo/ L/ y) xPoVc.J 
jJ&Pc<J-n &...6Yo<.? h< r-vv d.vo<pl)JYJ7trJ<6,JJ~cJo<. rovr-o Be J<crvvc:<rov ' e-~/ ;;A ftv rr;ov f,;J}y n ?j.rv;r-;1 lrPl v E y TQ,s.e: l~ d.rcJ Pw7rfvr-y ) 
El$-E-7 )f ~'YE&-t9c:< r .37 
And, when Simmias demands proof that ;Jb<.Jr;rr15 is d,Yt:X)Jrr;tns 
) 
'E;Yf, ;.;_E-Y ;,oy ~,. ,t¢17 o KEflJ?S> ,Ko<..).d_ lor:r) ,~-c1 ):Pwn.:.)-)JEYD I o1 i:l(v>PwrroJ) eo<.-y ns )(o<..?tws Ef>WY<:(o; c<vr-o1 , )E ;>'o ua--J v 
7T~YTCJ\ 1j eJ(El" f(f7'..[co? E.i 1-1/-t 6r-vy_;tqYEY t?<.v"Co?s E.n-icrrf,;vn 
EYCJViro\ 1 }lo(/ oPJ os 1\;yos} ovl) ~y o1o 5 I' li()r::AV [OV(O 7!'0! }1-
a"'tJ\7. . . . Of'o;1 oyov,AJEy y&>{f' Jf;mv; f= Y r/s T1 .!:xYoy.JY)itr/J;ftrE-
(.,<, I; c)E-?'v <Xvtov rovro 1TPfro;f6v 1Tof'E E.rrltrTo<t"J-cX l.38 
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Even more convincing to Plato was the fact that man has 
knowledge of Ideas (as of equality, beauty, goodness, etc. ) 
which he has never seen exemplified in concrete objects of 
perception .39 He is quite ready to admit that the conception 
of any ideal is called forth by man's experience of objects 
more or less nearly approximating it. But the fact remains 
that from seeing one thing he has conceived another, similar 
37 Phaedo, 72-73. ("If it is true, as you are fond of say-
ing, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then 
this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily 
have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But 
this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before 
being born in this human form.") 
38 Ibid., ?3. ("~riefly,' said Cebes, 'a very good proof 
is this: When p eople are questioned, if you put the questions 
well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; 
and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right 
reason, they could not do this .... We agree, I suppose, that 
if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some 
previous time. ~: ) 
39 Ibid., 73-76. 
to it and yet different, and such movement of thought is 
typical of the process of recal l . Moreover, perception is 
g iven intelligible meaning only by being related to such 
ideal conceptions, so that perceptual knowledge woul d be i m-
possible without previous conceptual knowledge. The latter 
must therefore have actually preceded the earliest develop-
ment of the for.mer. But it has been forgotten and must be 
.recalled by the help of percep tions s ufficiently like the 
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Ideas f orllierly known so that memory is stlllUlated by the asso-
ciation . The p rocess of learning is thus sh own to be in real-
ity a p rocess of recall. 
2) Other Interpretations of Knowledge Are Possible. 
It does not seem necessary to elaborate here the criti-
cisms of Plato's theory of knowledge wh i ch have caused it to 
fall i n to universal discredit as an account of t he facts. It 
i s s ufficient to say that other explanations of the relation 
I of p ercep tion and conception are possible. The psychological 
data favor the theory t hat p erception and conception advance 
togeth er in the individual's development, and that each is es-
sential to t he other. Plato's proof of pre~xistence seems 
therefore, to be outmoded by a less imposing but more coherent 
psycholog ical account of t h e learn i ng p rocess. 
e. McTaggart's Revival of Th is Doctrine. 
The Plat onic doctrine of pre~xistence has recently been 
revived by .J. I~L E. McTaggart, wh o also ci tea evidence some-
what simi lar to Plato's account of knowledge as reminiscence. 
I n addition to t his supposedly empirical evidence, McTaggart 
offers a "metaphysical" proof which presupposes his own pe-
culiar philosophical system and would carry us far beyond the 
proper bounds of this inquiry. The empirical considerations 
may, however, be briefly criticized. ~vo types of phenomena 
seem to :McTaggart to be evidence, though not proof, of pre-
existence.40 
1) "Love at First Sight." 
TY1o people who have seen but little of each other 
are often drawn together by a force equal to that which 
is generated in other cases by years of mutual trust 
and mutual assistance .... On the theory of pre-exist-
ence such relations would ~Iturally be explained by the 
friendships of past lives. 
It is not to be wondered at that other philosophers have not 
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rated the i mportance of such phenomena so highly as has McTag-
gart.42 The type of emotional experience described is about 
as capricious and unreliable as emotional attitudes generally 
are, and scarcely more significant than others. If "love at 
first sight" is the result of a long and happy friendship in 
another life, then it is remarkable how few of such old 
friends find more than tffinporary pleasure in their association 
in this life, and how many of them heartily despise each other 
as soon as they have renewed their acquaintance here. 
40 The metaphysical argument, he thinks, is £roof. See 
IAP, 86. 
41 McTaggart, IAP , 87-88. 
42 Ibid., 87, N. 1. 
2) Innate Aptitudes. 
McTaggart believes also that the peculiar traits which 
distinguish men from one a nother though they are reared in 
"very similar "43 environment may best be explained as the re-
sults of experiences previous to birth. He admits that 
heredity can explain these phenomena in part, but believes 
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t hat loecause none of a man's known a ncestors sh ow his peculiar 
ap titude, t herefore heredity cannot explain so well as p re-
ex istence. But though neither heredity nor environment alone 
would satisfactorily account for t hese ap titudes, it does not 
seem t o occur to McTaggart t hat the two together might explain 
much more. If to these factors were to be added the spontane -
ous i n itiating power of human volition (which power McTaggart 
believes to be non-ex istent), then the theory of pre~xistence, 
as e~? lanation of individual peculiarities, would seem to be 
an unnecessary extravagance~ 
f. Personality Probably :Begins in Time. 
It would seem, from these considerations, that the 
t h eory of pre~xistence, while not necessarily contradicting 
the emp irical data, does raise more difficulties than it 
solves. We may conclude that the history of an individual 
huma n personality probably begins at birth. 
43 McTaggart, IAP , 88. In comparing the psychological his-
to r ies of various persons, it is i :::nportant to note that what 
appears to an external observer to be an infinitesimal differ-
ence i n environment may be crucial in its influence on a grow-
ing child. 
F. Conclusion: Immortality a Metaphysical Problem. 
1\fone of Plato's arguments for i mmortality have seemed 
convincing. As Scholz says, 
So tiefsinnig die Gedanken sind, auf welche Plato 
und die Platonil.cer die Unsterblichkei t der Seele zu-
r~ck~4ftthrt haben: als Beweise sind sie fUr immer da-
hHL. 
Yet the result of this chapter is not wholly negative. 
Indeed it has brought us to the threshold of a discovery 
highly important in its bearing on the general problem of 
the dissertation. It was concluded that a human personality 
probably has a beg inning in time and hence is a dependent 
b e ing, i. e., t hat his existence is conditioned by the exist-
ence of a prior cause. If this b e true, then t he question 
whether or not men are eternal depends not merely on their 
own nature, but on the character of the world45 which brought 
them into being. The problem of determining what is t his 
essential structure of the whole of reality is precisely the 
problen of metaphysics. 
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It must be remembered that the adverse decision concern-
ing pre~xistence was tentative, being based on the mere im-
probability of the theory as seen in relation to the empirical 
evidence. But, this evidence being what it is, we must agree 
with JtlicTaggart that "any appreciable probability" of pre~xi st-
ence, "if established at all, must be established by more 
44 Scholz, DU, 40-41. 
45 Certainly no isolated phenomenon is the whole cause of 
anything, nor can the cause be completely described without 
describing the ultimate principles of the world-structure. 
46 McTa~art, IAP, 92. 
directly metaphysical arguments." 46 Especially is this true 
of infinite pre~xistence, which, alone, would be a proof of 
immortality. 
We are, then, confronted by this dilemma: 1) We may 
wish, with Plato and McTaggart, to uphold the belief in the 
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human soul as an eternal substance. But if so, we must resort 
to ~etaphysical arguments. 47 2) On the other hand, we may 
conclude that human personality is dependent for existence on 
the world of reality which called it into being. But then, 
we must decide the question of the i~nortality of the soul 
by resort to metaphysics. So in either case, we ar·e led to 
the same conclusion, viz., that the fundamental issues of the 
problem of i nmortality are metaphysical.48 
47 This first alternative will not be considered further, 
for three reasons: 
1) We have found the belief in the human soul as an 
eternal substance improbable. 
2) This possibility is not made a serious issue in the 
Ingersoll Lectures. 
3) It does not, in any case, i nvolve the crucial issues 
of the problem of immortality. For the possibility of disbe-
lief in i r.rrn.ortality arises only when the first alternative is 
rejected, while the possibility of belief, we shall find, re-
mains in either case. 
48 Cf. Gordon, INT, 46. 
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. CHAPTER FOUR 
DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES 
A. Th e Attack of Positivism. 
1. The Positivistic Argument. 
The conclusion of the preceding chapter will be highly 
unsatisfactory to one class of thinkers. They will admit 
readily enough t hat the argument f or immortality, i f t here is 
to be any, must be based on metaphysical considerations. But 
t hey will insist t hat this simply means t hat t h e issue is 
settled, that the negative wins by default. To them meta-
physical argument is no argument.l Th e only evidence to justi-
fy any b elief, t hey will say, is t h e empirical evidence pro-
vided by sense perception. There being no such evidence for 
i nnuortali ty, t h e only reasonabl e thing to do is to "put t he 
matter a side as one about which vre know nothing and have no 
means of knowing anything."2 I f a sked wh ether the "means 
of knowing" may not be at hand but only, thus far, undiscov-
ered, t h ey will reply with Osler, 
Now t he t h ings that are seen are temporal; of 
the t hing s t hat are unseen science knows nothing, a nd 
has at p resent no means of knowing anything .3 
1 Cf . Comte, PDP , 88-89 . 
2 Osler, SAI, 21. Osler is not s t a ting his own view, but 
h i s view is difficult to distinguish from this one. Cf. 
SAI, 40-44. Cf . also Lake, TiiiJvr , 2, N. 1 . 
3 Osler, SAI, 41. 
By its limited nature, our exp erience cannot g ive us p ercep-
tual evidence of the eternity of anything , hence not of the 
eternity of persons. And the positivist insists that we can 
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have scientific knowledge only when verification by the senses 
is pos s ible, and hence, as Ostwald says, 
In science no predictions o:t' any kind which 
relate4to infinite time or to eternity are pos -sible. 
2. Two Possibl e Replies. 
To t h e positivist's argument, which would t hrow the 
case out of co urt ror lack of evidence, there are t wo possible 
replies: 
1) It may be argued that the senses do g ive evidence 
for immortality, in t h e form of p sychic phenomena which demon-
strate survival of death and so give the doctrine of i mmortal-
ity scientific probability. 5 
2) It may be contended t hat the positivist's criterion is 
inadequate, t hat some evidence not given by sense percep tion is 
valid and s ignificant. 
It remains t o examine t hese t wo replies to t h e positiv-
ist's ob j ection. 
4 Ostwald, IAI, 35. 
5 Cl. above, G5; also Dole, HOI, 38, 52-53; Dickinson, 
IID, 48; Fenn , IAT, 8. 
?? 
B. Psychic Evidence.6 
1. Favorable Considerations. 
a. The Characters of Some Men Convinced by Psychic Evidence. 
Vmatever decision one may finally render concerning the 
interpretation of psychic phenomena, at least the time has come 
when, as Mathews says, "They should not be treated with con-
tempt."? The integrity and critical powers of some of the men 
who have been convinced by the evidence should alone be suffi-
cient to gain serious consideration by increasing numbers of 
qualified students. 
Long before the Society for Psychical Research began its · 
wo rk, Immanuel Kant confessed that when listening to stories 
of psychic phenomena he was "erns tha.ft und unentschieden."8 
He said further that, while his ignorance of disembodied 
spirits led him to deny the various 11 Geisterz~hlungen," it was 
doch mit dem gewBhnlichen obgleich wunderlichen Vorbe-
halt, eine jede einzelne derselben in Zweifel zu 
ziehen, allen zusammen genommen aber einigen Glauben 
beizumessen.9 
A number of recent thinkers, standing high in philosophy 
and the empirical sciences, have gone much further and ac-
knowledged that for them the evidence was convincing , even if 
6 For an extensive, though mldiscriminating, bibliography 
on this subject, see Hartmann, HID, Section ?. 
? Mathews, ICP, 45. 
8 Kant, TEG, 42. 
9 Ibid. Willia..m James expresses the same thought in liTAS , 
196-19?. Kant was not, however, optimistic about the future 
development of spiritualism into a science, insisting 11 dass 
man davon vielleicht ktlnstighin noch allerlei meinen, niemal s 
aber mehr wissen kBnne." (TEG, 42) 
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not finally conclusive.lO Among others may be mentioned sir 
Oliver Lodge, 11 James H. Hyslop, 12 W. F. Barrett,l3 Sir William 
Orookes, 14 Alfred Russel Wallace, 15 and F. W. H. ~JYers.l6 In 
addition, a number of others, while remaining unconvinced that 
evidence thus far secured has established the probability of 
actual communication with disembodied spirits, yet do think 
such communication may have occurred, and believe that suffi-
cient evidence may be obtained in the future. William James 
is of this number. Not long before his death, he wrote, 
I, personally, am as yet neither a convinced 
believer in parasitic demons, nor a spiritist, nor 
an ''orthodox scientist," but still remain a psychical 
~eser?cher, waiting for more facts before conclud-
~ng. 
But he confessed, 
~tr own dramatic sense tends instinctively to 
picture the situation as an interaction between 
slwnbering faculties in the automatist's mind and 
a cosmic environment of other consciousness of some 
sort which is able to work upon them.15 
And he said further, 
Hardly, as yet, has the surface of the facts 
10 Of. Brown, LA, 14-15. 
11 Lodge, SOM, 340-341. Of. Randall, :NLI, 66-68; Barrett, 
PR, 244. 
l2 Randall, }lli!, 83. 
13 Barrett, PR, 244-246. 
14 Bennett, SPR, 5. 
15 Ibid. 
16 ]nyers, HP, vol. 2, 274-275. Of. James, NAS, 194-195. 
17 James, MAS, 203. 
18 James, MAS, 201-202. Of. James, HI, passim. 
called "psychic" begun to be scratched for scientific 
purposes. It is through following t hese facts, I am 
persuaded, that the greatest scientific 8onquests of 
the coming generation will be achieved.l 
1Iore reserved, yet significant, is the dictum of HenrJ 
Bergson:20 
I regard the field open to psychical research 
as very vast, and even as unlimited. ~his new sci-
ence will soon make up the time lost.21 
b. Careful Procedure in Some Experiments. 
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Moreover, an unbiased reader must be impressed by the 
painstaking care of much of the exp erimental procedure recorded 
' 
in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychica~ Research. Fenn 
says, 
One cannot go far in this literature without 
coming to have confidence not only in the perfect 
candor of the investigators who record misses and hits 
with equal fidelity, ... but also in their acuteness 
to guard against fraud, ~~d shrewdness in detecting it 
when actually attempted. 
It is p lain that men long familiar with the principles of scierr. 
tific i nvestigation are using the utmost skill at their command 
to avoid mistakes. And while such procedure issues in negative 
results again and again, 23 other data are now and then brought 
to light which serve to convince such men as have already been 
19 James, MAS, 206. 
20 A former president of the Society for Psychical Research. 
21 Bergson, 1{E , 79. Cf. Schiller in Proceedings SPR , vol. 
17, 245-251. 
22 Fenn, IAT, 3-4. 
23 For a well-justified warning against the consideration of 
negative results as important adverse evidence, see Bennett, 
SPR , 55-56. 
mentioned. 24 
c. Data Not Otherwise F~plained. 
The results which produce these convictions are the 
phenomena which no hypothesis hitherto suggested seems to 
explain so well as the hypothesis of actual influence by dis -
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embodied spirits. Fenn points out that many so-called psychic 
phenomena may be due to coincidence, telepathy, or some un-
known powers of the subconscious having nothing to do with 
spirits of the dead. 25 But he expresses the thought of most 
earnest students of this literature when he declares, "I feel 
bound to confess ... that none of these explanations seems to 
me quite adequate."26 An assistant secretary of the Society 
for Psychical Research, Edward T. Bennett, says, 
It is a scientific duty to exhaust all known and 
recognized causes to the utmost reasonable extent be-
fore adlnitting the influence of other i n telligent be-
i ngs. The records of the Society contain much valuable 
matter showing how far argument can be pushed, and 
facts interpreted, without such an admission. Many of 
the leading workers in the Society have, however, been 
driven to the conclusion that certain facts do exist, 
which cannot be explained without admitting the p res-
ence of other intelligences, and t hat some of these 
facts are evidence of t h e continued action of men and 
women who have lived among us.27 
This is not t h e place for any detailed account of such 
evidential facts. They are of many kinds and are subject to 
wide ly variant interpretations. Probably the most relevant 
24 See above, 78. 
25 Fenn, IAT, 9-15 . 
26 Ibid., 15. Cf. Leuba, GAI, 162-163. 
27 Bennett, SPR , 48. 
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are some · of the instances of extraordinary knowledge. 
For example, Barrett tel ls of observing a group of ex-
p erimenters with an ouija board. The sitters were blindfolded 
with the greatest care. Instead of the usual board, the indi -
cator was op erated on a sheet of p late glass, beneath which 
the letters of the alphabet, each letter on a separate card, 
could be arranged in various orders by Barrett and a skeptical 
friend, and an opaque screen w~s interposed between the blind-
f olded eyes of the sitters and the glass. Yet the indicator, 
t h ough its speed was retarded when the letters were moved, con-
tinued to spell out significant messages.28 Barrett also 
tells of an ouija boar d message which purported to come fror11 
an army officer recently k illed in battle. In t h is message he 
gave instructions for the giving of a pearl tie pin "to the 
g irl I was going to marry." His f a.u1 ily was not aware that h e 
had been engaged and asked the lady's name. The indicator 
spelled out a f ull name, whi ch was unknown to the sitters. An 
addre s s was also g iven. W"11en the addres s was found to be a 
non-ex i s tent one, the whole message was p resumed to be ficti-
tious. But when the of f icer's personal effects were sent to 
the family, they found the same lady's name i n his will and a 
pearl tie pin &aong his belongings.29 
Much more cogent evidence is pr ovided by some of the 
L'lstances of "cross-correspondence, u which are too complicated 
t o describe here, but are recorded in detail in t he Proceedings 
28 Barrett, TOU, 177-182. 
29 Ibid., 184-185. Cf. ibid., 186 -188 . 
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of the Socie~or Psychical Research, volumes 21 to 25. 
At the least, such evidence as exists would seem to justi 
fy the following statement of William Jruues: 
Tne next thing I wish to go on record for is 
the presence, in the midst of all the ht~bug, of 
reall_y supernorma:l _  lfpowledg~. By this I mean know-
ledge that cannot be traced to the ordinary sources 
of int:prp1a tion-- the senses, namely, of the automa-
tist. In reall~ strong mediums this knowledge seems 
to be abundant. 0 . 
2. Unfavorable Considerations. 
a. The Peculiar Conditions Required. 
The conditions surrounding most psychic phenomena are of 
a character not productive of respect or confidence. As James 
characteristically puts it, "The cabinet, the darkness, the 
tying, suggest a sort of human rat-hole life exclusively. u3 l 
And, generalizing, he says, 
Fraud, conscious or unconscious, seems ubiqui-
tous throughout the range of psychic phenomena of 
spiritis.m .... If it be not everywhere fraud simu-
lating reality, one is tempted to say, then the real-
ity (if any reality there be) has the bad luck of 
being fated everywhere to simulate fraud.32 
Brovvn is thinking of the srune repulsive circumstances associ-
ated with spiritism, when he says of his deceased mother, 
If it were possible for her to come back and 
have a word with·me I feel confident that she would . 
•.• But if she crune I find it difficult to believe 
that she would seek out some dark, dingy room in the 
back parlor of a professional medium .... And if she 
should come, I cannot believe that she would resort 
30 James, MAS, 200. Cf. ibid., 188-189, and Bennett, SPR, 
47-57. 
31 James, MAS, 197. 
32 Ibid., 183. 
to table tipping or to mysterious rapping or to the 
fantastic movements of a Ouija board to manifest her 
presence and wishes .... The main methods employed 
by those who make a business of seeking communication 
with the unseep world do not co~nend themselves to me 
as reasonable.33 
However, if a good mother could comraunicate with her 
son only by such humiliating methods, can we be sure that she 
would consider the price too · great to pay? If the obstacles 
to such communications are, as Hodgson has suggested, similar 
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to the difficulties of "two persons who on earth should have 
only dead-drunk servants to use as their messengers, "34 mi ght 
not the effort even then be made? Dogmatism seems dangerous 
where so little is known. 
b. The Triviality of the Manifestations. 
One of the most disappointing features of psychic phe-
nomena is the trivial or even silly character of most messages 
which are supposed to come from the dead. Brown says, 
So far as I have been able to ascertain, nothing 
of permanent value in science or religion has ever 
been received from these spirits in the other world . 
••. The messages vn1ich have come by this strange 
route have been, as a rule, trivial and c9mmonplace . 
... If these communications are all that some of the 
wisest and best of earth can send back from the van-
tage ground of that heavenly country up on which they 
have entered, it raises a serious doubt in our minds 
as to whether we have been in communication with the 
wisest and best in that upper world.35 
33 Brown, LA, 16-17. 
34 Indirect quotation in James, J\I[AS, 203. 
35 Brown, LA, 18-20. Cf. Santayana's statement that the kind 
of survival sugge sted by psychic phenomena "is not so much an-
other life, as a prolonged death-rattle and delirium." Jour. 
Phil., 6 (1909), 413. 
Several replies may be made to this objection. Fenn 
has the following refutation to offer: 
And since I am speaking of critics, let me add 
that they also seem to make rather too much of the 
triviality of the alleged communications. As a rule, 
they are, indeed, either hopeless twaddle, or pompous 
nothings, but there are exceptions -which must be 
reckoned with. In fact it is rather probable that 
adverse judgment proceeds largely upon the supposition 
that those who have escaped the bonds of the flesh 
must certainly pass at once into purer intelligence 
and more perfect wisdom~6 But why should this be taken for granted in advance? 
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Yet reason as well as sentiment supports Fenn's further state-
ment: 
It must be added that only on the ground of un-
imp eachable evidence ought one to insult his honored 
dead by ascribing to them such vapidities as ~?equent­
ly occur in alleged communications from them. 
The believer in communication has not ye t completed his 
argument. For he may insist that the difficulties of com-
munication are so great that the medium gains only a seriously 
corrup ted version of the communicator's thought. The nature 
of t h ese difficulties is admittedly not known, but some 
ingenious and even plausible hypotheses have been constructed, 
which would answer many of the objections which such a view 
obviously suggests.38 
36 F eru1, IAT, 5. 
37 Ibid., 6. 
38 E. g., see James, 1~S , 18 9-190, 201-205; and cf. Bergson, 
LES, 79-84 . 
c. The Data 1~y Be Otherwise Explicable. 
Moreover, as the science of psychology advances, the 
data which now suggest the explanation of the spiritual ists 
may be explained otherwise. It is well known tha t many phe-
nomena, such as those of hypnotism, for example, were once 
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thought incapable of explanation i n terms of natural causation, 
and yet psychologists have succeeded in such explanation. 
Many of the phenomena which are now most puzzling may require 
the formulation of new psy cholog ical laws and the radical re-
vision of concep tions now generall y accep ted. But these 
change s in psychological t heory may eventually provide for the 
exp lanation of the da t a without reference to t he agency of the 
dead. 39 
3. Co nclusions. 
a. Present Explanations Inadequate. 
The contemporary situation in s cientific psychical re-
search is well represented by Mackenzie in the following words: 
It is the deliberate opinion of so learned a 
man of science as Charles Ri chet, the eminent profes -
sor of physiology in the University of Paris, that 
t h e phenomena of telepathy, clairvoyance, p r emoni-
ti on, even of levitati on and the movement of objects 
without muscular contact, are too numerous, too wide-
sprea d in history a nd over t he s urface of t h e earth, 
to be que s tion ed by anyone who inve s tigates t h e evi-
dence. He does not consider t hat t h e a ction of dis-
ca rnate sp irits is necessary to explain these innumer -
able and indubitable fact s of experience, and is seek-
i ng for explana tions which are i n closer accord with 
t h e general ca nons o1· natura l scienc e . But, whether 
39 Cf. Bro\vn, LA, 20-21. 
he is right in that restriction or not, that which is 
apparently established beyond all reasonable--doubt is 
that the mind of man is open to sources of knowledge 
which cannot be operative through the ordinary chan-
nels of our so-called sense exp erience.40 
b. The Spiritists May Be Right. 
One must beware of many pitfalls in interpreting such 
data as the psychical research societies have collected,41 
but not the least of the perils is the dogmatism of a con-
servative scientific tradition. I confess that for the in-
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terpretation of some of the data, the most reasonable hypothe-
sis yet suggested seems to me to be the supposition that some 
vague and more or less confused impressions in the minds of 
certain human beings are actually due to the agency of dis-
carnate personalities. 42 But the evidence is far from being 
conclusive. It is not only possible, but seems fairly prob-
able, that some more reasonable explanation may yet be found. 
c. The Evidence Insufficient for Belief. 
\Vhile the evidence remains so incoherent and contradic -
tory, it is probably not unreasonable to conclude with Fenn, 
that 
it is better to leave the question open than to fall 
back upon the 1nore than dubious hypothesis of disem-
bodied spirits. In other words, there is evidence 
enough to justify further inquiry, but not enough to 
warrant a decision either way.43 
40 Y~ckenzie, MCI, 36-37. 
41 Cf. Fenn, IAT, 2-3. 
42 Perhaps in some such way as suggested in the references 
cited above, 84, N. 38. 
43 Fenn , IAT, 16. 
If the e~1ibition of such psychic phenomena as are now reli-
ably attested is the best answer which can be given to the 
positivist's objection to inwortality, he would seem to have 
the better of the argument. An i m.partial and competent judge 
would not dismiss the case on the ground t hat there was no 
evidence, but he would hardly find sufficient evidence to 
justify a prolongation of the trial, until more intelligible 
witnesses can be found.44 
C. The Critique of Positivism. 
1. Present Vogue Is No Proof of Truth. 
It is true, as Lak e has pointed out, that 11 in an age of 
physical progress," the empirical scientist holds "a natural 
advantage" over the metaphysician in the popularmind.45 It 
is therefore not surprising that, as Brightman says, "the 
present is inclined toward positivism. 46 Brightman explains 
further, 
It is not quite true that the thought of the 
present is avowed and consistent positivism, yet it 
is true that many characteristic philosophies of 
the present are positivistic in temper. Philoso-
phie s of "as if," behaviorism, views that seek in 
adjustment to environment the panacea for all ills, 
real isms that confine the task of thought to analy-
sis of the given, have a conrmon logical affiliation 
with positivism, whatever the system-makers may 
avow. The development of positive science, socio-
logical and psychoanalytic flank atta cks on all 
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44 Cf. Bixler, IPM, 18-21; Fiske, LE, 59-60; Osler, SAI, 
27-31; Montague, CSD, 18-19; Lake, Ti\'ilVI , 19-20; Dickinson, IID, 
46-50; Dole, HOI, 4-5; Brightman, IPK, 5; Jefferson, W'~liJ\ffi , 115. 
45 Lake, IJl!!:L~ . 2, N. 1. 
46 Brightman, IPK, 12. 
metaphysical beliefs (especially on religious be-
liefs), and the intense interest in the history of 
ideas and institutions, coupled with skep tical in-
difference to their truth or validity, are all symp-
toms of current positivism.47 
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But a current vogue is not necessarily infallible. The assump -
tions of positivism may be wrong. 
2. Nor Is the Success of · Experimental Science. 
No one doubts the effectiveness of experiment nor of 
direct sense perception, so long as one is seeking merely to 
know phenomena and ''leurs lois effectives, c'est-i-dire · leurs 
relations invariables de succession et de similitude."48 But 
are no other kinds of knowledge possible? Would even this 
knowledge be possible if experiment and perception were not 
complemented by assumptions inconsistent with positivism? 
Such questions cannot be answered by merely pointing to the 
success of experimental science in getting for men things 
which they value. To suppose that such success was proof of 
positivism would be to as sume the pragmatic criterion of 
truth, and such an assumption vrould already have carried us 
beyond positivism.49 
3. Positivism Implies Skepticism. 
The positivist usually accepts as true the data and the 
generally approved "lawsn of the empirical sciences. These 
ideas are believed by him to be known with u nique certainty 
47 Brightman, IPK, 12-13. 
48 Comte, PDP, 89. 
49 See below, 117-142. 
because they are attested by direct sense perception. But 
what sense perception? Not merely his own of the present 
moment, for he would be shamelessly guilty of t he fallacy of 
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"hasty generalization" if he :::were to rear his "laws" on a base 
so infinitesimal. But if he is to build on his own past sense 
percep tions and the observations of other men, what faith he 
must have! Faith in human memory, faith in human veracity, 
faith that the symbols of communication mean to him now what 
they meant in the past to those who emp loyed them! And even 
with t h es e as sump tions , he has still gone no further than to 
collect historical data. Before he can formul ate laws,50 even 
in Comte's sense of "relations invariable de succession et de 
similitude," he must assume much more. As the materialist, 51 
George Santayana, says, 
The postulates on which empirical knowledge a nd 
inductive science are based--namely, t l1at there has 
been a past, that it was such as it is now thought to 
be, that there will be a future and that it must, for 
some inconceivable reason, resemble t he past ang2 obey the same laws--these are all gratuitous dogmas. 
If one is to accept the truth of those judgments only which 
are demonstrable to sense p ercept ion , it is obvious t hat h e 
can know nothing of the past (now that it is past), nor of 
the future (until it ceases to be the future). He will know 
50 To s ay nothing of believing in such imp erceptible ob,j ects 
of conceptual thought as atoms or electrons. 
51 Santayana, SAF , vii. Santayana also renounces metaphysics 
but only because he defines it in a peculiarly restricted and 
opp robrious sense. See ibid. 
52 Ibid., 14. Cf. Mill, SL, III, iii, §1. 
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only his own perceptions of the present moment. He cannot 
know that ob,j ects of perception exist independent of his per-
cep tion , for the conception of such independent existents can 
be inferred only from repeated perceptions. All that is left 
to hin1 is the perception itself. Indeed he cannot know the 
existence even of a perception. For who ever perceived a per-
cep tion? He has only data, and no knowledge. 
The datum is an idea, a description; I may con-
template it without belief; but when I assert that such 
a thing exists I am hypostasizing this datum, placing 
it in presumptive relations which are not interna~ to 
it, and worshipping it as an idol or thing. Neither 
its existence nor mige nor that of my belief can be 
g iven in any datum.5 
Positivism, then, so far from being the ally of science, leads 
to complete slcepticism. If sense perception is t h e cr iterion 
of truth, dre~u s and reality are on the same footing. Only the 
specious present54 is given, and nothing is knovm . 
4. Skepticism or Metaphysics. 
Logic offers the choice of ultimate skepticism or meta-
physics. There is no escape between the horns of this dilemma. 
For n othing can be known without t he assump tion of certain 
principles of reality. If no criterion of truth is :presupposed, 
then the assertion that a judvnent is true is meaningless; its 
53 Santayana, SAF, 35. 
54 Cf. ibid., 37. 
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contradictory might as well have been affinned. But assert a 
criterion of truth and you have asserted a principle of real-
ity. If you say only that can be known to be true which can 
be perceived by the senses, you have implied that all t h e real 
is such that it can be known only through ex ternal sensation. 
If you say that coherence is the criterion of truth, then you 
imply that all the real vnLich is knowable is coherent. Every 
thinking person assumes some criterion of truth,55 and hence a 
metaphysi cs. From beginning to end the knowing process im-
plies universal generalizations about reality. And if one 
tries to avoid metaphysics by embracing skepticism, even t hen, 
he has entered the metaphysical arena. For, as Bradley says, 
To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot 
reach it, is a claim to know reality; to urge that 
our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to tran- -
scend appearance, itself implies that transcendence.56 
5. Blind Versus Critical :Metaphysics. 
But though everyone has certain metaphysical principles 
from which he proceeds, the uncritical man does not intelli-
gently select these principles. He may give careful attention 
to the selection of various stones in the superstructure of 
his knowledge, but the foundation upon which all else is 
built is given little or no attention. It may be thoughtlessly 
accepted as a heritage from his fathers, or it may be chosen 
because some particularly fascinating stone wanted in t he super-
55 He may, of course, inco ns istently assume different cri-
teria at different times. 
56 Bradley, AR, 2. 
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structure fits conveniently into it. But the critical meta-
physician sees no reason why he should carefully select the 
materials for his superstructure but trust to luck for the 
foundation. He is determined to cr iticize h is basic assump-
tions even more carefully than his other judgments and to ac-
cept the most reasonable system of principles he can discover. 
And whatever principles he may finally accep t, he is certain 
that his criterion of truth ought not to be that of the posi-
tivist, leading as it does to a self-contradictory skepticism. 
6. Metaphysical Inquiry Justified. 
In the preceding chapter the conclusion was reached 
that "the fundai11ental issues of immortality are metaphysical.1157 
We have now exam ined the charge of the positivist that meta-
physics is only vain speculation, and his inference that since 
the senses are dumb co ncerning an endless life after death, 
there is no evidence worth considering in favor of the belief 
in imnortality. We have found that the senses do provide no 
conclusive evidence for immortality. But we have also found 
that the positivist's refusal to accept any evidence other 
than sensible phenomena would, if consistently maintained, lead 
to complete skepticism. Moreover, we have observed that the 
positivist himself assumes a metaphysics and cannot avoid doing 
so while he thinks at all. We conclude that metaphysics is 
inevitable, and in spite of the liability of our reason to 
57 Above, 74. 
error, we ought to accept, upon inquiry, the most reasonable 
metaphysical principles that can be discovered. 
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vrnen the problem of immortality draws us into meta-
physics, then, it leads where the implications of all our sig-
nificant thoughts on every subject eventually lead. 
CHAPTER F TVE 
I NTUIT I ON Al'ID lli.TWELAT I Olif 
We have concluded that the ultimate issues in the prob-
lem of immortality are metaphysical, and we have defended 
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this conclusion against the objections of the positivist. But 
there are other objections which come, not from skeptics, but 
from believers. For some believers in brumortality are adverse 
to committing issues of great practical i mportance to the 
judgment of reason. They call attention to the fact that the 
intellect is not the only faculty runployed by man in his quest 
for truth. Moreover, they maintain, man is in possession, not 
merely of data which reason may organize and bring to bear as 
evidence for immortality, but also of sanctions for the belief 
which do not require the mediation of reason, much less any 
rational investigation of metaphysical principles. Such sanc-
tions are of two general kinds, 1) intuitions and 2) revela-
tions, though, as we shall see, these classes are not mutually 
exclusive. 
A. Intuition. 1 
1. Th e Claim of Intuition. 
a. Intuitional Evidence for ilmnortality. 
Gordon believes that intuition strongly supports the 
1 Intuition is here used in the fourth sense defined by 
belief in immortality. 
For close at hand ar e the great instincts that 
plead for the dignity and permanence of man. There 
is an instinct that assures every man of the reality 
of the external world. Analyze that real ity as you 
may, construe it as you please, it is t here as real-
ity, attested by a feeling that is universal and 
practically invincible .... A corresponding feeling 
vouches f or t h e reality of t h e moral universe and f or 
the permanence of man's re l ation to it ..•. Vfhile the 
un iverse is so great, and reason in the mul titude is 
so low, these high instincts will continue to be one 
of t h e ~trongest supports of bel i ef in the p ermanence 
of man. 
Several other Lecturers agree. Crothers says that at the 
death of a noble person, "Al l things seem p os s ible save that 
t h ere should be no path for t h ese patient feet. "3 Brown 
quotes with approval a similar statement from Gordon's The 
Witnes§ to li~lortality. 4 Dole likewise emphasizes the 
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strength of this intuition with reference to g ood men. He is 
even 
inclined to think that, if a l l lives were so compl ete 
as some whom we have heard of and known, no one would 
doubt t hat man is "immortal."5 
Lalande: "Connaisance sui generis, comparable a l 'instinct et 
au sens artistique, qui nous revele ce que les etres sont en 
eux-mames, par opp osition a la conna issance discursive et 
analytique qui nous les fait connaitre du dehors." Lalande, 
VTCP , in loco. 
2 Gordon, I NT, 111-113. 
3 Cro t hers, EL, 25; cf. ibid., 38 - 39 . 
4 Brown, LA, 33. Cf . also Berg son, LDS, 283-285. 
5 Tiole, HOI, 24. The contex t a nd t h e quota tion marks create 
some s uspicion t hat Dole may not be using t h e word "iramortal 11 
h ere in its strict sense (cf. ibid., 3). The tendency to 
lapse into ob s cure fi gures is :found in many interpreta ti ons of 
i n t u ition and one must be on h is guard against the f a llacy of 
ambiguous terms. 
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b. Certainty. 
1/[o reover, t h e conclusions of reason concerning such 
matters as immortality are always relative and to sorr. e extent 
provisional. Hew data may be discovered which are inconsist-
ent with the present conclusion, or a new hypothesis may be 
suggested which explains the facts better than t he t heory 
which now seems most accep table. How weak and vacillating is 
t h is knowledge of reason! Men who act decisively a nd live 
with contag ious enthusiasm do not depend on such inte l lectual 
groping. They are the men who say, "We sp eak that we do 
know, and testit·y that we have seen. rr 6 These are the 
strong souls laden with fire who have kept alive "tile 
sen"Giment of immorta.li ty, --the little flock of Tere-
sians, who feel that to them it is given to know the 
mysteries.7 ----
such "Teresians," Osler believes, are "the salt of the earth, 
so far as preserving for us a firm conviction of the existence 
of another and a better world" is co ncerned. 
Not by the lips, but by the life, are men influenced in 
t heir beliefs; and where reason calls in va,in and argu-
ments fall on deaf ears, the still small voice of a life 
lived in. the full faith of another may charm like the 
lute of Orpheus and compel an unwilling assent by a 
strong, indefinable attraction, not to be explained in 
words, outside the laws of philosophy,--a something 
which is not apparent to the senses, and which is mani-
fest only in its effects.8 
6 John 3:11. 
7 Osler, SAI, 35. 
8 Ibid., 36-37. Cf. Brightman, "Immediacy?" in Harn1s, .JFI, 
1 (1934) 95. 
2. The Importance of Intuition in Truth-Seek i ng. 
a. Synthesis of Personal and Racial Experience. 
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Whatever may finally be concluded concerning the claims 
of the intuitionist, it must be admitted that intuition often 
plays an important role in truth-seeking. :Many of our memo-
ries are lost to recall under ordinary circumstances, yet com-
bine to cast up into consciousness images and concep tio ns 
which represent the wisdom of experience. Moreover, as we 
have already observed, 9 every man is the result of a process 
which was going on long before his birth. Hence there are de-
posited within him instincts and tendencies which represent 
successful adjustments of countless generations to the real 
world. The new-born babe seeks eagerly for the food of which 
he has never had experience. He can give no reasons for his 
faith, and its object could not possibly be inferred from his. 
data, even by the most ingenious intellect i maginable. Yet 
where reason, even if its formal p owers were fully developed, 
must be helpless, instinct swiftly and surely apprehends the 
truth. Why should not such instincts, become self-conscious 
and disinterestedly contemplating t hemselves, give to us much 
truth concerni ng the real world in which the race has been 
cradled? Vfuo can say how far beyond the possibilities of in-
ference from our data instincts may have adjusted the lives 
of men in whom they have been most highly developed? The 
9 See above, 72, 73. 
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inspiration of genius which can give no reasons for its assur-
ance may be the product of generations of adjustment to an 
enviromaent far transcending the world of the senses. The 
earnest seeker after truth ought to be humble a nd open-minded 
in the presence of such possibilities. 
b. The Production of Hypotheses. 
It is certain that the intuitions of men of genius have 
sometimes provided hypotheses which appear to reason as not 
even suggested by the data at hand, yet proved by further in-
vestigation to be t rue. Indeed, one of the most important 
distinguishing characteristi~of the truly great scientist 
is t h e unusual and often amazing ability to create signifi-
cant hypotheses. This talent of genius is no mere fecundity 
of imagination. The mere number a nd variety of hypotheses 
produced are not the chief cause s for wonder. It is the 
g,uality of the hypotheses which is most surprising . Thus, 
hypotheses are often framed which not only explain all the 
facts known at the time, but also a vastly greater number of 
unforeseen data from distant fields supposed hitherto to be 
unrelated. Such contributions of intuitive genius to science 
and philosophy are of ines timable value. 
c. For the Evaluation of Connections in Testing Coherence. 
Moreover, whenever the coherence criterion of truth10 
is applied to any judgment, it is necessary to evaluate the 
10 Cf. below, 246-247, 250-251. 
various rela tions between that judgment and others. The re-
lations are not merely those of consistency but include rela-
tions of causation, memory, aesthetic harmony, moral obliga-
tion, and other categories. In determining truth, such rela-
tions are obviously not of equal worth. In evaluating them 
different persons will disagree concerning their relative im-
portance. The evaluation is, of course, accomplished partly 
by reasoning from experience, for some kinds of relatio ns 
have proved surer clues to reality than have others. But, 
esp ecially when the judgment under examina t ion is in a field 
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where few crucial experiments have been made , one's co nclusions 
must depend, for better or worse, largely on p ersonal intui-
tion, or what Williar.<1 James has called the "dramatic sense. rrll 
d. The Possibility of a Reve l atory Function. 
Such "intuition" may be merely "wishful thinking.rrl2 
But on the other hand, we cannot ignore Bergson's contention 
that when intuition is at its best, 
c'est a l'interieur meme de la vie que nous conduirait 
l'intuition, je veux dire l'instinct devenu desinter-
esse, conscient de lui-m~me, capable de refl echir sur 
son objet et de l'elargir indefiniment.l3 
If intuition as here described is possible it is a veritable 
revelation of truth. 
A better known interpretation of intuition as a revela-
11 See above, 78. 
12 Cf. Osler, SAI, 35-37. Note that Osler does not distin-
guish between intuition and wishful thinking, both being in-
cluded by the figurative name, "the heart." 
13 Bergson, h~C. 192. 
tory function is the religious. Gordon says, 
These divinations of a transcendent world, these 
contacts with a supernal reality, these feelings in-
duced by a presence other than human, are underneath 
all belief, are, indeed, the mother of all faith .... 
Their true history seems to be that they are in us, 
yet not altogether of us .•.. They do not represent 
our wishes; they are not here because we have invited 
them. They represent the Maker of mankind; they are 
his ambassadors, and they bring their credentials 
from the Eternal . They are here as the sea is here at 
the flood, because the universe rolled t h em hither, 
because God sent them.l4 
3. The Necessity of Criticism. 
a. Inconsistent Intui tio ns. 
Whatever may be the worth of some intuitions, it is 
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impossible that all should be true. For some judgments sanc-
tioned by such experiences are self-contradictory and others 
contradict each other. 15 And however disdainfully the intui-
tionist may look upon logic, he cannot gainsay the fact that 
to affirm contradictories is to affirm nothing. There are, 
for example, inconsistent intuitions concerning innnortality. 
It is true that persons whose attention is directed to man's 
realization of timeless ideals16 frequently have intuitions of 
immortality. But on the Gther hand, if attention is focused 
upon man's kinship with the animals and his commerce with the 
material world, then intuition is likely to sweep over the 
14 Gordon, I NT, 112-113. Religious intuition is discussed 
further under nRevelation, 11 below, 104-115. 
15 Cf. Clark's statement, "It would seem that religious in-
tuitions differ as much as intellectual theories ... (Clark , 
ICI, 44.) 
16 Cf. the quotations cited above, 95-96. 
soul with an almost irresistible sense of the absurdity of 
immortality. 17 What intuitions may one believe? 
b. Bergson Suggests a Norm. 
101 
Some principle of criticism and selection is clearly 
needeq. Such a principle is suggested by the following pas-
sage from Bergson: 
Les grands hommes de bien, et plus particuliere-
ment ceux dont l'herolsme inventif et simple a fraye a 
la vertu des voies nouvelles, sont revelateurs de veri-
te metaphysi que. Ils ont beau etre au point culminant 
de l'evolution, ils sont le plus pres des origines et 
rendent sensible a nos yeux l'lit1pulsion qui vient du 
rond. Considerons-les attentivement, tachons d'eprou-
ver synlpathiquement ce qu' ils eprouvent, si nous vou-
lons penetrer par un1gcte d'intuition jusqu'au prin-cipe meme de la vie. 
Here an ethi cal criterion is presented which would plainly sup-
port the intuitions associated with man 's ideal quest rather 
than those arising from his involvements in the physical world. 
But in applying this norm considerable reasoning is required. 
Even if an intuitional ethics were adopted, reason would be 
needed to compare the lives of various men, and various moments 
in the s~ne lives, with reference to the ethical axioms, and 
to arrive at generalizations concerning the significant asso-
ciations of various intuitions. But even more important for 
our inquiry are the h~plications of the criterion itself. 
Where did Bergson learn that the men morally greatest are the 
men best able to reveal the essential character of the elan 
17 Cf. · the quotation from Dole, above, 95. 
18 Bergson, LES, 26-27. Cf. Dole, HOI, 51-52. 
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vital? vn~ere, moreover, did he learn that t h e universe is es-
sentially "la vie," a life sufficiently like human life at its 
best so that the best men may sympathetically apprehend its 
very principle? 
c. A Rationally Supported Metaphysics Implied. 
Bergson's principle of criticism and selection is ac-
tually a rational inference from his metaphysics, which is in 
turn supported by it. The intuitions of the best men are the 
most valuable revealers of metaphysical truth, because 
Ils ont beau etre au point culminant de l'evolution, 
ils sont le plus pres des orig ines et rendent sen-
sible a nos yeux l'impulsion qui vient du fond.l9 
Now anyone who has read Bergson's L'Evolution Creat1ce knows 
that he has employed brilliant and subtle reasoning in arriv-
ing at this view and takes great pains to show that it is more 
reasonable than any other. 20 The intuitions of which this 
metaphysics is the rational justification are no doubt em-
ployed as evidence in support of it. 21 But the vast amount 
of material drawn from the empirical sciences is eloquent 
refutation of the charge that intuition provides the only 
grorn1d for Bergson's view. 
4. Intuitional Evidence Worthless Apart From a World-View. 
Indeed the evidential value of intuition is nil apart 
19 Bergson, LES, 26. 
20 See, e. g., Bergson, LEC, 209-212. 
21 And every rationalist who employs the coherence criterion 
should agree that such support was quite proper and no mere 
argument in a circle. 
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from a world-view. It was found in the last chapter that all 
inferences from sense p erception to reality must presuppose 
some fundamental metaphysical principles.22 A similar conclu-
sion may be drawn concerning inferences from intuitio n . And 
it is only by inference that intuition can provide any know-
ledge of reality. t ntuition as intuition is a bare datum and 
not knowledge.23 If it is supposed to represent anything 
whatever beyond its own appearance in consciousness, the as-
sumption has already be .en made that reality is of s uch a na-
ture that its inner life can be and is represented in human 
intuitions. If one goes f urther, a s he must if int~itions are 
to provide significant evidence, and attempts a comparative 
evaluation of various intuitions, he is led deeper into meta-
physics. If, for example, he asserts with Bergson that the 
intuitions of good men are more truly repre s entative of reali-
ty than are the intuitions of the evil or mediocre, he implies 
that human distinctions of moral values are funda~ental, not 
only in man, butin the whole of reality. 
5. The Argument from Intuition Presupposes 
Idealism a nd the Objectivity of Value. 
We may conclude that intuition can be cited i!l support 
of belief in immortality only if it is assumed 1) t hat ulti-
mate reality is sufficiently like man's own life so that he 
22 See above, 91. 
23 Cf. Eright m·an, " Immediacy?" Harms, JFI, 1 (1934), 96. 
can sympath etically apprehend it from within, a nd 2) t hat 
t h e i ntuitions of human consci ousness at its mor al best are 
more trustworthy witnesses concerning reality than a re other 
i ntu itions. Hence the argument from intuition to t~.t e truth 
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of i mmortality clearly presupposes an idealistic metaphysics
1
24 
a nd the obj ecti vi ty of values. i. e .• , the universal va lidity 
and metaphy s ical relevance of true value judgn1ents.25 Whether 
or not t llese as s ump tions are warranted is a question for 
later inquiry. 26 
B. Revelation. 
1. Auth ority. 
a . Religious Authority for Immortality. 
Tn ere can be little doubt t ha t t h e a u thorities recognized 
24 nidealistic Jvtetaphysics " is here used in t h e sense of 
Eis l er's de:r1nition: "Idealismus: 1. metaphysisch: die Weltan-
s chauung , nach welcher die absolu~Wirklichkeit idealer Natur 
ist, d. h . an sich Idee, Urgedanke, Vernu.nft, Geist, :rFtirsich-
sein, " i n irgendeiner Form, allumfassendes Bewusstsein oder 
eine Mannigfaltig .eit von Bewusstseinseinheiten ist. Die Aus-
senwelt gilt ala .Erscheinung oder Entfaltung eines geistigen 
Seins oder als Inhalt eines universa len Be~~sstseins, das in 
den Subjekten sich individualisiert oder auch diese zum Inhalt 
hat." Eisl er, WPB, "Idealismus." Idealism does not, of course, 
necessa rily imply the existence of such intuitions as are dis-
cussed above. I mean to say that the belief in intuitions 
logically presupposes idealism but is not a necessary infer -
ence from idealism. 
25 It will be noted that more is meant by the phrase "objec-
tivity of value " here than .in t h e de f inition by Sorley on 
pages 93-101 of UVG. For Sorley does not include the meta-
physi cal reference in his initial definition, though he finds 
such a reference ultimately i mplied by exp erience. See HVG 
in t oto. 
26 Cf. below, 175-189 a nd 2 40-242. Cf. also the quotation 
from James in Fosdick, AOI, viii. 
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by the great religions of the world generally affirm the truth 
of i mmortality. :Moreover, the assurance of the future life of 
man becomes stronger and more definite with the advance from 
:primitive to more intelligent and eth ical religion. Wheeler 
says, 
If in the throb of Dionysos' :passion men seem 
to gain an insight into the spiritual harmonies of 
nature, and intimations of their own :potential kin-
ship with the divine, which cold reason and dull 
sense had not availed to give, it ·was still dim, 
groping vision; but yet the face was set thither, 
where, in a later day,--a day for which Greece and 
Dionysos :pre:pared,--men learned through the Convinc~ 
ing Love to know and live the eternity within them.27 
Most human beings who have believed in immortality, whether 
in ancient Greece or in modern America, have undoubtedly ac-
ce:pted the belief from religious authority. 
b. The Revolt Against Authority. 
But Bixler is evidently correct when he speaks of "our 
modern distaste for authority of any sort."28 As he explains, 
we are becoming ever more inclined to accept only t hat author-
ity, who, we are convinced, has such evidence that "his con-
elusions can be verified by anyone with his knowledge and 
equi:pment.n2 9 
c. If Values Are Objective Good Men Possess Rightful Authority. 
Yet if moral values are objective, the best men do 
27 ~~eeler, DAI, 53-54. 
28 Bixler, IPM, 21. One reason is the self-contradictory 
character of sacred writings. Cf. Gordon, INT, 72-80. 
29 Bixler, IPM, 21-22. 
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possess a rightful auth ority peculiarly their own .30 If the 
categories of value are fundamental in reality as we believe 
the logical categories to be, then familiarity with ideal 
values is an important qualification of the metaphysical 
truth-seeker just as intellectual objectivity31 and acumen 
are recognized to be. The saint, no less than the physicist 
may have a right to insist that "his co nclusions can be veri-
fied by anyone with his knowledge a nd equipment, " even though 
the quality of his equipment may make him too humble to assert 
this right. The issue between the most intelligent religious 
believer and the believer in the sciences who is skeptical of 
all religious authority is t he question whether the peculiar 
characteristics of the saintly prophet do actually constitute 
equipment which alone makes possible certain new discoveries 
of truth. If values are objective t here is every reason to 
suppose that s ome mystics do pos sess such equipment. If 
. values are not objective, then the mys tic has no rightful 
claim to an authority above that of other men. 
2. The Resurrection of Jesus. 
Gordon has considered t hat in a "philosophical endeavor," 
it is 
inadmissible to introduce into the argument the ulti -
mate basis of Christian3~elief in the future life, the resurrection of Christ. 
It seems difficult to justify such a position. If there is 
30 Cf. above, 101-104. and below, 
31 Cf. below, 182. 32 Gordon, I NT, viii. 
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good evidence for the event and the event is good evidence 
for imraortality, no philosophical investigation of the problem 
of immortality can be complete without taking it into account. 
If, on the other hand, the evidences are not capable of with-
standing criticism, they ought not to be considered by an in-
telligent Christian as "the ultimate basis of Christian be-
lief." The philosophical spirit forbids any such partitioning 
of the intellectual life as the above passage would imply. 
Moreover, a nmaber of Lecturers have thought the resurrection 
of Jesus a proper subject for inclusion in the series. It is 
plain, then, that some attention must be given to it in the 
present inquiry. 
a. Evidence Favorable to Immortality. 
The Lecturer who lays most stress on the resurrection of 
Jesus is G. E. Horr. He approves wholeheartedly the evalua-
tion of this evidence by St. Paul, in whose writings, Horr 
says, 
the historical resurrection of J esus, which must be con-
strued not as reanimation but as entrance into a higher 
order of life, becomes t he conclusive evidence of the 
future life, and the blessedness of those who have come 
into fellowship with God through faith in Christ.33 
Concerning t h e historical truth of t h e resurrection story 
Horr will adr.ai t no doubt, and he contends, 
You may meet an argument with an argmaent, but 
you cannot meet a fact with an argurnent : and, if it is 
reasonably established that Jesus demonstrated his 
33 Horr, CFE , 43. 
cont inued existence to the sens e-experience of t h e 
d i sciples, our philosophies will reckon with t he f a ct.34 
:Now if Horr is right, a strong evidence for i mr11 ortal i ty ha s 
b een f ou::td, f or one man ' s triumphant passage beyond death 
would demonstrate, at the least, a conditional survival of 
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death . It would, moreover, co nstitute evidence of extraordi-
nary va l ue in support of J esus' cla i ms to unique authority, 
and woul d s o str eng then all his u t tera nce s in favor of i mmor -
tality . But it is imp ortant to reca ll that the survival of 
death i s not, in itself , i mmortality . The resurrecti on of 
Jesus, if a f a ct, demonstrates only t h e survival of death, a nd 
it i s t h e survival of only one man, a man, moreover, wh ose 
uni quene ss is most strongly urged by t h ose to whom t h e a r gument 
fr om t h e r esurre ction seems mos t cogent. 
b. Not Accep table If Inunortali t y Not Reasonable. 
Every "f a ct " inc l udes s ome i n terpretation. Moreover , 
a hi s tori ca l event of long ago ca n be known only if one puts 
con1"idence i n ancient records . Vfh ile t h ere are many eviden ces 
favorab le to belief in t he r esurrection of J es us, t h e deta ils 
va r y cons i de rably a nd even inc onsistent ly in t h e various a c-
counts. It is undeniable that 
Something happened that convinced the disheartened 
disciples of 3esus that He had triumphed over the expe- _ 
rience o1' -death , and was not only alive, but that they · 
were in actual relationship with the Living Christ.35 
J3ut the question of t he precise order of events which convinced 
34 Horr, CFE , 44 . 
35 Ibid., 44- 45 . 
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them is highly complicated. Unless one has been convinced on 
other grounds that the Gospels and the writings of st. Pa.ul 
are reliable, he is not likely to be persuaded by such indi-
rect and apparently contradictory evidence. In short, there 
is involved the whole question of the truth of the Christia,n 
revelation. If it is believed that God exists and has re-
vealed Hi mself through prophets and sacred wri tings, but most 
clearly through Jesus, and that He is therefore such a God as 
Jesus represents Hi m to be, the belief in immortality follows 
almost inevitably36 and the resurrection story is easily 
credible. But if immortality is not believed, on other 
grounds, to be true, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the 
story of the resurrection of J esus will be found convincing 
evidence. Certainly it ·will not be acceptable if the belief 
in God is rejected. We have noted that George A. Gordon calls 
the resurrection of Christ " the ultimate basis of the Chris -
tian belief in the future life."37 This observation makes 
even more i nteresting the fact noted by Dole: 
It is at least highly significant that when a 
notable leader in a great evangelical church, Dr. 
George A. Gordon, presents his best thought in his 
book, "The Vli tness to Immortality," he takes pains 
to establish the theistic faith by philosophy, be-
fore h e adduces his reasons for believing in the 
resurrection of Jesus.38 
Dole observes further that 
throughout history too many marvellous stories of 
lik e events have been told to permit us to rest any 
36 Cf. below, 143-153. 
37 See above, 106. 
38 Dole, ROI, 6-7. Cf. the order of J3rovm' s argument in LA. 
precious conviction upon such testimony.39 
Of course Christian believers think this marvellous st.ory 
different in kind from the others. Consequently, if this 
were the only ground for belief in i mraortali ty, our inquiry 
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would be directed henceforth to a n evaluation of the gr ounds 
of Christian faith in the STew Testament revelation. However, 
that would limit the investigation unduly, f or the belief in 
in~ortality is by no means a peculiarly Christian belief. 
Most of t h e Ingersoll Lecturers who uphold i rrmortal i ty base 
t h e bel ief on broader grounds. 
c. Impl ications of t h e Resurrection Argument. 
In. so far as the resurrection argument derives its force 
fr01(~ a p rior belief in i :rmnorta.l ity it does not, of course, 
advance our present inquiry. However, it implies also the 
belief in theism, as we have discovered, and it also implies 
the objectivity of values. For no one would believe in the 
resurrection story if it were not believed also that the noble 
character of J esus was of cosmic significance. However , t h e 
p roblems both of theism and of t h e objectivity of values arise 
elsewhere in more general forms, and free from the historical 
and literary complications in whi ch they are entangled here.40 
3. Religious Exp erience and Imnortality. 
The a r guments from authority and historical revelation 
39 Dole, HOI, 7. 
40 See above, 104 and 99-100 , and below, 143-198. 
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a r e not the only argmnents for imLnortality which are essen-
tially religious. Indeed, even where belief is grounded on 
Jesus' resurrection or some other event recorded in sacred 
writings, the faith in the record is strengthened by the evi-
dence of present religious experience, which also gives to 
the other evidences their most distinctive religious character. 
Religious experience, as intended here, is the special 
kind of intuition which the experient believes to be produced 
by divine agency and to constitute a veritable communion with 
a divine being. 41 
In the Ingersoll Lectures two methods of grounding immor-
tality in religious experience are exemplified. 1) Through re-
ligious exp erience, it is said, God reveals Himself as a trust-
worthy God who will never fail t o provide man with life and op-
portunity. 2) The mystic42 has an experience which, it is 
claimed, implies that his individuality is a fundamental form 
of existence. 
a. Mystical Ground of Confidence in God. 
Gordon s ays, 
The intelligent Christian believes in immortality, 
not primarily because he thinks it is true, or hopes 
it may be true, or sees no reason why it should not 
be true; but because he feels that somehow he has 
reached the mind of God upon the que s tion. He has 
carried his case to the Hi ghest, and has h~g the ver-
dict of the Hi ghest returned in his favor. 
41 Cf. above , 99-100. 
42 Mystic me~ns here anyone who has religious expe r ience. 
43 Gordon, I NT, 110. 
Horr thinks the belief "that actually influences us'! is 
the resultant of instinct and experience and insight 
into the character of God and the worth of personal-
ity, confirmed, enlarged, and strengthened by the 
:Master of all the problems of the Spirit. 44 
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In so far as religious experience does support the belief in tru 
trustworthy character of God, it is evide Ece for · immortality. 
But the belief in a good God by no means rests on religious 
experience alone, so that the argument from the character of 
God to immortality can be better evaluated in the discussion of 
theism.45 
b. Fichte's 1zystical Argument. 
The second argument appears in the Lectures as it was 
formulated by Fichte, and is introduced by Brightman.46 It 
is Fichte's contention that in mystical experience the indi-
vidual finds himself in the life of God, and bearing such a 
rela tion to that life as a whole that his eternal existence 
is assured. The mystical experience which Fichte describes 
is the conscious merging of the individual into God until he 
becomes aware that his activity is really God's activity, that 
he is a determination of God's very being. The question may 
be raised whether this individuality may be but a passing phase 
of the divine life. But Fichte r eplies, 
This diremption into a system . . . of egos or in-
dividuals is a part of the ... diremption of the ob-
jective world in the form of infinity, and thus belongs 
---·---------- - ·- -
44 Horr CFE, 42-43. 
45 See below, 143-169. 
46 Brightman, IH( , 44-45. 
to the absolute fundamental f onn of existence which is 
not to be annulled even by deity itself. As being was 
d ivided within deity, so it remains divided into all 
eternity . Hence nothing posited by t his diremp t!Qn, 
no really developed individual, can ever perish. '1 
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In so far a s this argument depends u p on the p eculiar form of 
idealism represented by Fichte, it would probably not have for 
the Le cturers nor f or most think ers oi' t he present generation , 
more than h istorical interest. But included in Fichte's argu-
ment is a much more universal element. Mystical experience 
always g ives a sense of a strong mutual bond between the indi-
vidual man and God. In the experience of some raystics t he 
bond seems so strong that man and God are identifi ed as essen-
tially one. But wheth er or not the religious intuition goes so 
far, it greatly streng thens, if it is trustworthy, t he grounds 
for belief in inrruortality. For it opposes the conception of 
t h e human p ersonality as a mere accidental epiphenomenon and 
favors the view that human consciousness is so closely related 
to t h e eternal God t hat the relation is a guarantee of the 
eternity of t he human personality. 
c. The Monistic Tendency of J.i[ysticism. 
We have jus t noted t hat the stronger the bond between 
t h e individual and God the be tter is t h e reason for behi.eving 
in human i mmortality. J3ut on t he oth er hand, the stronger 
this bond t h e more essential is the unity of man a nd God, 
and t h e ~ore pTobable i s the .mere accidental character of the 
47 Quoted, ibid. 
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divi ~ ion between them which detennines the individual ity or 
man. The mys tical experience, then, would seem to s p eak in 
favor of t:~e survival of whs.t is essential in the human per-
sonality bu t would also suggest t he view that separate indi-
v iduality is not essential. In short, rrysticism tends toward a 
monistic view of immortality. The history of mys ticism s up-
ports t h is analysis of its implications. 
4. The Presuppositions of Religious Experience. 
a. Religious Experience and Intuition. 
Sinc e r elig ious experience is intuition , t h e use of it 
as evidence raises, of course, t h e issues which we have al-
ready found to be implied by arg'wnents from intuition general-
ly, viz., the question whether values are objective and the 
question whether an idealistic metaphysics is true.48 
b. The Special Implications of Religious Experience. 
But since religious experience is a special kind of 
intuition, having its ovm characteri stic references and noi'!l-IS, 
it has also i mplications not necessarily connected with other 
fo iT11S of intuition. Obviously, any inference from religious 
exp erien ce to imn1ortality must presupp ose the existence of a 
divine being with whom men may actually have comnmnion. It 
must assume further that there are available norms for deter-
mining what experiences are instances of such c ommunion. The 
myst ical argUJnent for immortality, then, assumes the truth of 
48 See above, 103-104. 
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theism and the objectivity of a special kind of values, viz., 
religious values. 
C. Conclusions. 
1. Intuition and Revelation Favor Lmmortality. 
We have seen that intuition and revelation lend power-
ful psychological support to belief in inm1ortality. Vfu en man 
approaches most closely his highest ideals, whether moral or 
relig ious, 49 he is most often and most vividly aware of in-
tuitive evidence for immortality. The validity of inference 
from such data to i mmortality must depend on their coherence 
wi t h each other and with all other relevant data. The rela-
tions between them and man's moral a nd relig ious ideals, al-
ready indicated, do seem to be instances of s uch coherence. 
2. They Ought to Be Rationally Criticized. 
But the investigation must be carried much further. 
For however true may be t h e testimony of in t uition and h owever 
justifiable a ma n 's reliance upon his own intuitive exp eri-
ences, t he g rounds of his assurance remain incommunicable , 
even to himself a t later times,5° until he relates these evi-
dences to other experiences. If they cannot be so related, 
a belief ba sed solely upon intuition cannot be and ought not 
to be long mai ntained. For truth is one and its only mark of 
49 There are, of course, other ideals, but these are the 
onl y ones which have thus far been shown to be relevant. 
50 Cf. Clark, ICI, 7. 
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identification is comprehensive and systematic unity.51 The 
arunission to belief of judgments not bearing this sign will 
result in t lle confusion of dreams with reality and turn the 
h ouse of reason into an asylum of delusions. 
3. The Presuppositions of These Arguments. 
We have now traced the presuppositions of the arguments 
from intuition and revelation. We have f ound that all such 
a rguments imply an idealistic metaphysics and the objectivity 
of value. 1'he arguments from revelation were found to pre-
suppose, in addition, the truth of theism and the i nclusion of 
religious values runong t hose posse s sing objectivity. The 
i s sues raised by t hese discoverie s , as well as others, must, 
of co urse, be exe.ra ined in turn before our task is completed. 
51 Cf. below, 246 - 249 , 251. 
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CILA.PTER SIX 
PRAGMA.TIC ARGUMENTS 
Two :frequently recurring argmne nts are of the pragmatic 
type. The first is based on the desirability of immortality,l 
and the second on the usefulness of belief in imrnortality. 
A. Is Immortality Desirable? 
1. Some Kinds Would Not Be. 
a. Some Traditional Conceptions. 
As soon as the question whether immortality is desirable 
is asked, there leap to the mind some traditional conceptions 
of a future life which would not be desirable. 
1) Shades. 
Probably we should so regard the conception of shad es 
held by certain peoples of antiquity. Achilles is represented 
in Homer's Odys~ as saying that he would prefer to be a 
hired servant of a poor man on earth rather than to be ruler 
over all the dead in the shadowy realm of their existence. 2 
C. H. Moore says, 
1 Desirable and desired must again be carefully distin-
guished. Actual desire for Drrmortality has already been dis-
cussed. See above, 35-41. That is desirable which ought to be 
desired, i. e., which contains and produces more of value than 
of disvalue. 
2 Odyssey, XI, 488-492. 
Such a future world could have no moral or 
other value; it cou~d only_hang over men as a gloomy 
prospect of that wh1ch gwa1ted them when t h e suns of 
this world forever set. 
Some early Hebrew notions were similar.4 
2) The Election of a Few. 
Neither ought we to desire the future prophesied by 
those who hold the doctrine of election as Gordon describes 
it: 
The theory in question draws a circle, larger 
or smaller as the case may be, within which, at most, 
is gathered an insignificant minority of the human 
beings who have lived upon the earth , over which the 
saving purpose of God extends, but beyond which to 
the countless millions wgo exist there he is compas--
sionless and implacable. 
A future life which implies the eternal misery of hosts of 
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men and t h e irmmorality of God would contain more disvalue than 
value. Such a life has undoubtedly been desired by many per-
sons, who, of course, have expected to be runong the elect, and 
is so desired by some today, but such desire is irrational and 
in:n:noral. 
3) Heaven Conditioned by Eternal Hell. 
And even if men's eternal destiny were determined by 
merit or a ny other principle, Dickinson's judgment would 
seem morally sound when he says, 
3 C. H. Moore, PII, 9-10. 
4 Cf. Horr, CFE, 7-9, vn1ere several Old Testament passages 
are cited. 
5 Gordon, I NT, 78 . 
Would an i n@ortality involving both heaven 
a nd hell be more desirable than extinction? From 
the humanitarian point of view, which is now so 
prevalent, and with which I, at any rate, have no 
intention of quarrelling, I believe most men would 
reply that extinction would be better. Most good 
men who might with reason exp ect heaven, would, I 
suspect, prefer to resign it if they can only have 
it on condition that others--go matter t h ough they 
be wicked--are enduring hell. 
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If t h e last statement quoted is not true, it -vvould seem to be 
only beca use most g ood men have not learned to judge the 
t -u ture life by as h igh ethical standards as t h ey employ wi th 
reference to t h is world.? 
4) Purposeless :Monotony. 
Charles R. Brown quotes from Willi~n Adruas Brown the 
following 'IWrcls: 
How empty and shal l ow t h e heaven to which we 
have often been ask ed to look forward! A h eaven of 
untroubled bliss with nothi ng to achieve, and nothing 
~o ant icipate; a h eaven freed trom suffering indeed, 
but freed also from the struggle of which suffering 
is born; a heaven i n wrncn there is nothing to do but 
to enjoy year arter year, aeon after aeon, a monoto-
nous eternity.8 
The Ingersoll Lecturer adds, "From all such heavens, Good 
Lord deliver us!"g No more need be said. 
b. Eternal Senility. 
Dickinson says, 
There are those who simply do not want to die, 
6 Dickinson, IID, 22-23. 
7 Cf. Gordon, I NT, 63-80. 
8 c. R. Brown, I.A, 27, from W. A. Brovm, TCH, 18 . 
g Brown, LA, 27. Cf. Dick inson, IID, 27. 
and whose desire for im.mortality is merely the ex-
pression of this feeling. Old people, so far as I 
have observed, often cling in this way to life, 
more often, indeed, than the young. Yet if they 
could put it fairly to themsel,ves, they would, 'I 
suppose, hardly say that they would wish to go on 
forever in this life6 with all their infirmities in-creasing Upon them.l 
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Probably it would be generally agreed that an infinite pro-
longation of weak, painful, and confused senility would be un-
desirable. 
c. Arrested Development. 
Dickinson goes further and says, 
To arrest any period of life, even the best, 
the most glorious youth, the most triumphant man-
hood, is what no reasonable man will rightly de-
sire. To the values of life, at any rate as we know 
it now, the change we call growing older seems to be 
essential; and we cannot wisely wish to arrest that 
process anyvn1ere this side of death.ll 
In so far as "growing older" means temporality, striving, and 
progress, Dickinson would seem to be on sure ground. But in 
so far as it means decline in bodily a nd mental vigor, it 
would appear to be by no means essential to value experience. 
Brown's statement, though figurative, is clearer: 
The life of one dime11sion, namely length, even 
though that length were endlessly prolonged, would 
not enlist our interest. The life desired must have 
in it the height of unflagging and unfulfilled aspira-
tion, the breadth of interest and of a ction made pos-
sible by growth and advance, the depth of conviction 
and of DUrpose needed to sustain this fullness of 
b . 12 e1ng. 
10 Dickinson, IID, 15. 
11 Ibid., 16. 
12 Brown, LA, 29. 
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2. As Otherwise Conceived It Woul d Be Hi ghly Desirable. 
a . Progressive Achievement of Value. 
If conceptions of immortality were limited to such 
cramped and unattractive ones as those defined above, the ar -
gumen ts froTI the desirability of immortality would be unworthy 
of further consideration. But the immortality described by 
some of the Lecturers is of a quite different character.l3 
If immortality is to be worthy of desire, according to Brown, 
There must be opportunity for self-expression in 
worthy action, for the i nterchange of finer forn1s 
of influence in a vast fellowsh i p of soul s, for 
progress in all those line-s of development vvhich 
bring the sense of worth and p eace . ~men the fu-
ture world is thus co nceived , we may believe that 
the number of those who would draw back reluctant 
to enter upon such a state would become negligible.l4 
And this is the i mmortality in which Brovm believes .15 Fenn ' s 
conception is similar: 
The religious view of life pre s ents itself to 
me as the endless pursuit of an ever a dvancing goal, 
that is what God's purpose for us means, that pur- · 
po se never is fulfilled, the process of self-reali-
zation is never complete, when death comes, but 
God's p ur pose carries over the physical experience 
and man keeps on forever.l6 
The main problem of Dickinson's Lecture is t h e very question 
now under discussion, viz., Is immortality desirable? He 
concludes his discussion of this problem as follows: 
13 Hone of the Lecturers who advocate belief in immortality 
describe it as similar to any of the conc eptions wh ich have 
been designa ted above as undesirable. 
14 Bro\¥11, LA, 29. 
15 Ibid., 30, 57-58 . 
16 Fenn, IAT, 35. 
To sum up, then, the immortality which I hold 
to be desirable, and which I suggest to you as de-
sirable, is one in which a continuity of experience 
analogous to that which we are aware of here is 'car-
ried on into a life after death, the ess ence of that 
life being the continuous unfolding, no doubt through 
stress and conflict, of those potentialities of Good 
of which we are awi?e here as the most significant 
part of ourselves. 
It seems that this co nclusion could not be denied except by 
one who denied that life could ever hold a net balance of 
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value. For even if our present life is believed to hold more 
of disvalue than of value, yet if at any time, however dis-
tant, the progress of the immortal hurnani ty envisaged by 
Dickinson were to achieve a favorable balance of value, there 
would be all eternity in which to malce up the deficit of past 
ages and to build an ever-increasing margin of good. A pessi-
mism so thoroughgoing as to deny such a possibility nowhere 
appears in the Ingersoll Lectures unless it be in the philoso-
phy of Schopenhauer, as presented by Brightman. And it is 
doubtful whether even he would go so far, seeing that the 1-Tir-
vana in which he believes is "the flower which proceeds from 
t~'le constant victory over the will. ul8 It would probably be 
impossible to justify rationally a final pessimism in conjunc-
tion with the belief in everlasting progress. 19 We may con-
clude, therefore, that any i rnnortality which included the con-
tinual net increase of values would be highly desirable. 
17 Diclcinson, IID, 45. 
18 ~uoted from The World as Will and Idea, Brightman, IPK, 
55. 
19 Even without the belief in everlasting progress it is dif 
ficult enough. See Brightman, IPK, 56. 
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b. Monistic Immortality Might Be Desirab l e. 
A special question arises with reference to monistic 
conceptions of immortality. Would it be desirable "that the 
individual self should somehow be taken up into a larger World-
self"20 which lives eternally? Dickinson replies, 
If it be meant that our self should be absorbed 
in another, so as to lose its identity and conscious-
ness, then I cannot see in that anything go od or de-
sirable. But if it were possible to be included in a 
larger self without losing one's own self, so that one 
could say "I am somehow that self" the~1for aught I know, that might be good a nd the best. 
The absorption in which Dickinson finds nothing desirable is 
not linmortality at all, as we have defined immortality. 22 On 
the other hand, h is description of the monistic existence 
which might be good is almost identical with our definition of 
the monism which alone should be cal led be l ief in i mmortality? 
And t his corresponde nce is what we should expect. Our origi-
nal definition of immortality requires the continuance of 
whatever is found to be essential to personality. ~he desira-
bility of the future existence requires that it should bear an 
excess of value over disvalue, a nd so far as we can conceive, 
value has meaning onl y in relation to personality. 
we may conclude, then , that a monistic immortality would 
be desirable if it implied a balance of value. ~iliether it 
would be more or less desirable than a pluralistic form is a 
20 Dickinson, IID, 44. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See above, 15-16 and 21-22. 
23 See above, 22-23. 
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question which we are not called upon to answer.24 
o. Relevance of Desirability to Truth. 
We have concluded that immortality as sometimes con-
ceived would be highly desirable. What bearing has this evalu-
ation upon the question whether i mmortality is true? 
a. Many Desirable Objects Do Not Exist. 
It -seems precarious to argue that because the truth of a 
given proposition appears to our best judgment as desirable, 
the proposition must therefore be actually true. Would it not 
be highly desirable that by the end of 1935 all the peoples of 
t h e earth should have resolved their hatreds, cemented uni-
versal bonds of friendship, a nd established means of intelli-
-gent co~peration for the benefit of all mankind? Unfortunately 
the desirabi l ity of such a state of affairs is not convL1cing 
evidence that it will exist. There are few things for which 
an i~telligent and good man ought to be willing to give more 
than for the realization of such international concord within 
the year. But, the world being what it is, there are few 
things which he will be more certain will not occur. 
b. Optimism and Theism. 
If one assumes an ultimately optimistic view of the 
world, however, t he kind of desirability possessed by immor-
tality would seem as nearly final evidence for its truth as 
24 Cf. below, 226 . 
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one could wish. The long-range optimist may sadly admit that 
the nations will not have achieved lasting peace by the end of 
1935, and yet believe that the good is progressively and eter-
nally triumphant. But one who a&nits that the personalities 
which are the sole bearers of values achieved on this earth are 
destined to ultimate extinction has no right to call himself 
an optimist, at least so far as any values known to men are 
concerned. And the more precious he deems the values of life 
on earth to be while they endure, the more gloomy is the pes-
simism in which he finally enshrouds all. 1\fow the theist, as 
Fenn explains, is a long-range optimist. 
Believing in God, he must needs think worthily 
of the world and of man its, as yet, h~gnest product. 
Notwithstanding all that seems not so, he cherishes 
.. un~Y-nd94"1 G·Qla.£.i~.ence that highest good is highest 
truth and waits humbly and happily for the working out 
of God's good purpose, well a.ssured that where that 
purpose reigns nothing of spiritual and universal 
worth is too good to be true, nothi ng. How good immor-
tality vrould be, we say to ourselves wistfully when 
we think of young and promising lives cruelly ended 
on the ghastly battlefields or in the hospitals of the 
war, of broken friendships and frustra ted hopes,--how 
good! and with reverent humility one who believes in 
God replies--yes, too good not to be true!25 
It is not, however, simply the value of in~ortality which 
makes it a corollary of optimistic theism. It is, as has been 
pointed out, the indispensability of immortality to the contin-
uance and increase of any and all goods known to man. 
Further discussion of theism and i rnrnortali ty must be 
postponed until we reach the chapter on theism. It is s uffi-
25 Fenn, IAT, 40-41. 
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cient at present to have shown that the argument from the 
desirability of immortality is valid only if an eventual op -
timism, such as theism, for example, is assumed. 
B. Is Belief in Immortality Useful? 
1. The Disvalues of Belief. 
J:Tone of the Ingersoll Lecturers contend that irrnnortal-
ity, if true, wo uld be an evil, while many, and perhaps all, 
think that it would be a good. In discussion of the a.rgu-
ments concerning the desirabi :Li ty of immortality, consequently, 
we have had to criticize only arguments favorable to im.mor-
tality. Tiut we now have to consider arguments both for and 
against in~ortality based on t he good or the evil results of 
belief in it. For at least one Lecturer26 thinks that the 
belief in immortality ha.s produced more evil than good. The 
evidence favoring h is contention will be presented first. 
a. Cruelty for Fear of the Dead. 
An authority on primitive human society, James George 
Frazer, says, 
The state of war, which normally exists between 
many if not most, neighboring savage tribes, springs 
in large measure directly from their belief in immor -
tality; since one of the co.mr:1onest motives for hostil -· 
ity is a desire to app ease the angry ghosts of fri e~ds, 
who are supposed to have perished by the baleful a:T-ts 
of sorcerers in another tribe, and who, if vengeance 
is not inflicted on their real or imaginary murderers, 
will wreak their fury on their undutiful fellow-tribes -
men .•.• The religious wars and persecutions . which 
distracted and devastated Europe for ages, were only 
26 Kirsopp Lake. See below, 129. 
t h e c i vilized equivalents of the bat tle s and murders 
wh ich the f ear of ghosts has instigated amongs t al -
most all races of savages of whom we p os s ess a record. 
Regarded from t h is p oint of view, the fed th i n a life 
hereafter has been sown like dragons' teeth on the 
earth and has brought forth crop after crop of armed 
men, who have turned their swords against each other.27 
These horrors need, h owever, to be seen in their proper hie-
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torical perspective. Frazer himself shows that the efforts to 
propit~ate the dead by vengeance and even by the sacrifice of 
persons held dear marked an advance from a state of society in 
which a belief in sorcery as the universal cause of death re-
sulted in even more of cruelty. For terrible as are the hor-
rors i nflicted in the name of departed spirits, 
Yet if we could reckon up the myriads who have been 
slain in sacrifice to ghosts and gods, it seems prob-
able that they would fall far short of the untold mul -
titudes who have perished as sorcerers and witches . .. 
. But t here a re strong rea sons for i nferring that i n 
t h e h istory of society a n Age of M:ag ic preceded an Age 
of Religion. If that was so, we may con cl ude t hat the 
a dvent of religion ... inaugurated an era of what might 
b e described a s mercy by c omparis~g wi t h t h e relent-
les s severity of its predece s s or . 
However, these considerations do not refute t he charge against 
belief in i mmortality . If t he bes t t hat t h e defense ca n offer 
is evidence t ha t t h is b elief has less cruel effects t han some 
othe r notions which preceded it, the rea sonable i nference 
would seem to be that it would be wel l for so ciety to g ive up 
t h e belief in i nnnortality, t h ough wi th due care to escap e f a ll-
i ng i n to othe r a nd even more vicious doctrines. 
27 Fr a zer, MGI, 409-410 . 
28 Ibid., 353. 
b. The Diversion of Energy and Wealth from Present Heed. 
The indictment has by no means been completed. 
When we consider further the gratuitous and 
wa.s teful des truction of property as well as of life 
which is involved in s a crifices to t he dead , we ~ust 
a&.1it that, with all its advantages, the b elief in 
i mmortality has entailed heavy economical losses up-
on the races--and they are p r actica lly all the races 
of t he ~8rld--who have i ndulged in t h is dear-bought 
luxury. 
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Moreover, think of the energy, skill, and weal th spent, through 
t h e ages, in the effort to secure peace a nd b l essing in another 
world! Some of these r esources have, of course, served man's 
life here, even while intended for the purchase of future 
bliss. But often they have been p ermanently removed from the 
sphere of earthly life. In the early centuries of Christian-
ity, for example, 
rvren were ex-_p ecting the End, and in such a frame of 
mind t hey were co ncerned not with civilization but 
with saving their own souls .... And at the close of 
the year 1000 a panic seized men's minds, the land 
was left untilled, business neglected, culture de -
spised, and the chur ches were thronged with men and 
women seeking to escape from the wrath to come.3 
The resulting poverty, hunger, disillusioned despair, and 
social decadence must be charged to a form of the belief in 
i mmorta.li ty. Nor has the turning of g oods from man's earth-
ly needs to his heavenly aspirations ceased. Many millions 
of dollars worth of property are today used for worship in 
which the belief in i mmortality is u ndoubtedly an essential 
29 Frazer, MGI, 410. 
30 Falconer, IAC, 22-23. 
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element, while multitudes of human beings lack shelter and 
food. 
In view of such facts as have been pointed out, Kirsopp 
Lake does not deplore what he thinks is a growing disbelief. 
He says, 
It has raised rather than lowered the standard 
of life. The pursuit of individual Lmmortality con -
sunled a lamentable mnount of energy in past genera-
tions. To attain salvation was thought to be the ob-
ject of existence. This life was held to be in the 
main a preparation for another. Somet h 1es it was 
thought of as a wretched period full of temp tations 
and mi series, to be lived through as well as possi-
ble, valuable only because success in withstanding 
temp tation and enduring misery would secure eternal 
happiness. Those who thought most narrowly in this 
way were considered to be the best. It is not alto-
gether surprising that people who argued in this way 
contributed little to the improvement of the world 
and that those who managed its affairs very rarely 
had any claim to saintliness of t hought or fineness 
of insight .... In place of a quest for Immortality 
there is today among the most active and virile of 
our contemporaries a new attitude toward life ..•. 
The object of their work is in their minds the im-
provement of the world in which our children are to 
live. It is an unselfish object, a nd the pursuit of 
a better world for another generation to inherit has 
become the surrogate for the hope of a better world 
above for ourselves to enj oy.31 
c. The Fear of Punishrnent. 
Another evil produced by belief in iw~ortality is the 
fear of punishment hereafter. Educators and psychologists are 
emphasizing the importance of freedom from fear, for the hap-· 
piness and wholesomeness of the individual personality. Eut 
teachers of the doctrine of i mmortality have tried for cen-
31 Lake, I Jlil11 , 22-23. 
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turies to instill into the minds of all people, especially the 
young, a fear more terrible and lasting than any other, viz., 
the fear of eternal torture in the hands of an angry God. Now 
all the horror, the nightmares of children, the anguished de-
spair of the dying, the demoralizing fear of the thousands who 
have dreaded to face the Judgment, caused by this doctrine of 
Hell, must be charged against a belief in immortality. The 
fear of Hell has not, it is true, been an unmixed evil. For 
there is little doubt that it has in great numbers of lives 
acted as a powerful deterrent from wrongdoing. But there can 
be no doubt that it has often been most vivid and overwhelming 
in the lives of innocent but timid and i maginative souls in 
whom it could do no good but has only provoked to paralyzing 
despair or even insanity. It is a heavy responsibility which 
must be borne by those who teach a doctrine so productive of 
needless suffering. But we must look at the other side of the 
ledger before concluding what is the total effect of belief in 
imraortali ty. 
2. The Values of Belief. 
a. Respect for Human Personality. 
It is impossible for a man preceded by hundreds of 
generations of believers in immortality to determine how 
largely the belief has contributed to man's confident and 
self-reliant assumption of his own superiority to all that he 
surveys. But it must have been of tremendous importance. In 
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so far as man's attitude of superiority has made him cruel and 
improvident in his dealings with the creatures under his p ower, 
t h e results, of course, are evil. But in his co nduct toward 
the animals man has probably been most of~en influenced by his 
belief in immortality to move towar d a moral superiority and 
condescending magnani1:n i ty. The p sychologist we l l knows that 
it is the man who feels inferior who is most likely to revert 
to cruel barbarism. ltToreover, man's assumption of superiority 
has i n creased his daring for conquests over nature, and has so 
been productive of great good. And in this connection we are 
told by !•fackenzie, 
It is no trifling and neg l igible fact, but cen-
tral to t he whole history of this p rocess, t h is visi-
ble conquest of physical nature, that the same mind, 
thus v ictori ous, has from the earliest days refused to 
believe that the death of the body ends the existence 
of the living, thinking self. The same mind at the 
s ame time and in the service of the sar,le fundamental 
qualities of intelligent self-preservation and ever-
widening prevision, has cherished along with its ma2~ery 
of nature the invincible conviction of immortality. 
Even more important is the effect up on man's relation to man. 
The doctrin·e of immortality makes of ea ch Han a being worthy 
of respect and of treatment as an eternal end and not as a 
means only, to be used a nd cast away. Whatever the historical 
perversions to which the b elief has contributed, its own logic 
is set against war a nd exp loitation, in favor of .Jesus' "golden 
rule" and Kant's "categorical imperative," and in the long run 
it must impel men toward these nobler principles of action. 
32 Mackenzie, MC I, 39. 
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The belief i n i mmortality has, then,. been p roduc t ive 
of much good and is de~ti ned to produce much more, by increa s-
ing man·~ self-resp ect a nd his regard for other human being s. 
b. Incentives to Goodness. 
Moreover, it will hardly be denied tha t the bel ief in a 
f ut ure life the character of which is somehow dep endent on 
conduct in this one has been and is a p o·werful incentive to 
go od f or grea t numbers of p eople, an incen tive which probably 
few p ers ons a l t ogether escap e. It is t he more important 
because alr11 ost invariably coupled with belief in a God or 
g ods who see everywh ere and ca nnot be deceived and it is 
t herefore often op era tive unde r circumstances vn1ere human 
puni slliuents a nd rewards are ineffective. It is true t hat 
merely 
To frighten p eop le into ethical action by t hrea ten-
ing them with eternal punishment is a poor and inef-
ficacious way of inf l uencing t h em.33 
But it is p oor and inefficacious chiefly because of its in-
credible exaggeration and one-sided emphasis. The belief in 
a life continuous with this one a nd dependent on it in so1.;.1e 
such way as all our f uture is dependent up on our past is, 
where held, neither p oor nor inefficacious any n1ore than is a 
reasonable expectation of long life on earth strongly affected 
to the end by conduct now and in the future. Rather, the 
very length of the fut ure life contemplated renders it the 
33 Ostwa ld, IAI, 73. 
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richer and more effective, the degree of its po tency depend-
ing, of course, on the a ssurance with which it is held. 
c. The Substitution of Hope for Despair. 
Probably t h e greatest benefit of belief in bm1ortality 
is the giving of hope to multitudes confronted by death and 
bereavement. To most men it offers the onl y effective solace 
in the time of sorrow, and even those who spurn it in other 
day s frequently try to embrace it when their hearts are 
weighted with grief. The good which it has accomplished by 
steadying a nd cheering m~n in their darkest ho urs when most 
comforters have fled is simply incalculable.34 
It should be noticed also that most believers in Hell 
have thought it to be escapable, while annihilation, which to 
many is nearly a s fearful as Hell , is knovvn to be i nescapable 
unless i ramortality is true. The doctrine of immortality has, 
t hen, for all who held it, even when it included the belief 
in eternal Hell, removed the fe a r of inescapable annihilation, 
and substituted, in the minds of most believers, the hope of 
Heaven, a nd in the minds of most of the "unsaved" remai nder, 
t h e fear of an escapable Hell. 35 
34 Cf. Ma ckenzie, TlWI , 39; and Bi xler, IP1\1T, 1-3, 23-27. 
35 The doctrine of election, it is true, would logically 
mak e Hell inescapable for the many, but those who took the 
belief seriously generally c~~e to conside r themselves among 
t h e elect. 
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d. Faith in the Permanence of Values Created. 
Another great contribution of the belief in immortality 
is the establisrunent of a corollary, the faith in the perma-
nence of the personal values so laboriously and painfully cre-
ated in this life. This faith adds an incalculable sum of 
dignity and worth to all present noble endeavor. The ulti-
mate social ends for which men strive are not but the phan-
toms of a day, if immortality be true. They are living monu-
ments which will never perish, but rather accumulate and pro-
duce increasing value forever. The resulting difference in 
man's outlook is comparable to the difference between the 
attitude of a molder of mud and a sculptor in marble. 
e. Support to Faith in God. 
The only other doctrine which has had effects comparable 
to those flowing from belief in everlasting life is theism. 
It is true that the belief in a personal God has produced dis-
values too, and to weigh the values and disvalues of theism in 
detail would take us beyond the reasonable limits of the 
present study. But probably most readers will agree that on 
the whole the belief in a personal God has been useful and 
that the evil effects tend to disappear as belief becomes more 
intelligent. We shall find in the next chapter that the be-
lief in immortality gives almost indispensable support to 
theistic faith. 36 All the values produced by the latter will 
36 See below, 160-169. 
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t h en be seen to be due in part to t h e log ical and p sy ch ological 
1 strength i mparted to it by the former. 
3 . Evaluation of Belief. 
Th e time has now come for a bala ncing of t h e values and 
disva lues of belief in immortality, in order to determine so 
far a s possible whether on the whole it is useful. 
a. Disvalues of Less Intelligen t Beliefs 
Irrelevant to t h e Pragmatic Te s t Under Considera tion. 
One f a ct ought to be noted a t the out s et, namely t hat the 
disvalues emphasized by Lake a nd others belong for t he most 
part to the less intelligent forms of bel ief which are in any 
event clearly inacceptable and so not at issue in the Ingersoll 
Lectures nor in the p resen t discussion. None of t h e Lecturers 
support a view of the future life which would issue in p ropi-
tiation of t h e dead by cruel barba rism or bloody sacrifice. 
And none a dvocate the belief in eternal d~~nation which has 
g iven rise to s uch horrible fears as have been describe d in 
anoth er paragraph . So long a s belief is associated with re-
lig ious worsh ip, it will p robably help to draw energy and 
wealth from other pursuits to t h e religious life. But none of 
the Lecturers would advocate t h e extreme forms of otherworld-
liness vn1ich have be en hostile to worthwhile pursuits in this 
life. 
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b. Intelligent Belief Provides a Large Balance of Value. 
Although many needs of men here and now are great, 
probably the most pressing is the cultivation of a practical 
idealism sufficiently strong to secure a just distribution of 
the abundance which humanity is now able to produce. To be-
begin this cultivation by ceas ing those religious activities 
which more than any other experiences have served to remind 
man of a vocation higher than a bestial scramble for plunder. 
would seem scarcely wise. Moreover, man's "life is more than 
meat.n37 The aesthetic, intellectual, moral, social, and 
r eligious values produced by the resources devoted to intelli-
gently directed religious institutions will compare favorably 
with values produced by other investments. 
We may conclude, then, that such intelligent belief in 
immortality as we find at issue in the Ingersoll Lectures p ro-
vides a large balance of positive value. 
4. Usefulness and Truth. 
But what bearing has the usefulness of a belief on its 
truth? 
a. Some Useful Beliefs Are Untrue. 
The mere fact that a belief is useful does not prove it 
true. Frazer shows, e. g., how the fear of ghosts in some 
primitive tribes not only 
37 Luke 12:23. 
has operated directly to enhance the sanctity of 
hwnan life by deterring the cruel, the passionate, 
and the malignant from the shedding of blood, 
but "it has operated also indirectly to bring about the s ame 
salutary result." 
For not only does the hag-ridden murderer himself 
dread his victim's ghost, but t h e whole community 
dreads it also and believes itself endangered by 
t h e murderer's p resence, since the wr athful spirit 
whi ch pursues him may turn on other people and rend 
them. Hence society has a strong motive for seclud-
ing, banishing, or exterminating the culprit in or-
der to free itself from what it believes to be an 
inw~inent danger, a perilous pollution, a contagion 
of death.38 
J3ut we should not believe tha t the salutary effects of the 
primitive belief in the haunting of living men by vengeance-
craving ghosts was proof t hat the belief was true. Numerous 
instances could be cited of useful beliefs which are untrue. 
b. · Usefulness :tro Substitute for Truth. 
Clark would like to substitute the question of useful-
ness for t h e problem of truth. He asks, 
Should we ask whether t h ese doctrines are abso-
lutely true or f a lse, or should we a sk whether they 
are psychologically ~atisfactory t o the p eople who 
have faith in them?3 
And h i s answer in favor of the psychological and h istorical 
question is clearly i mplied in the context. But the dilemma 
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whi ch h e offers is like the following: Should we ask how long 
t h e nova which has recently flashed forth in the constellation 
38 Frazer, :rviGI, 383. 
39 Clark, I CI, 25. 
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Hercules will retain its p resent brill iance, or should we ask 
whether the people who think it will always do so are happy 
in their ill-supported faith? Of course one may do either, 
but the problems are completely different. One cannot substi-
tute psychology for astronomy or history for metaphysics, 
though, of course, one may pursue or neg1ect any of these 
studies a s he pleases. 
c. The Will to Believe No Solution of a Problem of Trut h . 
A somewhat different form of t h e sa.rne fundamental con-
fusion is represented in the follovving passage from Dole, in-
spired by his study of William James: 
We tend to believe in a thing if, without fatal 
drawbacks, it is go od for use. We believe in most hu-
man propositions on this basis. We believe, for ex-
ample, in the monogamous family, in popular education, 
or in t h e democratic t h eory of government. We follow 
a good clew as far as it will carry us. So in prac-
tical conduct, we follow the hope of iw~ortality. It 
not only makes the hannony or unity which we need in 
our thinking,40 but, better yet, it fits into practice 
at once and goes to make life effective and whole.41 
Jrunes himself says, 
If religion42 be true and the evidence £or it be 
still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your ex-
tinguisher43 upon my nature (which feels to me as if 
it had after all some business in this matter), to 
forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the 
winning side,--that chance depending, of course, on my 
willingness to run the r isk of acting as if my pas-
sional need of taking the world religiously might be 
40 The criterion implied here is coherence, which includes 
pragmatic considerations but more. Cf. below, 246-251. 
41 Dole, HOI, 49-50. 
42 As defined by James in the context, religion is nearly 
synonymous with faith in the objectivity of values. 
43 Scientific doubt. 
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. d . ht 44 prophet l C an r2g . 
The principle by which James justifies this bending of belief 
for practical purposes is as follows: 
Our passional nature not only lawfully may but 
must, decide an option between propositions, when-
ever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature 
be decided on i ntellectual grounds; for to say, under 
such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the 
question open," is itself a passional decision,--just 
like deciding yes or no,--and !g attended with t~e 
same risk of losing the truth. 
However one may disagree with James's description of the funda-
mental religious p robl em and its status in the intellectual 
life, it is difficult to gainsay the moral wisdom of his 
g enera l principle as a practical maxim. If t here seems to be 
a reasonable p ossibi l ity of immortality being true, it woul d 
follow from James's principle t hat we ought to act a s if it 
were true. For the life of a ction and of feeling , an eager 
h ope is better than a sombre fear or stolid indifference. But 
this ethical problem is not the one with wh ich we are concerned 
when we ask whether the belief in i nm1ortality is true. I may 
decide t hat it is eth ical ly better that the problem of the 
truth of i~nortality s hould be no longer considered in my own 
mind, t hat so far as possible I ought to put away all doubt 
and cultivate belief with every device known to the psychology 
44 James, WTB, 27. 
45 Ibid., 11. For a treatment of the problem whether J ames 
ma de specific application of this principle to the question of 
i mmortality, and also a munber of selections from J a...T!! es 's 
writings on immortality, see J. S . Bixler, "William James and 
Immortality," Jour. Re., 5 (1925), 378 -396. 
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of relig_ion. :But I ought not to suppose that because I have 
left a metaphysical problem of truth for an ethical problem of 
right volition I have solved the metaphysical problem. It is 
well that most people do not spend their lives in efforts to 
answer the question whether there is an everlasting future 
life for man. It would probably be ethically wrong for any 
man to devote his entire life to this particular inquiry. But 
while one is engaged in it, if he is to be so engaged e.t a l l, 
let him keep the issue clearly in mind. It is one thing to · 
ask whether I ought to load the balance of my practical judg-
ment on the side of optimistic faith in immortality. It is 
another thing to ask whether I shall actually exist a year or 
an infinite number of years after my death. 
d. But Harmony of a Belief with the Needs of 
Personal Life l[ay Be Positive Evidence for Its Truth. 
Yet the considerations raised by James and Dole may not 
be wholly irrelevant t o the problem of metaphysical truth. 
For most searchers after truth are impelled in part by the 
assmup tion that on the whole and in the long run, the truth 
will best answer the practical needs of man's life. Even the 
two Ingersoll Lecturers who most definitely deny the reason-
ableness of belief in ill1.mortali ty seem thoroughly to agree on 
the superior usefulness of truth as compared with falsehood. 
l fuen :Bixler argues that we must not allow our jud~nent on the 
question of immortality to be di started by avoidable subj ec -· 
tive factors, what reason does he give for this self-discipline; 
He says, 
. ~e have seen ~oo much harm done by ignorance 
or 1nd1fference to 1ntellectual issues not to know 
that honesty comp els us to keep abreast of our age.46 
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This statement seems to imply a faith that intellectual honesty 
and utility must eventually be agreed. Ostwald is more out .. 
sp oken: 
l\fo matter where an unprejudiced search after 
truth may lead an i nvestigator; if his work is t hat 
of an honest scientist it must and will fi nally turn 
out to be for t h e benefit of mankind.47 
There seems to be considerable empirical g round for s uch faith. 
Nan's growing knowl edge of t h e world has certainly gained on 
t he whole an increa se i n h is resources f or producing values. 
And often knowledge which a t first seemed most p ure l y thea-
retical has eventually p roved most useful. Now if t h is f a ith 
in t h e superior usefulness of truth will always p rove, in t h e 
end, to be jus tified , then the judgrilent t hat belief in i mraor-
tality is of l a sting benefit to mank ind is a considera tion 
f avorable to the truth of i mmorta lity. For if truth is more 
benefici a l t han falseh ood, t hen of t wo contrary theories (as, 
e. g ., b elief or disbelief in li~ortality ) , t h e t heory which 
proves in many times a nd p l a ces to be the more beneficial is 
more likely to be true. 
e. Implications of Belief in the Utility of Truth. 
The faith of Ostwald , a nd p erhaps of Bi xl er, would seem 
46 Bixler, I PM, 4. 
47 Ostwald, IAI, 3. 
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to i mply what we have called t he objectivity of value. 48 For 
if values are not universally valid and metaphysically rele-
vant, why should the true solution of all p roblems about real-
1 i t y final l y " turn out to be for the benefit of ma nkind " ? This 
confidence in the ult imate utility of tru th woul d also receive 
obvious supp ort from idealism49 a nd espe cially from theism, 
t h ough we have yet to lea rn whether it log ically impli e s ei-
ther idealism or theism.50 
48 See above, 104. 
49 See above, 104 , N. 24. 
50 Cf. below, 169 , 1 97-198 . 
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CHAPTER SEVE:H 
GOD A1ID r~tORTALITY 
We have seen how theism is implied sometimes by a rgu-
ments from intuition, 1 and always by arguments from revela-
tion.2 It has also been observed that theism vv-ould give det·i-
ni te form to the ul ti:mate optimism implied by pragmatism. 3 We 
have now to consider some arguments proceeding directly from 
t h e explicit avowal of theism to belief in immortality. 
A. ])oes The ism Imply Immortality? 
1. Some Lecturers Affirm an Intima te Logical Rela"L i un. 
"Faith in innnorta lity i s in its last analysis faith in 
God, 11 4 says Crothers. Other Lecturers likewise stress the 
theistic imp lica tions of belief in i mm ortality. Gordon's 
argument is built on 
tne three great postulates of the endless life,--th e 
moral p er fection of God, t he reasonableness of t he 
universe, and the worth of ex istence.5 
And even more specifically he spealcs of 
the nremise t hat is indispensable for faith in the 
futu~e life- -- conf idence in t h e character of the eter-
nal. 
l See above, 99-100. 
2 See above, 114. 
3 See above, 141-142. 
4 Croth ers, EL, 41. Cf. Cabo t, SOI, 3-4. 
5 Gordon, I NT, 105. 
6 Ibid., 80. Cf . Gal lo·way, I OI, 195-197. 
Lyman asks, 
Are our finite selves, and the system of na-
ture of which they are a part, conditioned upon a 
Cosmic Se l f ? Is finit e creative synthesis which 
characterizes huma n personality a part of a cosmic 
creative synthesis? Is the human mind, as it seeks 
t o create and conserve value, in organic re lation 
with a Cosmic Mind that is creating and conserving 
value? 7 
And he concludes that 
It is upon the grounds for an a ffirmative answer to 
these questions that a rational faith in immortality 
must finally rest.8 
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If these Lecturers a re right, then it is no accident that his-
torically t he belief in God and belief in i nLrnortali ty have 
generally app eared together. But we must examine the relevant 
implications of theism in detail. 
2. The Goodness of God. 
a. Imp lies the Conservation of Value. 
I f we believe in theism, says Dole, then we must be-
lieve tha t 
The intelligence and the power of the un iverse are 
p ledged to wo rk out a destiny worthy of t h e scale of 
the infinite thought. This is involved in the in-
tegrity of the universe, and in its rationality. The 
preposterous will not be suffered to happen. We 
could not respect a God, much less worsh ip or love 
any being, who brought ranks of creatures into exist-
ence, shared the mi ghtiest thoughts with them, in-
spired infinite hopes in them, lifted the noblest of · 
them into rapturous communion with Hi ms elf, continual-
ly unfolded their minds and hearts and disclosed the 
7 Lyman, MOS, 31-32. Cf. Dole, HOI, 39, a nd Snowden, CBI, 
163. 
8 Lyman, MOS, 31-32 . 
une~1austed capacities of their being, only to drop 
them into nothingness, as children blow their soap-
bubbles, and drop them out of the window to burst 
and vanish. Is thi§ all that God can do? We do not 
find this credible. . 
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Reduced to its lowest and most convincing terms, this argument 
states that a good God sufficiently wise and powerful to ere-
ate and order the universe in which we live cannot logically 
be supposed to produce or aid in producing all the values so 
slowly and painfully achieved in human life, only to destroy 
them. In a famous passage of The Philosophy of R?ligion, 
Harald Haffding says, 
The fundaJ:uental axior,1 of religion, that which 
expresses the innermost tendency of all religions, is 
t h e axiom of the conservation of value.lO 
The question what is the essence of religion is not 
within the bounds of our inquiry. But it does seem apparent 
that belief in the conservation of value is a logically neces-
sary inference from theism. 11 And since persons are the only 
bearers of value, the conservation of value implies the con-
servation of persons. rra ffding disagrees. He says, 
The confusion of particular definite values with 
eternal values is irreligious. Nevertheless, few re-
lig ion s are innocent of it. The religious postulate, 
in such case, runs as follows:- ·-"If the kinds and forms 
of value with which I ~a acquainted do not persist, then 
the conserva tion of value is nothing to me, or rather 
I do not admit that that which persists is value or has 
value." This egoistic form of religiosity is by no 
means rare. The belief in personal immortality is often 
9 Dole, HO I, 39. 
10 Haffding, POR, 215. 
11 The problem of determining the implications of belief in 
a finite God will be reserved for special considera tion. See 
below, l6t:/rl /,b. 
b as ed on this ground,--as though existence mi ght 
not ~~ill have a mea ning even if I were not immor-
tal! 
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However, one does not conclude from theism to imraortali ty be-
cause it is supposed that exis tence could not have a meaning 
if a g iven person were to p erish. It is r a ther because exist-
ence could not have these meanings, t h ese values which this man 
bea rs. It is true, as H5ffdi~g insists,l3 that some values 
evolve i nto others. But the whole of a specific value-evolving 
process would be cut off if t h e individual were to be annihi-
lated. And lik ewise all human line s of value evol ution woul d 
be eventually destroyed were all men ultimate ly mortal.l4 
·what could then be t h e meaning of t h e conservation of value ? 
Or, more to t h e point of our own present inquiry, wha t could 
be the meaning of God's goodness and wisdom if He were so to 
destroy all t hese val ue-evolving proce sses which He has ini-
tiated and fostered at so great a price ? 
b. Implies Better Opp ortunities Than :Hany 
Men Have in This Life. 
Moreover, the belief in a good and sovereign God would 
seem to imp ly that t h e future must hold opportunities better 
than those of their present experience for the development of 
some men. For some human lives not only ach ieve very little 
[ 12 H5~{~i~g, ~OR , 258 -259. H5ff~ing wo~ld substitute for 
belief in p ersonal i mmortality the belief in t he timelessness 
of values. See ibid., 384, and cf. above, 19-20 . 
13 Ibid., 259 . 
14 Of. ab ove, i S-20 . 
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value while enduring disproportionate toil and anguish, in 
t h is life, but have, so far as we can see, no opportunity to 
attain here a life much better than they actually experience. 
It will not do to insist that such lives exi s t for the sake of 
their appeal to the sympathy a nd generosity of others who are 
thus developed by the misery of their fellows. For if any 
maxim seems certain in ethics it is that ~ person must never 
be treated as a means on l y, but always as an end. If God can-
not be trusted to act in accordance with this principle, it is 
difficult to see what could be meant by calling Him trustworthy 
or good. If it is necessary that present miseries be expe-
rienced by the rn1fortunate in order that they themselves may 
finally enter the rich joys of an abundant life, we might not 
understand the necessity, yet we co uld conceive of the possi-
bility of such lives being created by a good God. But if death 
ends all, the character of some lives here would seem absolute-
ly inconsistent with the sovereignty of a good God.15 
c. Implies Social Justice. 
Closely related to the above argument is the contention 
that theism implies a more just distribution of rewards and 
punishments than occurs in this life. The p salmist is not the 
only man wh~ has seen "the wicked in great power, and spread-
ing hi1l1self like a green bay tree. 1116 And the righteous man 
15 The proble~ of evil is discussed at greater length below, 
160-169. 
16 Psalm 37:35. 
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is not always, like the psalmist, able to see the day when 
he can say of h is evil neighbor, "Yet h e passed away, and lo, 
h e was not: yea I sought h im, b ut he could not be round. n17 
Frequently it happens that good persons suffer innumerable 
tria, l s (s ometimes precisely because they are good and hence 
sadde ned by the wickedness a nd mi sfortunes of others whose 
degrada tion disturbs not a whit the complacency of the p roud 
egoist), and continue to suffer to t he very hour of death, 
while evil men win triumph a fter triumph by their reckless 
knavery and at a rip e old age die in exultant pride. I t is 
only in fairy tales and 11 success lf stories tha t t h e skilled 
and faithful laborer is always rewarded by being made the 
head of the f irm. He is more likely to go unnoticed or even 
unemp loyed. It is exceedingly and increa singly difficult to 
g ive any existent economic system the appearance of a just 
deity . And although man's econ omic circumstances a re not 
the sole determinative f a ctors, they do constitute an i m-
p ortant condition l h~iting the possibilities of life. Does 
injus tice, then, have the l ast word ? It would seem t hat in 
vast numbers of p ersonal histories it is so, if death is t he 
end. Only if life goes on is there a possibi l ity that the 
balance of justice is eventually restored.l8 
But the question has been raised whether a just i mmor-
tality can be conceived. And we must exarnine some of the 
17 Psalm 37:36. 
18 Cf. the eloquent passage in Brown, IA, 35-37. 
difficulties in such a concep tion. 
1) Ought Dmaortality to Be Universal or Conditional? 
I n the first p lace, the question arises whether, if 
ideal justice were t o prevail, i mmorta lity should be for all 
men or for some only. hlany wr it ers discuss i mruortality at 
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leng t h vri thout coming to any consistent view on this p roblem. 
Mathews, for example, categorically e"ffirms trill t i mmortality 
is universal, if true at all: 
If we are i mmortal, or if we become inunortal, 
it will not be because we want to, but because in a 
universe like ours we can no more heln it than we 
can help feeling warm before a fire.l~ 
But h e explains with equal clarity, if less dogmatism, that 
immortality is conditional: 
Vmether all persons will survive death would 
seem to depend up on the extent to wh ich men meet 
t h e conditio~B requisite for the development of a 
personality. 
He arrives at each of these two conclusions by the very move-
rnent of thought by which it is most frequently reached. ·when 
his a ttention is focused upon the narrow bigotry of certa in 
traditional relig io us doctrines p icturing a conditional im-
mortality, he is certain tha t such restrictions are false and 
that the universe must trea t all men alike. But when he is 
thinking of t h e specific qualities in life whi ch seem to mak e 
it ·worthy of i rr:mortali ty, 21 he finds it doubtful whether all 
1 9 Mathews, ICP, 27. 
20 Ibid. , 48-49. 
21 Cf. above, 95, and below, 18 9-198 . 
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hun1an beings develop such qualities, and so is convinced that 
inunortali ty is condi ti anal. 
Now while it seems quite impossible to reconcile the 
contre~ry conclusions reached by I;iJ:a thews, it is not difficult 
to reconcile the two points of view from which these conclu-
sions a re drawn. It ought to be readily agreed, on the one 
hand, that many of the conditions prerequisite to immortality 
according to vario us religio us doctrines are absurd. 22 On the 
other hand, it must be a dmitted t hat if all persons known 
willfully treated life as so cheap and meaningless as do some 
of our acquaintances, probably none of us should have t hought 
i moortality possible. 23 There is better reason for supposing 
some than others to b e ilmnortal. However, there does not seem 
to be any demand by an ethical ideal of justice that some men 
should be ann ihilated at death. Rather, the setting of such an 
infinitely great gulf between the fates of those men who, ac-
cording to this supposition, barel y merited immortality and 
those vn1o barely failed to do so, would seem unjust. The 
ideal of justice would suggest r a t h er a variety of circum-
stances in the future life corresponding to the var i ety of 
p ersonal worths. 
2) Should Rewards and Punishments Exist in the Future Life? 
But this suggestion, too, is fraught with difficulties. 
22 See, e. g., :Moore, PII, 32-33. 
23 Cf. above, 95 
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The doctrine that men's eternal rewards or punishments are de-
termined by their beliefs, ceremonial observances, or even 
character, in this life, is repugnant to our most highly de-
veloped moral ideals. Gordon says, 
The unrelenting assertion of the theory of a 
probation for me for this life only, coupled with 
the declarQ.tion that without the knowledge of Jesus 
Christ salvation is impossible, has told tremendous -
ly upon the sublime inclination of human beings to 
trust their JuTaker. . . . The old theodicies, whether 
of the remnant, or election, or the restriction of 
moral opportunity to this life, rend asunder the 
ethical idea of God.24 
What would be gained by a life in which virtue was rewarded 
and wickedness punished? Would the total of value in the 
universe be increased by the misery of the wicked? Not, it 
would seem, unless the misery was to lead to sufficient value 
to offset its own disvalue and leave a positive net balance.25 
3) Punishment No End in Itself. 
But what then becomes of the idea of justice? If the 
punishment is to be reforraatory in purpose, then the funda-
mental need must be, not for a balancing of rewards and 
punishments according to merit, but the bringing to bear upon 
each life those influences which will best aid in the develop-
ment of his worth. This seems to be Dole's view. He says, 
Justice demands, it is thought, that the un-
equal conditions of human life shall sometime be 
equalized. Without venturing to claim so much as 
24 Gordon, I NT, 79-80. Cf. also above, 118-119. 
25 Cf. G. F. :Moore, 1'ttET, 61. 
this, without daring to a~~ail the moral order a.s 
unjust even in this life, insisting that except 
in a moral world it is meaningless to talk of 
justice or injustice,27 we are bound to say that 
human existence at least points tovve.rd and seems 
to call for some adequate fulfilment. We see in 
each life the beginnings of the making of a person ; 
we interpret even failures and crimes into the 
terms of moral discipline; we look for an outcome· 
worthy of the cost and pain . No outcome excep t the 
final winning of personality satisfies our minds. 
We ask for no childish system of rewards; we do 
want, by a deep law of our being , to be of some use 
in the universe. The only way to be of use is 
through the growth of our personal ity. But the life 
of this world is not enough to fulfil our personal -
ity--a name to describe a sort of infinite growth.28 
4) Divine Justice Implies a Rational Society. 
The ideal of justice demands , however, not merely the 
fulfilment of individual pers onalities, but also a social 
fulfilment in which the present incoherent distribution of 
goods and ills will be seen as only a stage in a process , 
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vn1ich, as a whole, is coherent, that is, comprehensively ra-
tional. This social reQuirement is essential to the ideal of 
justice. Considered as a mere balance of reward and punish-
ment with good and evil in all the various separate individual 
lives, justice is an irrational concept. It is rational only 
as an ideal of a society which as an organic whole has co-
herent meaning. 29 It is the evolution of such a society and 
26 It will be noted that I believe it ought to be so assailed 
if this life is all. See above, 147-148. 
27 Dole seems to confuse, here, a world in which justice has 
meaning with a world in which justice universally exists. 
28 Dole, HOI, 39-40. 
29 Cf. t h e doctrine of the Kingdom of God taugh t by the 
Hebrew prophets and Jesus. 
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the oppo&nity of all men to become members of it, whi ch the 
justice of God would seem to imply. 
d. Implies Satisfaction of Human Demand for · Eternal Life. 
Again, it is argued that a go od God would not create in 
man, aDnost or quite un iversally, the expectation and desire 
for i mmo rtality, only to deny t h e a nticipated object. Brown 
say s, 
Could any man that is a father tak e h is own 
children and thrust t h em away into eternal n othing-
nes s , if it lay within his p owe r to keep them alive? 
How much les s then could He from whom the whole fam-
ily in Heaven and on earth is named! t.Iow could He 
thrust away i nto nothi ngness generati on after genera-
tion of believing and aspiring men and women in the 
very hour wg0n they were looking up to Him in confi-dent trust? 
3. Theism Implies Immortality. 
The conclusion seems justified that the bel~ef in the 
perfect goodness of the Pe rson who is t i1e ultimate Viorld-
Grounu. implies the inn:nortali ty of man. Imrrwrtali ty is doubt-
ful only if theism is doubted or if it is compromised by the 
limitation of His go odness or His power.31 Evidences f or 
theism, then, are evidences for immortality. 
30 Bro\~ , LA, 37. 
31 S ee below, 164-169. 
B. Is Theism True? 
1. Theistic Argv~ents. 
a. Epistemological. 
The epistemological argument for theism has been well 
stated by Gordon: 
If a man shoul d meet a being whose language, 
signs for thought, and s~nbols for the world were 
whol l y different from h is ovm, with absolutely no 
point of contact between them, h e would never be 
able to arrive at any knowledge of that being. Kin-
ship between t h em existing nowhere, it would be i m-
p ossible ever to come to a mutual understanding. 
They would be to one another like the stone faces 
that stare a t each other from t he opposite columns 
of some gate. It ·would be sphinx looking at sphinx 
in endless p erplex ity and everlas ting silence. In 
the same way, i f the Infinite by which man's life is 
surrounded were like this strange being , an absolute 
and eternal contras t to humanity, knowledge itself 
would be i mp ossible. One would be perraanently unable 
to discover anyth ing , to find t h ought in t he heavens 
above, or in the earth benea th; to understand the 
fi gure a nd motion of the globe, t he orbits a nd orders 
of the sta rs ; to reach any sort of science upon any 
subject whatever .... Because we do know men and 
thi ngs; because the world lends itself to thought, 
melts i n to the receptivities of sense, runs into the 
forms of t he understanding , rises into a unity that 
corresp onds to the personal unity of the soul; be-
cause t h e world is an intelligible world, we believe 
that it is a live with mind, that it is an expression 
of t h e Infinite Mind, and that in rea ding its order 
we are reaching h is plan.32 
It should be noted that the a r gument p resupposes the faith 
154 
that the ordered world of man's advancing tho ught is an objec-
tive world, ex isting independent of our knowledge. This postu-
late being assumed, the a r gument does not necessarily imply 
32 Gordon, I NT, 114-116. 
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theism, but it is favorable to it. The epistemolog ical facts 
to ·which Gordon calls attention might also be exp lained by 
other ideal istic theories, such as, e. g., a monistic idealism, 
or possibly a panpsychistic plural ism. The latter view, how-
ever, wo uld hardly account adequately for the unity of the 
world, the sense of which grows upon man as his knowledge in-
creases. On the other hand, monistic theories have difficulty 
with t h e problem of error. This problem can be solved only 
when t h e human individual is conceded some degree of separatio~ 
at least temporary separation, from the ~nole. If the essen-
tial Being of the whole is then conceived to be good, the t h e -
istic i mplications of immortality would seem to be present. 
But no argument from merely epistemological relations 
can lead logically to any inference concerning moral relations, 
hence to belief in God's goodness. And it is the goodness of 
God which has been found to imply imn1ortality. 
b. Cosmological. 
Lyman finds evidence of a "Cosmic Iv'iind" in 11 the order 
and organization which the universe discloses." He explai ns 
further: 
All our knowledge of the universe is based on 
its orderly and organized character. If t here were 
no universal laws in physical nature, the spectro-
scope would tell us nothing about the make-up of sun 
and stars. If there were no universal laws in the 
realm of animate nature, symptoms would not aid in 
the discovery of the causes of disease, and serums 
would be valueless for their cure. And on the basis 
of the order wh ich these laws express the universe 
has attained organization on a vast scale--such or-
ganization as we see in our solar system, in geologic 
cycles, and in the system of animate nature; such 
organization as we see in atoms, molecules, crys-
tals, cells, and physiological organisms. Now why 
this vast and intricate organization in the uni-
verse, including system within system, instead of 
mere random action--like the wind among s and dunes? 
Is t here anything that can render it intelligible 
excep t the presence of Ji.Und in the cosmos ? A vast 
synthetic process, transforming what would other-
wise be random action , has been going on, and such 
a p rocess we can u nde r s tand only as the work of a 
Cosmic Crea tive Rea son.33 
156 
Again, it must be noted tha t the objectivity of t he or-
der of nature f amiliar to science is assumed. I f the order is 
merely t he product of human minds, a fiction of human imag ina-
tion and abstraction, then, obvi ously, no 11 Cosm.ic Hind" is 
required to explain the objective order which does not ex ist. 
Moreover, it is assumed that because "such a process ~ .£§!!_ 
understand only as the work of a Cosmic Creative Rea son, " 
therefore it mus t actually be the work of such a Reason. The 
categories of our unde rstanding are assumed to be objectively 
valid. 
Once more we find no h int of the goodnes s of God, ex cep t 
indirectly, as we observe that the i dea of a r a tional cre-
ative intelligence is coherent wi th t h e concep tion of a good 
will. An irrational will could not be perfectly good and a 
rational will, in so far as it was rational, could not be 
evil. 
33 Lyman, MOS, 34-35. 
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c. Teleological. 
An argument somewhat more relevant to the moral charac-
ter of the World-Ground proceeds from the evide nces of a 
long-range purpose at work in the world, or what Lyman calls 
"the extent to which the cosmos has produced progress." He 
says, 
If we are willing to achrrit that we posse s s 
some objectively valid ideas of value, we cannot 
but see progress in the transition from the first 
beginnings of life in the primeval slime of the 
ocean beds to man's achievements of Truth, Beauty, 
and Goodness .•.. Such a manifestation of progress 
is evide nce that a cosmic creative synthesis is 
taking place. The fact that the progress has been 
slow, halting, and devious, and t hat it has suffered 
intermissions and relapses, tea ches us someth i ng of 
the difficulty of the synthesis and of its cost; but 
it should not mak e us deny that the progress is real 
and that it is deeply rooted in the cosmos. Now, 
according to all our eXl)erience, persistence in the 
conquest of difficulties and t he creation of value 
is a manifestation of moral will. Hence the cosmic 
creative synthesis points to a Cosmic Moral Will.34 
This argument, as Lyman has observed, presupposes the 
objective validity of human categories, not only of under-
stand ing , but a lso of evaluation, i. e., t h e objectivity of 
values. 
d. The Objectivity of Values. 
Gordon says, 
Th e belief in t he mo r a l perfection of God is 
an assumption for whi ch t h ere is proof, but by n o 
34 Lyman, MOS , 35-36. 
means complete p ro of.35 Its deepest justification is 
t hat it is t h e assurnp tion without which human life 
cannot be understood; without which the ideals, the 
h igher endeavors, t he best chara cter and hope of man, 
are unac countable and insane.36 
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Here is an argument which 9 roceeds directly from the very fonn 
of man 's moral exp erience, h is very categories of moral evalu-
a tion to t h e existence or a g ood God. If it be assumed that 
t here is meaning in saying that one moral ideal is higher than 
another, that moral progress is different from mere chang e of 
customs, that t h e category of truth is applicable to moral 
judgments, in short, that t here is an absolute moral norm, then 
t he ism is implied. As H. Rashd.al l says , in a passag e quot ed 
. by '1:1 . R . Sorley , '\ 
Only if we believe in t he ex istence of a Kind 
for which the true moral i deal is already in some 
s ens e r eal, a Mind whi ch i s the source of whatever is 
true in our own moral j udgn1ents, can we rat ionally 
think of the moral ideal as no l ess real than the world 
it s elf. Only so ca n vv-e believe in an absolute standard 
of right and wrong, which is as indep endent of t h is or 
t hat man 's actual ideas and actual desires as t he facts 
of material nature .... A moral idea l can exist nowhere 
and nohow but in a mind; an absolute moral ideal can 
ex ist only in a lUnd fror.1 whi ch a l l Reality is derived.37 
Our moral ideal can only claim objec tive validity in s o 
far as it can r at ionally be regarded as the revelati on 
of a mo r al ideal eternally existing in t h e mind of God .38 
This inference seems to be a valid one, e.nd theism r:1ay there-
fore be regarded as reasonably established, if it may b e a s-
35 The proof canno t be complete, he believes, on account of 
t h e evil i n t h e world. See Gordon, I NT, 48 -49. 
36 Gordon, I NT, 53. 
37 Rashdall adds the footnote: uor at leas t a mind by which 
all Reality is controlled." 
38 H. Rashdall, The Theory of Go od and Evil, vol. 2 , 212, 
quoted in Sorley, };'[VG, 351. 
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sumed that t here is a n absolute norm by which moral val ue s may 
be judged. This ass~1p tion must be examined in the nex t chap-
ter. 
e. Religious Experience. 
A fourth ground of belief in the ex istence of a good God 
is religious experience. We have seen t hat religi ous experi-
ence presupposes theism. 39 But it also supp orts it. Deny 
theism and t he most e s-sential e l ements of mystica,l experiences 
become inexplicable. The possibility of p sycholog ical ac-
counts of physiological and other causes of these exp eriences 
is undeniable. But t h e causal exp lanation does not account 
for t he expe r ience of uni que value which is precisely the most 
characteri s tic and most certain element of mystical comn1un ion. 
How if t h is value experience is mere illusion , then religiou s 
exp erience signifies nothing ex cep t as it affords an illustra-
tion of irrational error in human life. But if mystical values 
are objective, t h en t hey p oint to the ex istence of a trust-
wo rthy ~od with more limnediat e directness than do moral values. 
The evidential worth of relig ious experience for theism is de-
pendent, t h en, up on the objectivity of religious values, which 
must later be exa~ined.40 
2. All Arguments for God's Goodness Assume 
the Objectivity of Value. 
It is worthy of notice that the only arguments which 
39 See above, 114. 
40 Cf. below, 184-187. 
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support belief in the existence of a p erfectly good God pre-
suppose the view that there are universally valid ideals of 
moral or religious value. And this is vn1at was to be expected. 
For an evaluation of character could hardly be inferred from 
non-evaluated relations. And evaluation cannot be metaphysi-
cally significant unless the nonns of evaluation are univer-
sally valid. Once again, then, we find evidences for immor-
tality which presuppose for their validity the objectivity of 
values. 
However, at this point a serious objection is raised 
agai nst the theistic argument for immortality, even when the 
objectivity of values is granted. And this objection must be 
faced before the inquiry of tb.e present chapter can be com-
plete. 
C. The Problem of Evil. 
1. Streng thens the Theistic Argument for ilrruortality. 
As we have seen, when theism is accepted, the existence 
of injustice and other kinds of evil in the present life is 
evidence favorable to immortality. The be l ief in immortality 
a ids greatly in the solution of the theistic p roblem of evil. 
If it is argued that a good and all-powerful God would n ot 
p roduce a world in which so much evil exists, t he theistic be-
liever in inm1ortality may reply that t h is world is not all, 
and that if it could be seen in its proper perspective we 
should learn t hat the inescapable evils of this life are bless-
ings in disguise. For they may be conceived as co ntributing 
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to the ultimate go od. It is an indubitable fact that "Many 
are the afflictions of the righteous," but the theist adds 
that "the Lord delivereth him out of them all. 1141 He may af-
firm also 
that the sufferings of this present time are not wor -
thy to be compared vvi th the glory which shall be re-
vealed in us.74:2 
Jl!Ioreover, as Brown says, 
It is conceivable that all the struggles and 
trials to which humanity is here exposed may find 
their moral justification in a certain disciplinar~ 
and educative value as yet imperfectly understood. 3 
When immortality has opened the way to such an ultimate opt i-
mism, the sharp edge of the problem of evil is turned. Though 
much rema ins unexp lained, esp ecial1y concerning t h e reason why 
such means must be used for the a ttairu.Jient of God 's go od ends, 
yet t he otherwise irreconciliable contradiction44 between the 
fact of evil and the belief in God is removed. 45 Since i m-
mortal ity does appear to be a necessary factor in any theistic 
soluti on of the p roblem of evil, t his p roblem may be said to 
strengthen the theistic argument for immortality. 
2. But Also Undermines It. 
On the other hand, the problem of evil furnishes one of 
the strongest objections to optimistic arguments for immortal-
41 Psalm 34 :19 . 
42 Romans 8: 18. 
43 Brown, LA, 38. 
44 Cf. Bixler, I PU, 37, a nd Clark, I CI , 40. 
45 Cf. Brown, LA, 39. 
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i ty, just as it is undoub t edl y the most serious of all ob.j ec-
tions to t h eism. For, t he emp iricist may well argue, whatever 
may be one's metaphysical theories, the facts of exp erience 
i nclude countle s s ins tance s . of irrational was te, abrup t 
thwarting of ma n 's noble s t and most heroic efforts, and, worst 
of all, long-co ntinued, monotonous, depressing, initiative-
destroying misery. Whether God ex ists or not, t h ese evils 
~~ st in t he real world. I f God cannot or will not preve nt 
them, what assurance have we t hat He can a nd will p revent t h e 
further evil of human annihilation? Moreover, 
Even if t here be survival, can t here conceivably 
be uanother chance " ·which will in any way atone for 
t he horror of certain p re s en t exp eriences--such as 
ma n ic depress i on or dementia pr a ecox? VVhere is t he 
j ustice, eve n in a nother life, for the milli ons of men 
who maimed a nd killed one anoth er merely on account of 
a p olitical quarrel i n which they had pers onally no 
intere s t ? If t he universe p lans to use t h is di scord-
a nt existence a s a · means to a f inal harmony, we ce.n 
only ech o in its p re s ence t h e cry of Amphitryon to 
Zeus: 11 Thou a rt a stup id god , or not an h one s t 0!1e." 
Certa i n of t he ills of t h is life are ull~lilate. Th ey 
cannot be merged in a h i gher synthesis. 
Even Georg e A. Go rdon, staunch believer in " t h e moral p erfec-
tion of Godn 47 a nd in i irlmorta lity, admits tha t when a l l the 
values of exp erience a nd even t h e instrumental values of evil 
h ave been t aken into a ccount, yet 
t here will remain a large residum~ of unaccountable 
distress, and, what is more serious, an order t hat 
~oe~ 2g t discriminate be tween t h e jus t and t h e un-
JUS l>. 
46 Bi x ler, I PU, 31. 
47 Gor don , I NT, 53 . 
48 Ibid ., 48 . 
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3. Implications of Evil in Relation to Theism. 
a. Atheism an Unnecessary and Unsatisfactory Inference. 
As far as belief in God is concerned, the most obvious 
inference from existent evil would seem to be that theistic 
fai t l:l is false. But atheism is an unnecessary and unsat is-
fact ory solut ion of the problem. It is unsatisfactory be-
ca.use it f a ils to accord with t he various cons iderat io ns which 
have been shown to support t he ism. Especially, it fails t o 
account tor the moral cat egories being p resent in man's ex-
p erience. It would thus render inexplicable the very fact of 
the exis tence of the problem of evil. And it v.;ould offer no 
explanation of t h e g ood in t he world. It is unneces sar y be-
cause, a s Brig.h'tman says, 
Mu ch natural evil is a who l esma.e d1 sciplJ.ne; 
suffering pur ifies and obstacles strengthen the 
soul. 
Moral evil is a necessary consequence of t he 
abuse of the divine gift of freedom. 
lviuch that seems evil to us may be due to the 
f a ct t hat God's purpose s are unknoYrn to us and i:I-
clude t h e g ood ot· ot her ne ings t han the hw1mn race. 
It is as rational for philosophy to assmae 
t hat b eyond a nd out of every apparent evil t i:1ere is 
a g ood to be at tained as it is for science to as-
sume that eve r y unexplai ned f a ct in the vwrld has a 
cause a nd can be e~plained. 
The concep tion of a finite God ... a ccounts 
fo r much of t h e- delay and suffering i n t he world on 
its road to t h e ideal for which it strives.49 
Br i ghtman's last suggestion requires a brief discussion. 
49 Bright man, TPG, 16 0 . The order oi' the passages quoted 
has been somewhat altered . 
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b. Th e Con cep tion of a Finite God.5 0 
1) A Rea sonable Inference. 
:Many t heists51 have believed t hat the evil in t h e vvorld 
p roves t hat God i s limited. For, it is con tended, if Go d 
were almi ght y a nd p erf ectly goo d , h e wo ul d no t crea te a wor ld 
which included such evils a s t h ose which a ctuall y confr ont 
men. And even if "out of every apparent evil t here is good t o 
be attained, u52 for an o:mnipotent God t h e g ood v1oul d be p os -
s i b le without t he evil means . God' s will must s omeh ow be 
limi ted, t hen , s o t hat He is not able to d o all that He would 
do. Thi s vi ew seems to be one reasonable i nference f r om t he 
f a cts. 
2) J3ut Not t he I' ~o st Reaso nable One. 
Omnipo tence has no t usually been intended to i mply t he 
p oss ibil ity of viola ting t h e log ica l laws of thought.53 A 
God vrt~o did violat e the log ica l laws would certa inly be moral-
ly and r a ti onally l imited. Tho s e v.rho dema nd tha t God shoul d 
de termine all men to be morally g ood demand something self-
contradictory and h ence meaning l e s s . Si mila r is t hE') .dema nd 
t hat Go d crea te t h e va l ue s of self-sa crificial love a nd he r oic 
loyalty without p ermitting t h e righteous to s uffer. Even from 
50 Th e concep tion of a fi n ite God does not appea r in the 
Lectures, but t h e problem of evil does, and t h is method of 
soluti on is a dva nced elsewhere by t h ree of t h e Lecturers, 
James, Brightman, and Mont ague. 
51 s uch as, e. g ., J . S . Mill, William James , H. G. Wells, 
H. Rashdall, E . s . Brightman, and W. P . Ivion tague. 
52 See qu otation from Brightman, above, 163. 
53 :McTaggart thinks it should. See JIJicTaggart, SDR , 216-220. 
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our limited range of vision we can see that much of the evil 
in this world is an obstacle necessary for the development of 
the highest hmnan values. And the higher the moral and re-
ligious character of the man, the more evils he is able to 
transmute into good--a good which in its uni que and concrete 
character is inconceivable without the evil. Vmile am~itting 
all this, the believer in a finite God may insist that an om-
nipotent God could at least modify the laws of nature in such 
a way as to produce a more fruitf ul distribution of natural 
evil. But it is not likely that he can e~)lain precisely and 
convincingly how the order of nature ought to be :modified to 
p roduce t h e desired results, taking into account, of course, 
the incalculable instrumenta l value of unvaryi ng natural law 
a mid t h e enormous variety of men's capacities and needs in 
different times and lJ laces. The demand for such an explana-
tion will, no doubt, be tho ught unj us t. For a man cannot be 
expected to know so much as an omnipotent God. The faith 
that an omnipotent God could create a better "vale of soul-
making" does not i mply that a man can p rovide Him with the 
specifications for such a world. But why, then, should the 
believer in an omnipotent God be required to exp l a i n concretely 
how every natural evil is p roductive of more g o od otherwise 
unobta inable than of evil otherwise escapable, before affirming 
his faith? The latter faith seems more rational than the for-
mer. Fo r the religious man has seen evil after evil which 
once seemed utterly i n coherent with the divine purpose finally 
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take an essential part in the construction of unique value 
experiences which he now believes well worth all the cost. 
An analogy may be drawn between descriptive science, interpret-
ing events by the category of causation, and t heistic meta-
phy sics, interpreting events by the category of purpose. The 
scientist sees an increasing number of phenomena which were 
once brute facts take their places in a causal syste~ . He has 
faith that all facts have their place in such a system, but 
only his understanding is to blat.ne for his fre quent failure to 
see how.~· Likewise, the teleologist sees an increasing number 
of data which once seemed utterly purposeless evils t ak e t h eir 
places in a dawning vision of the everlasting divine purpose.54 
He has faith that all evils would be teleologically explicable 
if only h e had sufficiently deep i nsight into mora l and re-
ligious values and a range of exp erience sufficiently broad 
and long. The curve of man's deepening moral and religi ous 
exp erience approaches ever nearer to coincidence with that 
faith. 55 
4. Implications of Evil in Relation 
to Imrnortali ty. 
It has been concluded that the unexplained evil in the 
-54 TI~is analogy of scientist and teleologist, it will be 
noted, is similar to the one quoted from Brightman above, but 
is here drawn out to what seem to me its logical conclusions, 
favoring t h e omni1Jotence r a t her than the finiteness of God. 
Cf. Knudson, DOR, 208 -209. 
55 For further discussion on the doctrine of the finite God, 
see Brightman, TPG and PAR; Rashdall, TGE ; Knudson, DOR, 2 00-
212; and Montague, BU, 66-98. 
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world may imply the limitation of God's j_'J ower. or, more 
reasonably, only the limitation of our insight and knowledg e. 
Either i mpl ication weak ens the theistic evidence f or i mmor-
tality . Let us exw1ine ea ch of t h e s e t wo p ossibi l ities. 
a. :Belief in a Fi nite God Implies the 
Probability of Inmw r t ali ty. 
If God is so limited t hat He cannot prevent t h e vast 
amount of suffering and other evils in the world, why may not 
He be too limited in p ower to save men f rom annihilation? 
Bright man admits t ha t t he limitation of God's p ower "intra-
duces a f a ctor of haza rd and uncertainty about details." 
"Yet, " h e i nsists, 
it woul d in no way i mperil t he divine ideals and pur-
poses ; it woul d ca use t a ctical difficulties, not d if-
ficulties in major strategy . God will always know 
I 
I 
:I 
I 
every p ossible contingency and nothing could ca tch 1 
him unp repared . If God be James' cosmic chess-p layer, 
h e can a l way s mak e the move in any given situation I 
which will lea d to t h e victo r y in h is cause.56 
This op timi s tic f a ith woul d imply i nwortality just as does 
the traditional t heistic optimism. And it is based on t h e 
srune data, especially t h e evidences of r a tional order in t h e 
world, which indica te t hat God can eventually control t h e 
chaotic f a c t ors He did not crea te, and t he progressive evo l u-
ti on of va lues in human exp erience. 
56 Brigllt man, TPG, 186. 
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b. Belief in an Absolute Go d Implies a Greater 
Probability of Lmmortality. 
If t h e evil in t h e wo rld vnLich app ears to serve no good 
purpose is eviden ce of t h e limi t a ti on of our i:1sight and 
lcnowledge, then it must be a dm. i t ted that Yve may n ot under-
stand the d ivine purpose sufficiently wel l to be sure tha t it 
imp lies human i mmortality . For our t h ought n ust be vastly 
transcended by the divine t hought if sou e of t h e evil s we ex-
p erien ce a re seen by Hi m to be ultimately beneficial. J.~ay not 
His marvellous a nd i ns crutab le purp os e will a l so t he ann i h ila-
ti on of every man because He understands, a s we canno t, t ha t 
this p lan will eventually p rove to be best ? 
Th ese questi ons wo uld seem ·to be answered beyond a 
reasonab le doubt by t He !act -cnat t h e evidences up on which be -
lief i n t h e goodness or God a re based a re evidences, not for 
some s trange and unknown qual ity of purp ose a rbitra rily called 
g ood, but tor a goodn ess es s entially like our own h i ghest 
ideal. And we can conceive, without 1·u lly understanding , that 
a perfectly good and trustworthy God mi ght not only be able 
\ to help man draw some good from every evil, a.s Bright man b e-
lieves, but a lso to draw from every evil a g ood oth erwise 
unobtai nable , and wo rth all the cos t . But a vd l l ·wh ich vwuld 
pur pose the des t ruction of a ll t h e values a ttained by men a t 
such grea t cost, and t h e denia l of any poss ibility of furth er 
development, would not be a g ood will in any intellig ible 
sense. 
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We may conclude, t hen , that the belief in a perfectly 
§ oo d G-od of unlimited power i mplie s an overwhelming probabi l-
i t y of i nrm.ortali ty. 
D. Theistic Argument f or I rornortali t y Valid If 
Values Ar e Objective. 
We hav e c onclude d t ha t theism i mpl ies i mmortality. It 
has been s een tha t the existence of much unex:plained evil in 
t h e wo rld is a s eri ous objection both to theism and to belief 
in i rrnnorta li t y . But the beli ef in a God of linli ted p ower 
seems much more reasonab le t han athe ism, a nd t h e belief in an 
absolut e God yet more r easonab l e . And t h e ex istence of a 
I p erfectly goo d God , whether limited or unlimited in power, im-
1 p lies t h e p robability of i mmortal ity, t hough t h e inference 
from belief in an omni po tent God is mor e conv incing than t h e 
inference from beli ef in a fi nite God. The belief in the 
d ivin e g oodness, and h ence t he theistic argtuilent for i mmorta l -
ity, has been f ound to be reasonably well established if it 
ma y be assumed t hat human idea l valu es are objective. This 
assump tion mus t now be exami ned. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EVIDENCE FROJVT VALUE EXPERIEJITCE 
A. The Anthropocentric View Implied by Belief in Immortality. 
1. The Assumption That 1vTan's Ideals and Values 
Have Cosmic Significance. 
Thus far we have found every signi f icant argument for 
inm1ortality dependent on the assumption of the objectivity of 
values. 1 We are ready to agree, then, with Brightman, when 
he says, 
If the realm of sense experience vvere the whole 
of knowable reality, as some professional empiricists 
seem to bel ieve, there would be no ground for sup})os-
ing life after death. But if value experiences g ive 
us truth about the structure of the universe, then the 
human spirit may have its eterna l p lace in the value 
of the Absolute Spirit.2 
I 
II 
1
! It has also been pointed out that values have meaning and 
,, 
/; 
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ex istence only in the experience of persons. The belief in 
'I 
i mmortality i mplies, then, the cosmic importance of personal 
value experience. 3 
·I 
But is there not implied by t h is view an a ttitude closely ~ 
akin to egoism? vVhy should a human being think his exp eriences 1 
I 
I 
'I I( of' such transcendent importance? 
II 
!I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
:J I 
'I I 
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1 For a de:t'in i tion of this term, see above, 104. For in-
stances of its il.11pli cation in arguments f or immortality, see 
above, 115-116 , 141-142 , 1 69 . 
2 Br i ght man, IPK, 30. 
3 Cf. J.{athews, ICP, 18, and Fosdick , SV , 3?-38 . 
171 
2. Implications of Scientific Discoveries for This View. 
\ Such an anthropocentric view of the 
! ments for inunortali ty imply has been made 
world as the argu-
more difficult by 
I 
I 
j certain discoveries of modern scientists. Fiske speaks ot· 
I 
the bewilderment that was wrought by the discovery 
that our earth is not the physical centre of things, 
and that the sun apparently does not exist for the 
sole purpose of giving light and warmth to man's ter-
restrial habitat.4 
He adds, 
We need not wonder that Galileo should have 
been commanded to hold his tongue on a topic that 
seemed to cast discredit upon the whole theology 
that assumes5man to be the central object of the Divine care. 
But Copernicus and Galileo did not dream of such a world as 
the astronomer of today conceives. Bixler says, 
In despair Pascal cried: "The silence of these 
infinite spaces terrifies me," while George Herbert 
prayed 
0 rack me not to such a vast extent! 
Those distances belong to thee. 
The world's too little for thy tent, 
A grave too big for me. 
But what would Herbert have said of our world? Pro-
fessor .Jeans give~ the number of stars in the uni-
verse as (2 x 102 ). The same number of grains of 
sand spread over England, he observes, would make 
a layer hundreds of yards in depth. Then comes a 
devastating suggestion. 11Let us reflect," he says, 
"that our earth is one millionth part of one such 
grain of sand, and our mundane affairs, our troubles 
and our achievements, begin to appear in their cor-
rect proportion to the universe as a whole.6 
What difference can the hopes and fears, the aspirations and 
4 Fiske, LE, 44. 
5 Ibid., 45. 
6 Bixler, IPM, 9-10. 
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needs of a human being make in such a universe? Bixler says 
again, 
Th~ significant ~hing about life is its quality, 
and qua11ty, we know, 1s not determined by number and 
exten~ •. But ~or the m?dern mind these stupendous 
quant1~1es ra1se q~est1ons as to the kind of design 
the un1verse conta1ns and the pQssible relations it 
may have to the desires of man.7 
3. Space and Causality Versus Meaning and ,Value. 
Bixler's observation that quality, which is "the sig-
nificant thing about life" is "not determined by number and 
extent," ought, it would seem, to carry more weight than he 
allows. 
a. 1lagni tude Is Often Significant for Us. 
Magnitude impresses us because it so often is indicative 
of great importance relative to our own purposes and desires. 
I view with unconcerned amusement the violent rage of a di-
minutive house wren, objecting to my investigation of his 
home. But t he observation of a similar spirit in the defender 
of a lion's den would fill me with terror. Because the wren 
is small he cannot effectively interfere with my plans, but 
the lion may not only disrupt my tmmediate plan to explore a 
cave, but also bring to an end my whole quest of values on 
earth. I.ikewise, an ant hill in t he path of an army does not 
merit recognition in the general's plans, but a mountain range 
may prove costly even to a swaggering commander who boasts 
7 Bixler, I P1-& , 11. 
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that "There are no Alps. " So numerous and striking are the 
experiences in which the magnitude of objects has an important 
bearing on our human purposes that the association of bulk 
with significance becomes a habit. If a lion is more im-
portant than a wren and a mountain range than a n ant hill, how 
much more signifi cant than a human being, must be an Arcturus 
with circumference greater than the orbit of our planet! 
b. No Significance Apart from Mind. 
But a fortiori arguments are notori ously precarious, and 
in this one the fallacy is plain. In the instances which 
have taught us the significance. of quantity, the quantity is 
significant for us, in relation to our purposes. Except in 
relation to the purposes of some conscious being, the question 
of significance is absolutely meaningless. If the universe is 
1
1 
fundamentally impersonal, then the question whether Arcturus 
or a man is more important for that universe is idle, for 
neither can be of any importance to a being which does not 
evaluate. If, on the other hand, the universe is the work of 
a purposive Mind, there is every reason to suppose that such 
a Being must care far more for other creatures which have 
kindred experiences of value than for all t he intrinsically 
worthless stretches of matter and space. 
c. The Small Sometimes a Better Clue Than the Great. 
The objection may mean, not that Arcturus is more sig-
nificant to the universe than is man, but rather that Arcturus 
I 
'I j. 
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must be, for man, a better clue to the essential character of 
reality than is man himself. But how can anyone know that 
this is so? Sometimes an infinitesimal part of a body is a 
better clue to the conditions of the entire body than is all 
the rest of its mass together. Bixler himself, in another 
connection, gives a good illustration: 
The total amount of thyroxine needed by the body 
in one .year, we read, is about three and a half grains. 
"But this pinch of material," an expert tells us, '' spells 
all the diffgrence between complete imbecility and nor-
mal health. " 
If this be true, then to one trying to understand the behavior 
of some bodies and to prophesy their future, three and a half 
grains, or less, of thyroxine, would t·urnish a better clue 
than all the mass of bone, muscle, nerve, and other tissue in 
the organism, though this mass is more than a million times as 
large. 
d. Space and Mind Incommensurate. 
Moreover, neither Arcturus nor the whole of space is a 
million times or l,O OO,OOOn times as large as the value ex-
periences of a man. Bulk and reason are simply incommensur-
ate. 
e. Prima Facie Mind a Better Clue. 
It would seem prima t"acie that if _one is wanting to 
understand the order or reason or purpose oi' the universe he 
8 Bixler, IPM, 11. 
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might expect to find his own mind a clue -more significant 
I "tnan any reaches of' space, however vast. For he can be sure 
that here in his own consciousness, at least, some order and 
purpose are actually at work in the universe. It is only by 
a much more remote inference that any meaning, whether mech-
anistic or teleolog2cal, can be found among the celestial 
I spheres. 9 But we must examine now the positive evidence for 
I 
I i the validity of the anthropocentric view of the universe, 
i that is, for the objectivity of values. 
B. The Objectivity of Value. 
1. Objective Postulates of Value Experience. 
a. Aesthetic. 
1) Universal Norm Implied. 
Vlhen a man says the Yosemite Valley is beautinJ.l, he 
does no-t mean merely that it appeals to his 2nterest .10 If 
bis friend says it is not beautiful, both will understand 
that they are in disagreement, not because it is thought that 
one of them mus·t falsely describe the relation ot the scene 
to his interest, but because each man's judgment implies that 
the other's interest 2s not what it ought to be. They may be 
unable to agree on a~ aestnetic norm by which to judge the 
scene before them, and eo they may consider argument useless. 
Nevertheless, their judgments clearly conflict. Ana. 1:;he t ·act 
9 Cf. below, 180-182, 251. 
10 CI' . Perry, GTV, 115-145. 
jl 
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of their disagreement shows that both make one common assump-
tion, viz., that there is a true norm of beauty. If there is 
no objective beauty, then to attribute beauty to a specific 
object is meaningless. Aesthetic experience implies that 
there is a universal norm of beauty to which any individual 
ought to approximate, and ~~ to approximate in his aes-
1
thetic judgments. If a poet believes his lyric beautiful when 1/ 
lall around him say it is not, he may yet be right. If a man, 
1 
/or even all men, :t'ail to !"ind a given object beautiful, that J 
does not necessarily mean that it is not. We may all be wrong. 
The non~ is independent of our various human judgments and in-
terests. 
2) Metaphysical Relevance Implied. 
Moreover, when I say that the song of the hermit thrush 
!is beautitul, I do not mean to say that my aesthetic apprecia-
1 
ltion or interest has created an appropriate object. I have 
not merely created the beauty. I have discovered it. It 1s 
true that in my discovery value has been created. But t fle 
value is no more in my judgment alone nor my interest alone, 
than it is in the pulsing air or the vibrating tissues of the 
bird. Neither subject, object, nor the relation between "Lhem, 
taken alone, could be called beautiful. This quality is some-
how a characteristic o1· the whole and not oi its parts. Our 
aesthetic experience is not ours alone. It declares the or-
ganic unity of mind and nature. Aesthetic ideals are not 
separate from reality. They are relevant to it and to a great-
I 
II 
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er or less extent are embodied in it. 
. 1??~-
We must conclude, then, II 
that aesthetic experience implies the obj ecti vi ty of beauty, 
i. e., the universal validity and metaphysical relevance of 
true aesthetic judgruents.ll 
3) Aesthetic Skepticism. 
One may, of course, be an aesthetic skeptic, denying 
that aesthetic judgments have any universal or ob,jective mean-
ing. There is no angwer to be made to him except the impact of 
his own aesthetic experience itself. If one denies the supe-
; rior claim of a theory which makes experience meaningful over I -
one which denies its meaning, then he is beyond the reach of 
all argument or criticism on any subject whatsoever. But he 
has then paid tne pr ice of becoming irrational and unempirical. 
One who seeks to render a coherent account of aesthetic expe-
rience should, it would seem, conclude that this kind of value 
is objective. 
b. 11oral. 
1) }[oral Judg111ents Imply an Absolute :Norm. 
Similarly, but more definitely and precisely, a moral 
judgment is a claim of universal truth. If I say that Socra-
tes was right in refusing to appeal to the sentimental pity 
of his jurors, when on trial for his life, I do not mean that 
his refusal accorded with the customs of his time nor of ours. 
Neither do I mean to describe my own emotions on reading the 
11 Cf. the definition of objectivity of value, above, 104. 
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Apology. I mean that what he did accorded with the- tru~ ~o-;~1-=-- ~-------
ideal. I may humbly admit that my judgment is likely to be 
mistaken. But its intention is to declare the relation of 
Socrates ' re£usal to a moral ideal which is universally valid. 
Perhaps I am a hedonist and judge that Socrates' deed was 
right because it brought the greatest possible pleasure to 
himself or to all concerned. But my moral judgment then means 
not only that his deed had such delightful consequences, but 
also that he conformed to the moral ideal in producing such 
consequences. Perhaps I am a rationalist, and judge that what 
he did was right because it was, on the whole, the most reason-
able thing to do. But my moral judgn.1ent based on such theory 
means not only that Socrates' refusal was reasonable but that 
he was morally obligated to do the reasonable thing. And if my I 
friend declares that Socrates was morally wrong on that occa-
sian. I recognize that my friend and I are contradicting each 
other. .Any difference between our ethical theories :may help to 
explain our disagreement, but it does not eliminate it. For 
both of us assume an absolute ethical norm which is independent 
1
of any man's judgment about it. 
2) Moral Judgments Imply the Relevance of the Ethical 
Ideal to All Persons. 
The ethical nor~m implied by moral judgments is not only 
valid for all minds which may render moral judgments, but is 
1
also relevant to the acts of all rational beings. When an 
I 
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ethical theorist declares that a person is morally obligated 
to act reasonably, he means not only that he and members of 
179 
his group are so obligated, but that the Bushmen of Africa are I, 
likewise. That is precisely why he has a right to claim moral 
superiority to the Bushmen. If the same nor.m were not appli-
cable to persons in all times and places, then talk of moral 
superiority or moral progress would be meaningless. Moreover, 
lif a new tribe were to be discovered in some remote region, 
I 
I 
1
we should be certain that ethical norms which were true any-
where would be true in relation to that tribe, so that the 
tribe may with meaning be called morally superior or morally 
inferior to the Bushmen or to the justices of the American 
Supreme Court. And if rational beings exist on some other 
planet of the solar system or several million light years away, 
they act morally or immorally or with various degrees of 
jethical rectitude. If any rational being is exempt from the 
oral law, all are exempt. Obligation is universal or it is 
illusory.l2 
3) The Objectivity of 1roral Values. 
Now the faith in the universality of obligation which is 
implied in every moral judgment, is a faith in a moral cosmos, 
12 Cf. Kant, GMS, (PhB) 63-67. This universality of moral 
!principles must not, however, be confused with Kant's other 
!(and really contrary) doctrine of specific unconditional du-
ties. The falsity of the latter doctrine is apparent when one 
considers the frequent conflicts of such "unconditional duties" 
as Kant specifies in "Das ]Jag in der Theorie Richtig Sein, u. 
s.w. " (Werke, vii, 211.) 
I 
I 
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not, it is true, a universe in which every volition con1'orms 
to the moral ideal, but a. universe in which the moral ideal 
is relevant to every volition. The validity of moral obliga-
tion ~plies that there are moral laws which for.m a struc-
1 tural network coextensive with the universe of rational be-
l 
ings, significantly relating them one to another. Such in-
escapable, universal principles can llardly be expla1ned, it 
would seem, except as characteristics of an independent reality 
upon which all other sp iritual beingsl3 depend :for their very 
existence. Moreover, in our experience mind and bo~y are too 
intimately related to pennit; our acceptance of any ultimate 
metaphysical dualism. 14 We are therefore led to conclude 
that the moral laws belong to the metaphysical reali-r;y on 
which all else depends for existence, even t hough its moral 
character is not directly mani:tes t ed in material things. And 
this conclusion cannot logically be avoided except by denying 
altogether t he signit.icance of moral experience. 
c. Intellectual. 
Moreover, the quest of truth is itself based on the 
assump -r;ion that certain human nor.ms are universally valid and 
metaphysically relevant. 
13 I say "all other spiritual beings " because a non:sp~rit­
ual reality of which ethical principles are character~st1c 
would be an inconceivable absurdity. Cf. above, 15 7-.lb9. 
14 Cf. Lamont, IOI, 4?-48, 52. 
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1) Faith in the Objectivity of Reason Important 
the Problem of Lmmortality. 
:B'or 
The observation just made is highly significant with 
181 
reference to the problem of brunortality. Gordon declares that 
the debate concerning i !lliilortali ty 
involves, at the outset, the life of reason, the 
reality ot· thought, the existence of an intelligible 
universe.l5 
Bixler accepts the challenge by declaring that the argument 
for immortality based on the rationality or justice ot· the 
universe 
is not conv1 ncing ... because we know so little of 
what rationality as applied to the universe can be . 
• • • ':!e canno"" be sure, in other words, that our 
idea of1ghat is rational is a measure for that of nature. 
2) Human Norms Alone Available. 
But it· a man seriously doubts "that our idea of what is 
rational is a measure for that of nature," the quest for the 
truth about nature thereupon comes to an end. Every law of 
nature discovered by the empirical sciences is an inference. 
Now suppose t 11at while scientists agree on the principles of 
correct inference nature ignores them and behaves in ways wh1ch 
men would believe quite irrational: of what value then is the 
15 Gordon, INT, 17. 
16 Bixler, IPM, 30. In the same passage Bixler suggests 
that the universe may be indifferent to "human desires. 11 The 
confusion of desires with norms of reason and evaluation is 
unfortunate. 
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scientist's inference? 
3) Interpenetration of Intellectual and Other Values. 
Again, let one suppose that all of his experience is as 
misleading and illusory as he has hitherto believed certain 
sciousness of memories which, upon awaking, one is positive 
were utterly false? It is by no means impossible for anyone 
to assume that his present experience is just such a dream. 
Perhaps it is even a curse inflicted upon men by some cosmic 
1
fiend who fills their heads with "memories" and "sensations 11 
! 
laughs to see how fantastic are their deductions. No man 
I 
land 
i 
lean prove that this is not the true character of his experience ·II 
II 
But while a man entertains such a supposition his scientific 1 
I 
I 
and philosophical quests are at a standstill. Before he can 
move one step in the search for truth, he must assume that his 
experience is an essentially f~ and honest representation of 
reality. And before travelling far he must assume that when 
he subjects himself to moral discipline, so that he is open-
minded, honest, and objective, his judgment is worth more than 
when he does not display these virtues of the conscientious 
scientist. The physicist or chemist may deride the application 
of the moral laws to spheres of activity other than that in 
which he is engaged. But let him ignore them in his own work 
and his colleagues will shout from the housetops the worthless-
mess of his testimony. The search for truth i mplies the objec-
I
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both of reason and of moral law. 
4) Objectivity of Value or Skepticism. 
II 
J! volve 
All our attempts at knowledge, as Dole points out, in-
i 
I 
l 
I 
il 
I, 
II li 
l i 
I' 
II 
II 
I 
I 
i 
I! 
li 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
lj 
a majestic assumption. We suppose that there is such a 
reality as truth; we suppose that we live in a reason-
able or logical world, and that our thinking follows 
certain intellectual laws. We_ suppose that our philo-
sophical bias in favor of order and unity, like our 
instinct toward food, is a par t of the reality of the 
world. We suppose that the sense of duty to follow 
truth, which honest men everywhere recognize, is also 
real. If this is "reasoning in a circle," it is the 
only possible mode of reasoning. 
We are able, however, to throw our minds 11 out of 
gear," to suppose invalid our splendid assumption of a 
realm of order and reality. We can become thorough-
going agnostics. VV'nat happens now? It follows that 
we have ceased for the time to be thinkers. We have 
got out of the world of logic into a dream world where 
no logic binds things together. Talk about "truth" as 
we may, we cease to feel any obligations to follow 
truth or speak truth. Terms and words that had mean-
ing and value before, such as right and duty , now fade 
out of sight. All that remains to us is to be observ-
ers of sensations. To become thinkers again means to 
take up the old assumption, and to go on again as if 
we belonged to the ideal realm of logic, order, beauty, 
truth, duty, and unity.l7 _ 
IThe principles of reason and of ethics which we have are the 
I !J principles which vre must use in advancing our knowledge of 
!I ~~ reality. We are always ready, of course, to revise them and 
i
1
add to them, as our own spiritual natures are cultivated in 
L 
183 
!! active commerce with the rest of reality. But we must assume 
\\ 
1! that in the main the categories of human thought and action 
'I 
are essential and not accidental to reality, or we must give 
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17 Dole, HOI, viii-ix. 
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up the rational life altogether--if we can. 
d. Religious Values. 
1) Their Complexity and Importance. 
Religious values are not so widely recognized nor so 
well understood as moral and intellectual values. Moreover, 
they are so complicated in structure, so thoroughly interpene-
trated with aesthetic, moral, intellectual, and other values, 
that they are unusually difficult to analyze. But they are of 
special importance for our inquiry, both because they do illus-
trate so well the interpenetration of values, and, more espe-
cially, because upon their objectivity depends the validity of 
arguments from religious experience. 18 
2) Religious Values Exist. 
When we are forming our view of reality, an earnest de-
sire for truth will impel us to take into consideration all 
the empirical data obtainable. Pertinent to this task is the 
quotation of Jiitackenzie from Archbishop Temple: 
The Religious beliefs and practices of mankind, 
and the experiences which both originate them and is-
sue from them, are part of the data, and cannot be 
ignored without co~1ittal of the gravi~t of all intel-
lectual crimes- ··neglect of the facts. 
18 See above, 114. 
19 Mackenzie, MCI, 84-85. 
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3) Analys is of Causes and Contributing Values Does 
Not Adequately F~lain. 
~mny psychological factors consp ire to produce religious 
exp erience, and various kinds of va lue are usually combined 
in it. It therefore offers a rich field f or the analyt ical 
psychologist. J. H. Leuba20 and others have explored t h is 
field with considerable sk ill. But when its psycholog ical 
causal connections have all been described, and its inclusion 1 
I 
of moral, aesthe t ic, intellectual, and social elements has been I 
clearly demonstrated, the experience of religious value re-
mains a fact. This peculiar quality of certain experienc es 
which are ca lled religious is not adequately explained when 
its neural concomitants have been described and t he sequence 
of psychic events to wh ich it belongs delineated. Such analy-
ses leave unexplained precisely what wants explanation, namely 
the precious and uniquely religio us worth of the experiences. 
Of greater value than such external studies as Leuba's are 
attemp ts at analysis from within, a s, e. g., t he investiga-
20 tions by R. Otto and J . B. Pratt. But no psychological de-
scription can explain why man should have experiences of t h is 
kind any more than descrip tions · of dust and l i g11t can explain 
i 
:the beauty of a sunset. 
I 
I l 20 See Bibliography. 
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4) Systematic Character of Religious Experience. 
Religious experience is of widely variant kinds. And 
1yet such studies as Otto's, and even Leuba's, show t hat it 
I 
lhas its own un iversal characteristics, and follows, historical-
ly, certain fairly definite lines of development. ].~oreover, 
religious values are usually most rich and satisfying as reli-
gious val ues when t hey are most thoroughly interpenetrated with 
oth er kinds of value. E. g ., t h e mystic's religious awe in-
creases with h is certainty t hat t h e revelation he receives is 
!new truth. Likewise, religious experience is almost invariably 
connected closely with high moral endeavor, though the mystic's 
desire to insist on t ile distinction between religious a nd moral 
values fre quently iss ues in statements W.i1 ich seem to set eth ics 
in opposi t ion to religion. Vfuen, in times past, the ethical 
and intellectual ele1nents have been eliminated f rom mysticism, 
it has lap sed into a vague and chaotic emotionalism which has 
soon se~oarated from t h e es s ential ongoing streams ot· t he great 
istoric religions. Religious expe r ience possesses vitality 
when it i s coherent with t n e production and app r eciation of 
oth er values. 
5) Relig ious Experiences Imply a Basic Nor.m. 
Some religious exp eriences seem to co ntradict oth ers. 
When one worsh i pper's heart is warmed with lovingkindness by 
communion with the divine Father, and another is driven, in 
frenz ied cruelty, to send n is own child "through t he !·ire to 
,I 
I 
I 
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:Molech, ".Gl one man's religious experience, at least, must be 
partial l y or wholly illusory. Yet all worshipp ers agree in 
! the major asstun:tn~ion that there is a div~ne Being seeking to 
i 
I i reveal Hi msel1 T,O ruen. This assumption is necessarily inhe r-
' I 
ent in all relig ious exp erience. Psy cholog ists may speak of 
God as the projection of human desires, or the personi f ica tion I 
II 
of subjective ideals, but mystical exp erience cannot be had 
without t he implication tha t God ex ists. Moreover, relig ious 
exp erience pr esupp oses the perfection of tne God. w11o is re-
veale<i. The Psalmist expressed the universal religious ideal 
when he described Jehovah as the embodiment of truth, beauty, 
and goodness. 22 
vn1en revelations disagree, they ought to be judged by 
all the norms imp 1ied by t h e religious experiences l..tlern s elves, 
i. e., "the ethical, i ntellectual, aesthetic, or other ideals, 
which the experiences claim to embody. The more values result, j 
and the more coherent is the religious experience with other 
kinds of experience, the more reason t he critic will have to 
supp ose t hat t he mystic has a ctually con~uned w1th God. It 
is, of course, possible to dismiss all religious experience 
as illusion. But wherever it exists, its own force is a claim 
of obj ectivity. The attempt to cultivate religious experience 
1without the claim of objectivity is futile because self-contra-
' !dietary. 
! 
21 II Kings 23:10. 
22 Psalm 96:3-6, 11-13. 
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2. Objectivity of Value a Reasonable Postulate. 
The objectivity of value is not absolutely demonstrable. 
It does seem, however, to be a reasonable postulate. For with 
out believing that some l<:inds of value are ob,j ecti ve, the 
whole quest for order and reality is impossible, and when the 
·objectivity of other kinds is denied, vast ranges of experienc1 
are rendered incoherent and ineJ~licable. What further proof j
1 
could be expected of a postulate which the rational interpreta-
tion of the relevant data must presuppose? 
Fosdick says, 
All creation is a seamless garment; we cannot 
rip it up according to our caprice and understand it 
piecemeal. The habit of mind, therefore, which bi-
furcates t h e un i.verse, putting physical facts on one 
side and on the other such personal facts as the ex-
perience of spiritual values, and then proceeds to in-
terpret the essential nature of the universe in terms 
of the former, regarding the latter as inconsequential 
and impermanent by-products has something deeply the 
matter with it.23 
3. An Alternative View: the Analytic Method. 
The above argument for the objectivity of values presup-
poses the validity of the coherence criterion of truth and the 
synoptic method of inquiry. 24 The method of analysis, when 
used alone, would eliminate value experiences from the em-
pirical data. Value belongs only to certain wholes and the 
division of such wholes into infinitesimal parts fails to re-
23 Fosdick, SV, 27. 
24 The first sentence of the quotation from Fosdick makes 
this presupposition especially clear. 
veal it. 25 Now if one begins with the assumption that those 
objects alone are real which are revealed by analysis, then, 
of course, values will not be found to be objective. 
4. The Objectivity of Value Presupposes the Synoptic Method. 
We may conclude, then, that ideal values a re objective 
if coherence is the valid criterion of truth. If conceivabil-
ity as an elemental unit or sum of such units is t he criterion, 
then values are not real. In t hat case they demand not to be I 
explained but only to be explained away. Here, then, is an 
issue foreshadowed. Is analysis a complete method for meta-
physical inquiry? Or is synopsis, incl uding analysis, but 
more, the valid method? ·which is more fundai'!ental, the under-
standing of an object by determining t he elements which it con-
tains, or by determining its relation to the whole to which it 
belongs? In the l a st chapter this issue and its implications 
will be more fully delineated. 26 Just now let us see wha t are 
the implications of our provisional conclusion that ideal 
values are objective. 
c. Imp lications of the Objectivity of Value for Immortality. 
1. Royce's Argument. 
a. Individuality Implies Immortality. 
Royce's argument for in~ortality is based on his attempt ' 
to define the individual. He is certain that the individual is 
25 Cf. above, 176-177. 
26 See below, 246-251. 
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the real. But what constitutes its individuality, hence its 
reality? Analysis does not reveal the answer. For analytical 
description only tells to what various types or classes the 
individual belongs. The uniqueness of the individual must 
consist in its specific relations with the whole of the Uni-
verse, relations which cannot be duplicated by -: any other indi-
I 
vidual. 
'J 
And yet what these relations are we cannot define I 
without reducing them also to types in which is likeness rathe I 
than uniqueness. 
We live thus, in one sense, so lonesomely here. 
For we love individuals; we trust in them; we honor 
and pursue them; we glorify them and hope to know them. 
But after we have once become keenly critical and world-
ly wise, we know, if we are sufficiently thoughtful, 
that we men can never either find them with our eyes, 
or define them in our minds; and that hopelessness of 
finding what we most love makes some of us cynical, a.nd 
turns others of us into lovers of barren abstractions, 
and renders still others of us slaves to monotonous af-
fairs that have lost for us the true individual mean-
ing and novelty that we had hoped to fin~ in the~ .... 
We seek true individuality and the true individuals. 
But we find them not. For lo, we mortals see what our 
poor eyes can see; and they, the true individuals,--
they belong not to this world of our merely human 
sense and thought. 
They belong not to this world, in so far as our 
sense and our thought now show us this world! lili, 
therein,--just therein lies the very proof that they 
even now bel~ng to a higher and to a richer realm than 
ours. Herein lies the very sign of their true immor-
tality. For they are indeed real, these individuals. 
We know this, first, because we mean them and seek 
them. We know this secondly, because, in this very 
longing of ours, God too longs ; and because the Abso-
lute life itself, which dwells in our life, and in-
spires these very longings, possesses the true world, 
and is that world. For the Absolute, as we now know, 
all life is individual as expressing a meaning. Pre-
cisely what is unexpressed here, then, in our world 
---------
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of mortal glimpses of truth, precisely what is sought 
and longed for, but never won in this our human form 
of consciousness, just that is interpreted , is devel-
oped into its true wholeness, is won in its fitting 
for.m, and is expressed, in all the rich variety of 
individual meaning that love here seeks, but cannot 
find, and is expressed too as a portion, unique, con-
scious, and individual, of an Absolute Life that even 
now pulsates in every one of our desires for the ideal 
and for the individual.27 
b. Presuppositions of the Argument. 
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I This argument is ba.sed on the assump tion that the noblest j 
ends for which men strive are objective, and that the quest of 
ideal values is shared by the Being on whom all reality is de-
pendent for existence. If only sense perception and concep-
tual analysis are significant clues to reality, then there is 
no reason to suppose that individuals of unique significance 
to the Absolute life exist. The membership of individuals in 
a realm transcending the world of sense and analysis is in-
1 ferred "because we mean them and seek them, 11 and because these 
longings are believed to be properties, and not mere acci-
dents, of "the Absolute life itself, which dwells in our life, 
and inspires these very longings, possesses the true world, 
and is t hat world." 
c. A New Form of a Familiar Argument. 
Vfuen it is assumed that values are objective, then the 
argument is valid as evidence favorable to belief in immortal-
ity. For if the ideal quest of human beings is also the ideal 
27 Royce, CI, 72-74. 
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quest of the Reality upon which all else is dependent, then it 
11 
is reasonable to believe that Reality will not destroy the ob-
jects of our noblest interests, which objects are at the same 
time sharers in the Absolute's striving for ends. Royce's 
argument is now seen to be very similar to the argument from 
the objectivity of values to the goodness of God and thence to 
immortality. The only essential difference is that Royce's 
argument does not, like theism, make explicit the relation of 
the human individual to God. For the purpose in hand Royce 
might describe "the Absolute life 11 either in pantheistic or 
in theistic terms.28 His argument assumes, then, no more than 
we have found to be reasonable, but adds nothing to arguments 
already examined, except a more general, but, at the same time, 
more vague, reasoning from the goodness of God. 
2. The Infini t .e Potentiality of Personality. 
a. Infinite Implications of Our Pllrposes. 
Crothers notes that everything we do has infinite impli-
cations: 
There is an attempt to do a definite thing; it 
turns out to be immeasurably greater than it seemed. 
The Hebrew sage describes the process. 11 He maketh 
the understanding to abound like Euphrates, and as 
Jordan in tue time of' harvest; the first man knew 
her perfectly; no more shall the last find her out. 
For her thoughts are more than the sea, and her coun-
sels prot·ounder than the great deep." He tells us 
how he became conscious of these profounder depths. 
28 Indeed his conception of t he relation between the individ-
ual man and God is ob s cure throughout Royce's writings. 
--- --·--- -_-_ --_------ --- -=--'=== 
"I said, I will water my best garden; and will water 
abundantly my gar den bed; and lo , I il9 b.r:ook became a 
river, and my river became a s ea."2 
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Ben Sira ch, the Hebrew sage from whom Crothers has quoted, 
found t 11e in:i:'ini te potentiality of life while seeking truth, 
under the guidance of the Torah. And for every earne s t seeker 
after truth the implications of every problem lead on and out 
in just t h is manner, so that it is only by arbitrary abstrac-
tion that any study can be kept within manageable limits. One 
thinks immediately of Tennyson: 
Flower in t h e crannied wall, I pluck you out of 
t h e crannies, 
I hold you here, root and a l l , in my hand, 
Little flower--but if I could understa nd 
What you are, root and all, a nd all in a ll, 
I should know what God and man is.30 
it is not only the intellectual quest which draws Tennyson 
out from the flower to infinity. The understanding that he 
seeks inclu.a.es an adequate appreciation of beauty and the 
g rateful love it stirs within the poet's breast. The flower 
truly represents every object which engages man's interest in 
his pursuit of ideal values. "He that seeketh findeth," 31 but 
I the finding sends him always on a new search, more conscio us 
than ever of undiscovered treasures ahead . This is true of 
the mystic as well as the scientist, and of the faithful lover 
as of t he artist. The body of man, like every biological 
organism, has certain narrow limi t s of growth which it cannot 
29 Crothers, EL, 9-10; the quotation is from Ecclesiasticus 
24. 
30 Tennyson, "Flower in the Crannied Wall." 
31 Matthew 7:8. 
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pass, but his mind has no such limits. 
There is literally no end to the possibilities 
of the development of selfhood; its infinite devel-
opment can never be completed--and this fact is "the 
seal of its vocation for eternity.n32 
But how does the infinite potentiality of the self prove the 
infinite duration of the self in time? 
b. Evidence for Immortality. 
Assuming as a reasonable postulate that man's ideals are 
universally valid and metaphysically relevant, the infinite 
potentiality of man's spiritual growth does seem to be evi -
dence favorable to belief in human immortality. The moral 
ideal bids man to achieve the noblest values within his reach 
and then to str ive after yet nobler ends. The moral idealist 
is 
one who takes counsel of his courage rather than his 
fears. He is one who, in every enterprise, is 
Still nursing the unconquerable hope, 
Still clutching t he inviolable shade. 
For things still unattained he gives and hazards all 
he has. As he will not make his reason b l ind, nei-
ther will he allow his heart to grow cold nor his 
ideals to be dliumed .... Ideals are to him no empty 
dreams; they are to be realized in action .... 
Thus the man has lived. At last the moment 
comes when life strikes hard on death. For that 
moment, too, comes the word, "Pitch this one high. 11 
That means that he is to summon his best, that he 
is to keep on as aforetime with his face toward the 
light,--he is to keep on,--hoping, loving, daring, 
aspiring. 
And then comes the sudden silence, and to us 
who watch the brave ongoing all things seem possible. 
All things seem possible save that there should be 
32 From an interpretation of an argument used by Fichte, 
Brightman, IPK, 42; quotation from Fichte, Werke, i, 270. 
I 
I 
I ,, 
il 
I 
I 
I. 
I 
- ---=--==!*=====-=-=- -- 195 
no path for these patient feet.33 
A universe which plants in man's soul, not only a system 
of ideals which would require eternity for their fulfilment, 
but also a sense of obligation which requires that he throw 
himself heart and soul into t h e achievement of them, is not a 
rational world if it then cuts him off when he is just begin-
ning to obey the command. 
c. This Argument Not Wishful Thinking. 
This moral argument for immortality is not to be confused 
with mere wishful thinking. Bixler, while not believing in 
imPJortality, is ready to defend the champions of belief against 
this charge. He says, 
We know that the desire for immortality, so far 
from being the for.m of wishful thinking it is some-
times called, so far from resting on an unwillingness 
to face t he facts, actually springs from the confidence 
of the race in its own integrity and in the validity of 
its aims.34 · 
But it is not only his own integrity that the believer defends. 
It is likewise the integrity of the u Diverse which has given 
birth to him and his infinite ideals. As Falconer says, 
Indeed, the fact of growth in character and 
wisdom makes more incredible the assumption that 
death ends all .•.• On t hat supposition the more 
value the race acquires, the more irrational the 
universe becomes.35 
24-25. 
I 
I 
I' 
II 33 Crothers, EL, 22, 23, 34 Bixler, IPM, 51. 
35 Falconer, TWC, 52-53. 
43-45; Galloway, IOI, 190. 
Cf. Gordon, UTT, 54-57; Brown, LA, jl 
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I 3. A Teleological Account of the Universe. 
When the objectivity of values, hence the validity \ 
of the teleological category of interpretation is granted, the \ 
teleological argwnent of Dole seems unassailable. This argu-
ment is essentially a general and summary statement of the im-
plications of the objectivity of value for immortality, and 
so makes a fitting conclusion for the present section: 
We tend to believe that this is a world of pur-
pose. This is only to think that the universe must 
have significance. A purposeless universe seems to 
us contemptible. It may be said that our own minds 
impres s this idea upon us, and t he desire to find pur -
pose creates our belief. But our minds are themselves 
the outgrowth or the children of the universe. The 
nature of intelligence is to seek order, significance, 
purpose. It cannot be irrational to trust this char-
acter of our minds. It would look as if the highest 
faculty in us answered to the highest f a ct of the uni-
verse. The contrary supposition certainly reduces 
all t hought to mockery. 
Now, the idea of i mmortality is almost the only 
means of expressing our thought of a purposeful uni-
verse. To say that the highest values do not die, 
to say that nobie persons go on in their personality, 
to think that the universe exists to manifes t and to 
develop t h is order of life, is to affirm a purpose 
worthy of the universe. Is there any other conceiv-
able purpose? If so, what is it? For a universe of 
mere everlasting succession of shifting phenomena is 
not a r ational universe. 
To believe in a purposeful universe is to be-
lieve in t he integrity of the universe; namely, that 
it is one, that it is orderly, and that it can be de-
pended upon. All science really proceeds upon this 
faith ..•. All philosophy is the attempt to think the 
facts of the world and of life into some harmony and 
unity. The very word "universe," that we use so glib-
ly, is t he expression of a conviction or faith in the 
integrity a!· the world. It would be strange and un-
reasonable to use this word to sum up the result of 
our impressions of visible or material things, and 
then, just where the _interpretations of visible things 
touch the life of man, to stop saying, "the universe," 
and to reduce the realm of human or spiritual facts to 
. -- -=..=-c....:-==ij[-= =-======-==-=-- --·-
chaos. We are possessed by the intellectual neces-
sity, if we think of a universe at all, to think o:f 
it so throughout. The profound facts of human per-
sonality must belong to the integrity of the uni-
verse and must be safeguarded and not brought to 
confusion by its laws. This is just wgtt we mean 
when we utter our hope of immortality. 
D. Conclusions. 
1. The Case for Immortality Rests on Belief in the 
Objectivity of Values. 
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We have p resented all of the kinds of arguments urged 
for the truth of immortality in the Ingersoll Lectures.37 And 
all have been found to presuppose the theory that the ideal 
norms implied in hw~n value experience are universally valid 
and metaphysically relevant. This t heory, which we have called 
belief in the objectivity of value, would seem, then, to be a 
!fundamental ground of belief in immortality. If it is true, 
then there is strong evidence for belief in immortality. 
2. Values Are Probably Objective. 
Moreover, we have concluded that values are probably 
objective . 
3. The Objectivity of Values Seems to Imply Idealism. 
It was noted, however, that if analysis is the only 
36 Dole, HOI, 25-27. 
37 The highly original a rguments oi· Jl.{on tague have not yet 
been considered, since they are f ramed with reference to the 
psychophysical objection, and can be better understood in con-
nection with the discussion of t hat objection. They will be 
found, however, to de r ive the validity which they possess as 
positive arguments f r om the same belief in the ob j ectivity of 
values implied by other affirmative argwnents. See below, 
220-230. 
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valid method of seeking truth, then there is no reason to be-
lieve in the objectivity of values. Belief gains reasonable 
support only when one employs the method of synopsis, assuming 
coherence as the criterion of truth. Now t h is is the method of [ 
philosophical idealism, while analysis is the method of 1 
I 
realism. The arguments for immortality would seem to be 
then, only if in philosophical method, the idealists are 
valid, I 
right .I 
But it would appear that 1t ic no~ only the method of idealism 
which the arguments for immortality imply. For the objectivity ! 
of value would seem also to imply an idealistic metaphysics. 
It is difficult to see how values could be relevant to a non-
spiritual reality.38 The logical relation between idealism and 
immortality must, however, be examined more carefully. 39 
I 
But before entering upon that inquiry we must examine the i 
principal argument which is urged against in~ortality. 
38 Cf. the definition of idealism, above, 104. 
39 See Chapter Ten, below, 234-2 51. 
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CHAPTER NI NE 
THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL OBJECTION 
A. The Dependence of Mind on Body. 
Ostwald tells us that the scientist is likely to be 
impa tient of Questions concerning immortality. He may say 
that such problems are outside the field of his scientific 
interest and subjects only for opinion and speculation. 
Or he may dismiss his interlocutor still more 
shortly by saying from his standpoint of matter-and-
motion: Soul is a function of living matter only. 
The moment life ceases i n an organized body the value 
of this function becomes zero, a nd there is no fur-
ther ques t ion about imnortality.l 
Willia.m Ja.rnes reports, 
One hears not only physiologists, but numbers 
of laymen who read the popular science b ooks and 
magaz ines, saying all about us, Row can we believe in 
life hereafter when Science has once for a l l attained 
to proving, beyond possibility of escape that our in-
ner life is a function of that famous material, the 
so-called t'gray matter" of our cerebral convolutions? 
How can the function possibly persist after its organ 
ha s undergone decay?2 
]~thews says flatly, 
Unless all modern psychologists are wrong, we 
cannot detach the self from matter ...• The individ-
ual, the sup eranimal, timeless qualities of life, the 
inevitable differences in t he outcome of acts, can -
not be detached fro.m a physical organism.3 
l Ostwald, IAI, 
2 James, HI, 7. 
Fiske, EL , 53-59. 
3 ]ifa thews , I CP , 
5 . 
Cf. Lake, Hfl.il:, 2, N. 1; Gordon, UTT, 27-31; 
28-29. Cf. Bixler, I fl'[ , 8; Clark, ICI, 9-ll. ll 
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There is much evi dence to support this view. This evidence \ 
must now be briefly summarized. 
1. Physical Organs of Sensation. 
Lake says, 
It is not because our generation enj oys life 
less, but because we understand it better, that so 
many turn their gaze away from the alluring picture 
of the continuance of existence as we know it now. 
For that better understanding has brought with it the 
conviction that the continuance of sensation is im-
possible without physical structure, a nd that the 
survilal of physical structure is ex tremely improb-
able. · 
The intimate connection of sensation and the organs of sense i s 
not a new discovery, nor is any technical investigation needed 
to g ive evidence of it. Opening and closing t he eyes discloses 
and banishes t he vision of one's environment. An injury to the 
ears may compe l a man to live the rest of h is days in a world 
of perpetual silence. It is when the hand touches the hot 
:stove that t he sensation of pain and heat occurs. These are 
I 
matters of common observation. One may, it is true, lose his 
hand by amputation and continue to feel sensations which in 
themselves are indistinguishable from t hose for.merly connected 
with t h e contacts of ~he fingers with various substances. But 
the afferent nerves which formerly joined hand and brain are 
still present, and altera tions in the stimuli at the cut ends 
! of these nerves are fol l owed by alterations in the sensation . 
I The sensa tion may be erroneously loca ted but its quality is de- 1 
4 Lake, B i?.i , 9. 
, pendent on a sense organ, just as before. If all the sense 
organs of the body and the sensations which accompany their 
stimulation were destroyed, what would remain of conscious-
201 
ness? Can consciousness be conceived as existing without 
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, or muscular 
sensations ? 
2. Neural Changes and Mental Changes. 
Jrunes, who discusses the psychophysiological objection 
at greater length than any other Lecturer, calls attention to 
other empirical data favoring the objection: 
Every one knows that arrests of brain develop-
ment occasion imbecility, that blows on the head abol-
ish memory or consciousness, and t hat brain stimulants 
and poisons change the quality of our ideas. The anat-
omists, physiologists, and pathologists have only shown 
this generally admitted fact of a dependence to be de-
tailed and minute. What the laboratories and hospitals 
have lately been teaching us is not only that thought 
in general is one of the brain's functions, but that 
the various special forms of thinking are functions of 
special portions of the brain. When we are thinking of 
things seen, it is our occipital convolutions that are 
active; when of things heard, it is a certain portion 
of our temporal lobes; when of things to be spoken, it 
is one of our frontal convolutions.5 
3. Glands and Personality. 
As Bixler points out, new d i scoveries frequently add fur 
ther evidence in support of the objection. 
And now, to the familiar psychological problems 
arising from the apparently necessary connection between 
consciousness and the nervous system, the new science 
of endoc~inology adds questions of its own. Absence of 
5 James, HI, 7-8. Cf. Mttnsterberg, PAL, 35-99. 
hormones or secretions in the blood means lack of 
capacity for personal development. The total amount 
of thyroxine needed by the body in one year, we read, 
is about three and a half grains. "But this pinch of 
material," an expert tells us, "spells all the dif-
ference between complete imbecility and normal health.n 
The briefest excursion into medical literature yields 
scores of illustrations of the principle that person-
ality cannot develop unless bodily conditions are ful-
filled.6 
4. The Common History of Body and Mind. 
202 
Gordon tells of the skeptic's objection "that the for-
tune of both soul and body seem identical." ]!ore specifically, 
The child new to earth and sky is as incapable 
mentally as it is physically. The growth of the 
physical organization is accompanied, in all normal 
cases, with a corresponding mental development. This 
process of increase is coincident to maturity, and in 
decline the coincidence is equally plain. Plato at 
seventy cannot think and write as he did at fifty; the 
mind that produced the Laws is no longer the genius 
that created the Republic .•.• John Henry :Newman has 
recorded his opinion that after seventy severe intel-
lectual exertion means death. And indeed t h is partici-
pation of both body and mind in a common fortune is un -
deniable. The helplessness of infancy, the vigor of 
youth, the power of manl1ood, and the decline of old age 
extend to the total expression of man's life. There is, 
as Aristotle7says, an old age of the mind, as well as of the body. 
Is not the conclusion overwhelmingly probable that the two his-
tories so intimately connected will cease together? 
5. A Serious Objection to Immortality. 
Such connections between the body and mind as have 
6 Bixler, IPJV[, 11-12. Cf. Watson, BEH, 53-63; Uontague, 
CSD, 24-26. 
7 Gordon, INT, 26-27. The allusion to Aristotle refers to 
the Politics, ii.9.23. 
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been pointed out constitute a serious objection to i nm1ortal-
ity.8 And data of the kind cited could be multiplied indefi-
nitely. 
How, in the f a ce of such cumulative empirical evidence 
can the belief in immortality be maintained? Several rep lies I 
are to be found in t h e Lectures and are paralleled in other re- 1_1 
cent literature. 
B. Replies to the Psychophysiological Objection. 
1. The Body Also Dependent on the Mind. 
a. Jl.'Iental Activities Affect the Body. 
I 
I 
Bixler is deeply impressed by the empirical data f avoring ! 
1 the t h eory t hat mi nd is a function of the body. One of his l 
I illustrations of such data has been given above. He adduces 
several oth ers and then adds, 
To use such illustrations is, however, merely 
to call attention t o others which point the opp osi te 
way. In hypnosis a power which we can only call men-
tal controls t h e body to t he point of p r oducing an-
a esthesia. A mental s hock can induce abnormal be-
havior and lead actually to death . The results of 
suggestion indicate the mental origin of many nervous 
disorders. Even the Freudian psychology, which seems 
at first to make unconscious s emi-mechanistic drives 
paramount, appeals in the end to an integrated, con-
trolling self . We must remember also that the role 
of mind i s ever greater as the evolutionary process 
unfolds. Passive at fi r st, and at the mercy of the 
physical, it f inally reaches a point where it uses 
the body f or its purposes. A similar change takes 
place in t he life of the individual. A child cries 
automatically when annoyed. An adult , however, can 
inhibit or reenr o.rce or initiate specific tendencies 
8 Cf. Fisk e, LE , 81 , a nd Go r don, I NT, 32. 
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to action. 9 
Indeed, many of the examples g iven by the mechanist to illus-
trate the causal dependence, or even the non-ex istence, of men 
tal activities, seem -co exemplify equally well or better, the 
causal dependence of the body on the mind. Consider t n e typ-
ical illustration given by J. Stanley Gray in a current issue 
of a psychological journal: 
The individual .is sti:cnulated by an en otional 
stimulation but does not feel the emotion until arter 
h is endocrines have functioned sufficiently to change 
his blood chemistry. Th e emotional feeling really 
does follow changes in physiological condition ...• 
Thus er;;.ot ion can be explained objectively as the in-
tense but temporary bodily behavior initiated by some 
sort o1· stimulation sufficient to bring about imme-
diate action of the endocrines (and a resultant change 
in blood chemistry), profound visceral activity, 
heightened muscle tonus, increa sed sensitivity .... He 
I: the human 11 organism"] feels himself behaving in that 
way called emotional ..•. This is no psychic state but 
physical behavior in response to internal stimulation.lO 
But each time the psychologist quoted comes to the crucial 
point in his description he lapses into generalities. He make 
it clear that a change in the blood effects a change in emo-
tional feeling, though one may pause to wonder what is meant 
by an emotional feeling which follows endocrine activity but 
which is "no psychic state." A more important issue is raised 
by the question what produces the change in the blood. Gray's 
answer is that "The individual is stimulated by an emotional 
stimulation," or, again, that the change is "in response to 
9 Bixler, IPM, 12-13. 
10 J. Stanley Gray, "An Objective Theory of :Emotion," The 
Psychological Review, 42 (1935) 115-116. 
,! 
II 
I 
I 
205 
internal stimulation." What, then, is an internal emotional 
stimulation? No further light being provided by Gray, our 
only recours e is to experience. I am sitting in a quiet room 
in a public library, bent over a book. Suddenly my heart beats 
more rapidly, a peculiar prickly sensation occurs at the back 
of my ne ck, my face becomes flushed, and I feel slightly 
choked. I fear that if the behaviorist were near he would be 
able to observe too readily that my endocrine glands were badly 
I misbehaving. But why? What "stimulation" has compelled them? 
I am sure he could not even guess. He would doubtless think 
that a visual sensation caused by light reflected from certain 
printed forms on the pages of the book was respo nsible. But 
he would be quite wrong. The truth can only be known by the 
introspection he so heartily despises. ~~ thoughts had momen-
tarily wandered from the book to other subjects, apparently 
I 
altogether irrelevant. And suddenly there came to me the real- 1 
ization that I had made a very important engagement for last 
eveni ng, and then had completely forgotten it until now. It 
was at the moment of this remembrance that I began to exhibit 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
the uncomfortable symptoms of endocrine misbehavior. I cannot I 
doubt that certain changes in my body have contributed to my 
feeling of discomfort. But these changes in the body were 
caused by a thought in the mind, a thought about a situation 
many miles away f rom my body and in past time. 
I 
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b. This Fact Does Not Prove the Mind Independent of the Body. 
The true relation of mind and body, then, would seem to 
be an interaction rather than a one-sided dependence. But the 
demonstration of the mind's effects on the body does not prove 
the mind to be independent of the body. No one doubts that a 
fire causes profound changes in the log it burns. But it is 
equally certain that when the log is all consumed, the fire 
will cease, unless it can make a successful leap to new fuel. 
c. Yet It Refutes Any Epiphenomenal Theory of Consciousness. 
However, when anyone contends that the life of the mind 
is a mere epiphenomenon, an insignificant, superfluous accompa-
niment of certain biological processes, having no more effect 
on the real physical world than the shadow of a locomotive has 
on the engine, such facts as have been pointed out would seem 
sufficient refutation. Only an abstraction-mad theorist could 
really believe that all the activities of men's bodies, their 
intricate manufactures, the composition of symphonic music, the 
writing of poetic drama, the production of volumes on behavior-
! 
j ism, all are caused solely by chemical reactions and the me-
chanical play of physical movements an1ong atoms and molecules 
absolutely uninfluenced by evaluating purpose or rational 
thought. 11 
11 Cf. Fosdick, SV, 28-33, and below, 235-239. 
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2. The Doctrine of Bodily survival. 
a. The Resurrection in Historic Theology. 
Lake believes that modern psychology and primitive 
Christian theology are in substantial agreement regarding the 
relation of mind and body, but draw contrary inferences con-
cerning immortality. He says, 
The phenomena of life as we now live it, includ-
ing t h e facts of consciousness and the whole complicat-
ed process of sensory existence are bound up with the 
body. The modern scientist and the early Christian are 
in complete agreement on this point, and there has been 
a curious revival and reversal of early arguments. The 
modern man has aff irmed the validity of primitive 
Christian reasoning as to a Resurrection of the Flesh 
while denying the final conclusion. He treats as a 
reductio ad absurdum what to the early Chr istian was a 
demonstr ation, but he , accepts the intermediate argu-
ments. Thus the difference between them is that the 
early Christian, postulating a future life, insisted 
that in that life man must have a body, while the mod-
ern scientist, postulating the dissolution of the £~dy, 
argues t hat therefore there can be no future life. 
There is ground for protest against Lake's sweeping attributio 
of skepticism concerning immortality to "the modern scientist." 
Modern scientists differ. 13 But as a comparison between the 
views of primitive Christians and the grounds upon which many 
modern scientists base their denial of immortality, Lake's ac-
count seems substantially correct. And the primitive Christian 
belief in the resurrection of the human body is an answer to 
the problem raised by the demonstrable importance of t he body 
to the mind. If the dead and decomposed corpses of men are to 
12 Lake, IW~ , 18. 
13 Cf. Leete, CIS t 309-341. 
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be miraculously refashioned to serve again as instruments of 
the soul, then the dependence of soul on body may be accepted 
without logical damage to the belief in immortality. The 
resurrection of the fleshly body is not, however, a possibilit~ 
entertained in any of the Lectures, nor ought it to commend 
itself to any thoughtful person of the present age.l4 
b. Mathews' Hypothesis. 
:Mathews states that "we cannot dissociate consciousness 
from the trillions of cells that make up our physical organ-
ism."15 He does not, however, mean by this statement to deny 
immortality. For he has a conception of "our physical organ-
ism" by which he evades the psychophysiological objection in a 
manner similar to that of the primitive Christian. His view, 
which he states in hypothetical for.m, is 
that the evolutionary drive is within the personality 
of the individual rather than within the animal ves-
tiges which now condition personality. If this were 
the case, such elements of the stuff of the physical 
organism as find expressi on in personal activity would 
maintain a dynamic relationship with the cosmos and so 
survive the destruction of those other elements of 
matter which it shares with sub-personal organisms .... 
This ... hypothesis has this in its favor, that it im-
plies that any process of developing personality must 
be within the limits set by personality itself, and is 
so far an extension of the theory of the possibility 
of new expression of the potentialities within the ul-
timate activity in the form we call matter. As the 
14 The theory that a ~ instrument or medium of social ex-
change will serve the mind after death in place of the present 
organism is a different notion, implying a denial of the essen-
tial dependence of the mind on the present body. Cf. Lake, 
nJ11r, 38-44, and below, 
15 Mathews, ICP, 38. Cf. above, 199. 
----- ··---
-
======-=-~-=~~==~====-=- ---~================================~== 
history of the evolution ot· human personality is that 
of a co6rdination of the ultimate cosmic stuff through 
atoms and molecules and cells into organisms, the pro-
jection of the process wi l l be in the same direction. 
It will not be away from personality. ~~atever ele-
ments ot· the physical organism disappear, matter would 
be in a new combination, not a new disintegration. 
Such a view, perhaps unexpectedly, makes the spiritual 
body o:r Paul seem not qui t e so remote as it was when 
we were dominated by the dualism of static matter and 
an independent soul. If our psychology really describes 
ourselves, and if evolution gives us any basis for a 
belief in immortality, some sort of physic~l instrument 
of continued consciousne ss is impera1.ive.l6 
209 
That there occurs in this passage an important shifting of po-
sition is evident. For whatever may be the ''new combination" 
in which the matter of the human body becomes organized after 
death, it is certain t hat it does not include "the trillions 
i of cells whicil make up our physical organism" a nd from which I, 
t he objector thinks consciousness cannot be dissociated. It is I 
true that many of the molecules in t hose cells may eventually 
find their way into oth ers with which some oth er mind is as 
inextricably associated. But this fact does not increase t he 
probability of personal immortality. 
It seems clear that :Mathews does not really think that a 
given individual consciousness must be associated with the 
"trillions of cells 1' with which it i s now connected, b ut only 
that it requires "some sort of physical ins t r ument oi' con -cinued 
consciousness, :: i. e., it must have "whatever has made the 
I 
I 
I 
I 
cells of the brain capable of thoughts and ideals."17 Unfortu- 1 
nately, he does not suggest vthat sort of physical instrument 1l 
16 Ma thews, ICP , 45-47. 
1 7 Ib i d . , 31 . 
I 
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seems li.kely ~t:-o rel:iain when the body dies, nor what it is that 
gives to the cells of the brain their ability to think. 
3. Relative Psychological Dualism. 
a. Distinguished from Metaphysical Dualism. 
Another reply to the objection is that the mind is not 
dependent on the body, e.l though it may be admitted that mind 
and body interact during their contemporaneous careers. This 
relative psychological dualism is not to be confused with an 
ultimate metaphysical dualism. 18 The relative psychological 
dualism might conceivably be combined with a metaphysical ma-
t . 1. 19 er1.a 1.sm. It might be argued that the body and mind were 
both organizations of matter, interacting with each other but 
not dependent on one another for existence, just as two gears 
in a machine may intermesh and so move one another for many 
years, yet continue to exist when separated and used as parts 
in a new contrivance. On the other hand it may be combined 
I with metaphysical idealism. Gordon, c:md many others, believe 
I that a man's body exists only as experience of minds, yet it 
can exist as external perception in the experience of other 
minds when it ceases to be a part of his own experience, and 
he continues to exist in and for himself and in a new society, I 
after his friends have had the sad experience which they de- ., 
18 This confusion is largely responsible for Lamont's over-
isimplification of the problem of immortality, to which atten-
tion was called in the introduction, above, 14. Bergson makes 
the distinction clearly in his LES, 31. 
19 This combination does not actually occur in the Lectures, 
Jnor, in view of all the facts, would it be reasonable. Cf. 
, below, 234-235. 
I 
ll 
211 
-- ====tJ:============-· ==-=-c=-======:-=-:- ===-::===========j:J=c--=:-=== 
scribe as seeing him die and as the laying away of h is body in 
the grave. 20 
The theory now under discussion is not, then, a theory 
about the metaphysical being of body and mind or their rela-
tione with the rest of the universe. It is only a theory about 
the relation of a man's body with his consciousness. And the 
theory in question asserts that this relation is an accident 
and not a property of man's consciousness, so that the mind may 
exist and continue to be mind when its interaction with the 
body has ceased. This doctrine has appeared in a number of 
for.ms in the Lectures and other recent thought. Several of 
these forms will be briefly examined. 
b. James's Transmission Theory. 
1) The Theory Described. 
The second Ingersoll Lecture, that of William James, is 
devoted almost entirely to a refutation of the psychophysiolog-
ical objection to ~ortality. James begins by postulating 
"the great psycho-physiological formula: Thought is a function 
of the brain."21 Then he insists that 
~ven though our souls' life (as here below it is re-
vealed to us) may be in literal strictness the func-
tion of a brain that perishes, yet it is not at all 
Lmpossible, but on the contrary, quite possible, that 
the life may still continue when the brain itself is 
dead.22 
20 Cf. below, 230-232 . 
21 James, HI, 10. 
22 Ibid., 12. 
i 
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For, James points out, there are various kinds of function. 
If the brain engenders consciousness 
in its interior, much as it engenders cholesterin and 
creatin and carbonic acid, its relation to our soul's 
life must also be called productive function. Of 
course if such production be the function, then when 
the organ perishes, since the production can no longer 
continue, the soul must surely die.23 
But there are other kinds which he calls permissive or releas-
ing function (like that of a crossbow trigger) and transmissive 
function. It is the latter which James thinks most likely to 
be the true relation of mind to body. In recording the re-
sults of scientific observation, he is convinced, 
we can only write down the bare fact of concomitance;24 
and all talk about either production or transmission, 
as the mode of taking place, is pure superadded hy-
p othesi s , and metaphysical hypothesis at that, for we 
can frame no more notion of the details on the one al-
ternative than on the other. Ask for any indication 
of the exact process either of transmission or of pro-
duction, and Science confesses her imagination to be 
bankrupt .... Into the mode of production of steam in 
a tea-kettle we have conjectural insight, for the terms 
that change are physically homogeneous one with another, 
and we can easily imagine the case to consist of nothing 
but alterations of molecular motion. But in the pro-
duction of consciousness by the brain, the terms are 
heterogeneous natures altogether; and as far as our un-
derstanding goes, it is as great a miracle as if we said 
Thought is 'spontaneously generated,' or 'created out 
of nothing. ' 
The theory of production is therefore not a jot 
more simple or credible in itself than any other con-
ceivable theory. 25 
In place of the theory of production, James would posit a 
theory of transmission which he approaches through a concep-
23 James, HI, 13. 
24 Cf. Gordon, INT, 43-44. 
25 James, HI, 20-22. 
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of natural experience, as we get it, to be but a II· 
time-mask, shattering or refracting the one infinite 
Thought which is the sole reality into those millions 
of finite streams of consciousness known to us as our j 
private selves. 
"Life, like a dome of many-colored glass, 
Stains the white radiance of eternity." 
Suppose, now, that this were really so, and sup-
pose, moreover, that the dome, opaque enough at all 
times to the full super-solar blaze, could at certain 
times and places grow less so, and let certain beams 
pierce through into this sub-lunary world. These 
bea~s would be so many finite rays, so to speak, of 
consciousness, and they would vary in quantity and 
quality as the opacity varied in degree ...• 
Admit now that our brains are such thin and half-
transparent places in the veil. What will happen? 
Vmy, as the white radiance comes through the dome, with 
all sorts of staining and distortion imprinted on it 
by the glass, ••. even so the genuine matter of reality, 
the life of souls as it is in its fullness, will break 
through our several brains into this world in all sorts 
of restricted forms, and with all the imperfections and 
queernesses that characterize our finite individualities 
here below. 
According to the state in wh ich the brain finds 
itself, the barrier of its obstructiveness may also be 
supposed to rise or fall ..•. And when finally a brain 
stops acting altogether, or decays, t hat special stream 
of consciousness which it subserved will vanish entire-
ly from this natural world. But the sphere of being 
that supplied the consciousness would still be intact; 
and in that more real world with which, even whilst 
here, it was continuous, the consci~gsness might, in 
ways unknown to us, continue still. 
2) Advantages Claimed for This Theory. 
This theory, James believes, has "certain positive su-
periorities"2? over the production theory. These advantages 
are: 
26 James, HI, 15-18. 
2? Ibid., 23. 
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[11 It puts itself in touch with general ideal-
istic phi lQsophy better than the production-theory 
does ..•• 
[2] It puts itself also in touch with the con-
ception of a 'threshold,'--a word with which, since 
Fechner wrote his book called "Psychophysik," the so-
called "new Psychology 11 has run. 
[3] The tran~nission-theory also puts itself in 
touch with a whole class of experiences that are with 
difficulty explained by the production-theory. I re-
fer to those obscure and excep tional phenomena re-
ported at all times throughout human history, wh i ch 
the 'psychical-researchers,' with }ft . Frederic V&ers 
at their head, are doing so much to rehabilitate; such 
phenomena, namely, as religious conversions, provi-
dential leadings in answer to prayer, instantaneous 
h ealings, pr~1onitions, apparitions at time of death, 
clairvoyant visions or impressions, and the whole range 
of mediumistic capacities, to say nothing of still more 
exceptional and incomprehensible things .... 2B 
with a[ ii 1-!l~~r:~~t!~~2~dvantage of not conflicting 
3) An Ill-Supported Theory. 
The first claim made by James for his theory derives 
214 
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I 
I 
1
t·orce only from a prior acceptance of an idealistic metaphys-
; 
I 
1 ics. And idealism offers an independent refutation of the 
psychophysiological objecti~ns which does not require James's 
fantas t ic n otion of the brain as a filter allowing little 
streams of t ranscendental Mind to trickle through into finite 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
II 
consciousness. 30 The only important point of agreement between 1 
James's theory and idealism would seem to be the common denial 
iof the mind's dependence 
I 
'
, _ __ _ 
28 Cf. above, 8o - 87. 
I 29 James, HI, 23-28 . 30 See below, 230 - 233 . 
on the body. 31 As for the second 
31 The monistic conception adapted 1·rom certain forms of ab-
solute idealism James insists is merely illustrative and not 
essential to his theory. See James, HI, 58, N. 5. 
I 
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advantage, while Fechner's observations can readily be inter-
preted in accordance with James's theory, such an interpreta.-
tion does no-c seem to be necessary. The "threshold" may be 
explained as a purely physical resistance occurring at certain 
synapses, preventing weak nervous impulses from passing into 
those parts of the brain which produce and co ntrol conscious-
ness. The psychical data to which James calls attention do 
seem to be impossible to explain it one begins with the assump-
tion that every state of consciousness is caused by a movement 
1 in the organism. As we have seen, the psychical research soci-
/ eties have not gathered evidence sufficient to prove the ex-
1 
istence of a future life, put 
that which is apparently established beyond all reason-
able doubt is that the mind of man is open to sources 
of knowledge which cannot be operative through the or-
dinary channels of our so-called sense experience.3G 
But these data, while implying a psychological dualism, would 
not seem to imply necessarily the "transcendental 11 conception 
of mind suggested by James. 33 The fourth advantage claimed 
for the transmission theory is valid evidence only if the be-
lief in immortality is true. 
4) James's Theory Does Not Cle~rly Imply Immortality. 
But what is the being which, according to James, con-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
tinues to exist when the human body dies? It is nthe sphere of 1 
32 J'viackenzie, MCI, 36-37. Cf. above, 82. 
33 The term ''transcendental" is James's. See his HI, 58, 
N. 5. 
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being that supplied the consciousness,"34 or the "something 
mental that pre-exists, and is larger than 11 our raincls.35 But 
is this immortality? Vfuen a man asks whether he is to live 
after death is he to be told that something mental which is 
larger than himself and which existed before hun will live af-
ter him? Such a conception seems to belong among the substi-
tutes for immortality36 and not among the ideas of immortality 
I itself. It is true James insists that this "more real world 11 
which is immortal ''supplied the consciousness and is continu-
ous" with it even while consciousness is "here."37 But con-
tinuity is of many kinds, and does not necessarily imply iden-
tity. There seems to be little reason to suppose that if 
James's hypothesis is true the present individual self-con-
scousness will live on in the immortal mind "behind the 
scenes." Rather, it would appear that the individual human 
I 
I 
:I 
I I!. 1 consciousness would probably cease to be when the brain ceased 
1 
its activity at death. 
c. Bergson's Dualism. 
1) The Outlines of the Theory. 
A theory of the psychophysiological relation superficial-
ly similar to James's but essentially different and also much 
more precisely conceived and effectively supported by evidence, 
34 James, HI, 18. 
35 Ibid., 58, N. 5. 
36 Cf. above, 17-20. 
37 James, HI, 18. 
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is the dualism38 of Henri Bergson. Briefly described, his 
theory is that "the psychical state" is "in most cases, imm€!18 
ly wider than the cerebral state." He explains, 
I mean that the brain state indicates only a 
very small part of the mental state, that part which 
is capable of translating itself into movements of 
locomotion. Take a complex thought which unrolls it-
self in a chain of abstract reasoning. This thought 
is accompanied by images, that are at least nascent. 
And these i mages themselves are not pictured in con-
s~ousness without some foreshadowing, in the for.m of 
a sketch or a tendency, of the movements by which 
these images would be acted or played in space,--
would, that is to say, impress particular attitudes 
upon the body, and set free all that they implicitly 
contain of spatial movement. Now, of all the thought 
which is unrolling, this, in our view, is what the ce-
rebral state indicates at every moment. He who could 
penetrate into the interior of a b r ain and see what 
happens there, would probably obtain full details of 
these sketched-out, or prepared, movements; there is 
no proof that he would learn anything else. Were he 
endowed with a superhuman intellect, did he possess 
the key to psycho-physiology, he would know no more 
of what is going on in the corresponding consciousness 
than we should know of a play from the comings and go-
ings of the actors upon the stage. 
That is to say, the relation of the mental to 
the cerebral is not a constant, any more than it is a 
simple, relation. According to the nature of the play 
that is being acted, the movements of the players tell 
us more or less about it: nearly everything, if it is 
a pantomine; next to nothing, if it is a delicate com-
edy. Thus our cerebral state contains more or less of 
our mental state in the measure that we reel off our 
psychic life into action or wind it up into pure know-
38 Bergson says in his introduction to the English transla-
tion of .1'1!EM, "This book affirms the reality of spirit and the 
reality of matter. • . • It is, then, frankly dualistic." (IiWI, 
vii) This metaphysical dualism does not seem to be final, how-
ever. Cf. Bergson, LEC, especially 203-294. At any rate, we 1 
are not here concerned with metaphysical dualism, which is 1 
readily distinguishable from the psychological dualism in ques- J 
tion, as Bergson himself points out. See his LES, 31. 
I 
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It must not be supposed, however, that the pantomine of though 
which is the function of the brain does not affect and alter 
consciousness. 
La symphonie depasse de tous cDtes les mouve-
ments cdu baton du chef d'orchestreJ qui la scandent; 
la vie de l'esprit deborde de meme la vie cerebrale. 
Mais le cerveau, justement parce qu'il extrait de la 
vie de l'espr it tout ce qu'elle a de jouable en mouve-
ment et de material isable, justement parce qu'il con-
stitue ainsi le p oint d'insertion de l'esprit dans la 
matiere, assure a tout instant l' adaptation de l'esprit 
aux circonstances, maintient sans cease l'esprit en 
contact avec des realites. Il n'est done pas, a propre-
ment parler, organe de pensee, en de sentiment, ni de 
conscience; mais il fait que conscience, sentiment et 
pensee restent tendus sur la vie reelle et par conse-
quent capables d'action efficace. Disons, si vous vou-
l~z,48ue le cerveau est l'organe de l'attention a la 
v~e. 
2) Supported by Empirical Evidence. 
The empirical evidence seems to favor Bergson's view 
rather than either behaviorism41 or the doctrine of strict 
parallelism. Not only does his theory explain quite as well 
the data by which the rival conceptions are supported, 42 but it J 
renders a much more coherent account of many other scientific-
ally observed phenomena. Especially does it explain, with 
I 
reference to memory, 1) how one's memory may have ready for re- ' 
call literally thousands of images of the s rune object as seen I 
39 Bergson, MAJfl , 
quotation is taken 
of MEM. 
x111-xiv. The introduction from 
appears only in MAM, the English 
40 Bergson, LES, 50-51. 
41 Cf. above, 203-205, and 206, 
42 Cf . Bergson, LES, 33-36. 
and below, 
I' which the :! 
translation ~ ~ 
I 
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at different times and from various points of view, 2) why, in 
progressive aphasia, regardless of the for.m of the disease, 
its causes, and the parts of the cerebral speech convolutions 
affected, the various kinds of words are always lost to recall 
in the srune order, the nouns being lost first and verbs last. 
I 
tain local structure in the brain, t hese facts seem quite 
~er- I If each image, word, or idea in memory corresponds with a 
1nex- l 
. Plicable. But they are just what Bergson's theory would lead I 
one to expect. For if this theory is true, memories are pre-
served in. the mind, t hat is, in consciousness itself, and not 
in the brain. As tor the brain, then, 
il ne sert pas a conserver le passe, mais a le masquer 
d'abord, puis a en laisser transparaitre ce qui est 
pratiquement utile .... Degageant de l'esprit ce qui 
est exteriorisable en mouvement, inserant l'esprit 
dans ce cadre moteur, il l'ameme ~limiter le plus sou-
vent sa vision, mais aussi a rendre son action effi-
cace. C'est dire que l'esprit d~borde le cerveau de 
toutes parts, et que l'activite cerebrale ne a2pond I 
qu'a une infime partie de l'activite mentale. 
I 
When disease strikes that part of the brain which serves to 11 
recall words, according to Bergson, then it first becomes un- l1 
able to perform its function when the tendency to movement is 
weakest, i. e. in si tua ti ons wllich would normally serve to re-
.call nouns. 
I 
But even at a more advanced stage of t he disease, 
i . lthe urgent 1mpulses to 
I 
would be able to break 
43 Bergson, LES, 61. 
44 Ibid. , 55-61. 
action which serve to recall verbs 
through the morbid tissue. 44 
I 
I 
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3) Implications Favorable to ilamortality. 
Bergson's theory of the relation between mind and body, 
if it is true, constitutes a refutation of the psychophysio-
logical objection to immortality. For if 
la vie mentale d~borde la vie c~r~brale, si le cer-
veau se borne a traduire en mouvements une petite 
partie de ce qui se passe dans la conscience, alors 
la survivance devient si vraisemblable que l'obliga-
tion de la preuve incombera a celui qui nie, bien 
plutot qu'a celui qui affirme; car l'unique raison 
de croire a une extinction de la conscience apres la 
mort est qu'on voit le corps se desorganiser, et 
cette raison n'a plus de valeur si l'independance de 
la presque totalite de la conscience a l'egard du 
corps est, elle aussi, un fait que l'on constate. 45 
Even if Bergson ' s theory is not true in detail, his argument 
does seem to refute conclusively the claim that scientific ob-
servation has established the strict parallelism of mind and 
body. And if strict parallelism is not established, certainly / 
I 
the theory of existential dependence of mind on body is not 
established. The psy chophysiological objection to immortality 
is thus shown to be inconclusive. 
d. Montague's Theory of the Self as a Physical Field. 
1) A Physical Soul. 
Montague has no hope of finding the mind or "any conceiv-
ably adequate ground for it" in 11 the reflex arcs of physiology, I 
in the relations of chemistry, and in the whirling atoms of 
physics."46 But he suggests that the mind may yet be a phys-
45 Bergson, LES, 62-63. Cf. LDS, 282-283. 
46 Montague, CSD, 51. 
'I 
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ical being. 
a) An Excursion Into ~hysics. 
I Montague reminds us that I 
There is ... something else in the physical world be-
sides the material particles a~~ their motions. There 
is that which is between them. • 
221 
This "medium"48 he defines, following Einstein and Hink owski, 
as "a single four-dimensional continuum called 'space-time. 111 49 
Under a certain stress there occurs "a non-Euclidean warp or 
bend or wrinkle in space-time or in the field." 50 Sometimes 
such a warp is "temporary and due to flatten out when the par-
ticles which determine it move away." such a temporary warp is 
called a "strain." But some warps are permanent, we are told, 
and one of this kind is called a "set.n5l 
b) The Four Grades of Fields. 
There are, according to :Montague, four "grades or lev-
els1152 of fields , which he calls "for want of better names," 
(1) the mechanical or inorganic; (2) the vital or vege-
tative; (3) the animal or sensory; and (4) the personal 
or rational.53 
o<. Ivre chanical. 
The mechanical field may be illustrated by such examples 
47 Montague, CSD, 51. 
48 Ibid •• 51-52. 
49 Ibid., 53. Cf. Alexander, STD. 
50 Montague, CSD, 53. 
51 Ibid., 53-54. 
52 Ibid., 74. 
53 Ibid. 
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chanical fields, 
there seems to be no case in which the field of force 
is not completely depeggent upon the bodies and ele-
ments that support it. 
~- Vital or Vegetative. 
Now a mechanical field has the power to extend or even 
I reproduce its own peculiar Gestalt. A magnetic field, to use 
I a familiar example, can induce its own powers in masses of ~~ 
1 sui table material which come within its field, and these masses, j 
I 
1 in turn, can reproduce the magnetic pattern in other fields, 
I if suitable "food" comes within the area of their influence. 
But in such "reproduction," each new generation is weaker than 
its predecessor. 
No mere mechanical field possesses the power to anabo-
lize or assimilate the energies of the environment and 
so increase its strength and grow.57 
The power of anabolism is a conspicuous mark of superiority in 
vital or vegetative fields. By means of it, protoplasmic 
fields are able to reproduce themselves without diminution. 
54 Montague, CSD, 75. 
55 Ibid., 56. The field-pattern of iron filings affected by 
a magnet is a pretty example cited by Montague. 
56 Montague, CSD, 75. 
57 Ibid., 79. 1 
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Moreover, they sometimes actually increase in complexity. For 
sometimes the new induced fields remain together in a cluster, 
and each new field induced by this cluster has the Gestalt of 
the cluster as well as that of an individual cell. These new 
fields are known to us as seeds. 58 But though vital fields 
thus clearly show their superiority to the merely mechanical, 
their own comparatively low grade is revealed by their resem-
blance to the mechanical 
in that their powers are all directed to the forming 
of material structures and to the motions of those 
structures and their parts. Hence to the possibil-
ity of their survival we can only answer as before. 
If any trace of merely vital fields continues in ex-
istence after the dissolution of the bodies which 
they formed, the significance, if any, of such pro-
toplasmic wraiths would lie not in themselves, but 
in their contribution to the meaning of a large~whole, 
a cosmic memory in which they were contained.59 
~· Sensory or Animal. 
Sensory or animal fields differ from the vital or vegeta-
tive chiefly in two respects. First, the animal field acts not 
lonly upon the immediate environment but also upon that which is 
distant in space or in time or both. Its own peculiar stamp is 
put upon the past, in memory, and on the future, in purpose, 
while it seeks often for material which is not near at hand. 
Secondly, its reaction to stimulus is often postponed, and its 
tendencies which are meanwhile held in check, and denied release 
in action on the environment, oppose or reinforce one another, 
58 Cf. Montague, CSD, 80. 
59 Ibid., 80-81. 
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merge in new combinations, and form new qualities of the kind 
often called "tertiary,"60 i. e., 
the purely internal relations of the phases of the 
psychic field to one another. They are such things 
as pleasantness and unpleasantness, anger, curiosity, 
and tenderness, and the indefinitely rich totality 
of those forms both simple and complex that are felt 
to be essentially and exclusively menta1.6l 
We have seen that mechanical and vital fields cannot, 
at least in significant form, survive the configurations of ma-
terial particles which gave rise to them. But Montague is not 
so sure about animal fields. 
The question as to whether an animal mind will 
die with its body is the question as to whether a sys-
tem of energy-forms consisting of tertiary or non-
guantitative qualities can translate its full nature 
into tbe purely quantitative energ~es of the decaying 
nervous system. To me it seems difficult to conceive 
that even such humble qualities as pleasure and fear 
could find their equivalents in the motions of atoms 
and molecules. Yet unless the mind or memory system 
of an animal, which is the field built up in his brain 
during life, can be flattened out and adequately ex-
pressed in the mere motions ensuing upon his death, it 
must endure as an ineffaceable trace of what it was. 
Such ghosts of purely sensory or subrational minds, if 
indeed they do persist, would seem to possess no in-
trinsic significance, and to have no function except 
as items in some larger whole. For though the soul of 
an animal is not directly a mere builder of organs and 
tissues, and thus differs from the soul of a plant, it 
does seem indirectly to be concerned almost exclusive-
ly with preserving its body and the other bodies of its 
species. Apart from the bodily life to which it min-
isters, albeit only indirectly, it would seem to have 
no way of functioning or of expressing the kind of po-
tentialities of which it is constituted.62 
I' 
I 
60 Cf. Montague, CSD, 81-85. Montague believes that primary i 
!qualities are objective and effectual in physical relations, I jwhile secondary qualities are objective but ineffectual or epi-
!phenomenal. CSD, 84-85. Jl 
i 61 Mo~tague, CSD, 86. : 
l 62 IbJ.d., 86-87. I' 
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8. Rational Fields. 
With man the situation is much different. For in him 
The traces of the past stored up in memory attain suffi-
cient strength to function in and for themselves, rather 
than as mere guides to bodily conduct. Instead of the 
past and the future and the imagined being utilized only 
for present action, present action is utilized for them 
and their enjoyment. Instead of mind as organ of the 
body, body becomes an organ of the mind, a nd the whole 
material set-up is, or may be, treated as the means a nd 
t h e occasion for personal and cultural ends. Fancy, 
freed from the fetters of p resent bodily needs, presents 
us with a world of waking dreams, with p romises that far 
outrun performance and make us humble and ashamed at 
wha~3we are when t hought of in the light of what we might be. 
2) Three Possible Forms of Immortality. 
Iviontague believes that rational fields, i. e., human 
I 
,, 
minds, are probably immortal, since their structure seems to be l 
essentially internal and independent of t heir relations with 
material particles, and t heir energ ies seem to be of kinds im-
possible to translate i n to mere movements. 64 While death may, 
h e concedes, end a11, 65 it is more probable, he thinks, that 
t h e rational field or mind survives p ermanently in one of three 
fo r.ms, the comparative p robability of which n e does not discuss. 
These p ossible fonas of lirrmortality are as f ollows: 
The first and lowest of t h ese prospects is mere 
continuance in existence of the memory-system ...• 
But this for us means hardly more than everlasting 
sleep. Just as a body can be embalmed or frozen in 
some glacier and thus endure and not decay, so would 
63 ]I:'Iontague , CSD, B ?- 88. 
64 See ibid., 86- 8 7 and 93-96. 
65 Ibid., 90. 
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our memories endure exactly as they were at death, 
congealed within the greater memory of the universe 
itself whose past would go on with it, but as its 
past, and so unchanged. 
The second prospec ·t; is that life continues 
not merely in existence as something that has been, 
but really awake and quick as now it is, and with 
that power of ever further grov1th that seems all but 
definitive of life's essence. 
The third and highest p rospect i'or eternity is 
that p ersonal life, at least, not only goes on grow-
ing but wins to some strange mystic un2on vn th ·t.hat 
greater Life in which it has its little being. Pre-
cious and indispensable for value as personality ap-
pears, there is about it something tragically want-
ing; and as in every 1'ini te thing, but more acutely, 
a sort of wound t hat cries lor healing. rt· that 
vaguely longed-1-or supp.Lement to our being should 
come, and come without the annihilation of such be-
ing as we already have, then would eternity hold out 
to us the prospect g~ someth2ng unimaginably more 
than mere survival. 
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The 1·irst of these possibilities does not seem to be a 
possibility of hnmortality. It would seem to be a conception 
of a potential consciousness never to become again actual, 
like the potential energy of a rock hurled to a mountain sum-
mit and, while potentially a crushing, terrifying force, 
destined actually to remain there forever, motionless and 
dead. Change and life are of the very essence of conscious-
ness.67 Though the memory of a man were to remain as a field 
of potential energy ready to become conscious the instant a 
new organism becomes possessed by it, if no new organism is 
forthcoming, such a "survival" cannot be called the survival 
of a person. 
66 Montague, CSD, 97-98. 
67 See above, 46-48. 
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The second and third "prospects" plainly fall within the 
terms of our definition of i~nortality. 68 
3) Conclusions Concerning ]!Iontague' s Theory. 
a) Mind ~~Y Win Independence of Body. 
Montague's theory constitutes a highly original and sug-
gestive statement of the possibility that the mind may be, dur-1 
I 
ing its development, dependent on the physical organism, yet 
win a final independence. This does seem to be a possibility. 
b) Spatial Concepts of Mind Inadequate. 
The description of mind as a "field" may, perhaps, be 
pedagogically useful in guiding persons accustomed to thinking 
1 
only in physical terms to a more satisfactory view of mind. As I 
I a metaphysical statement of truth, however, it seems ·inadequate. ! 
Certain purposes of mathematics and phy sics are doubtless I 
I 
served by the description of magnetic and electrostatic fields 
as warpings of space-time. Such a field can be observed only 
as "a regulating or organizing agency, a kind of Gestalt with 
reference to the things in it.n69 External observation gives 
lonly this sort of acquaintance with mind. But Montague is not 
I 
1 so obsessed with a theory as to deny with the behaviorists that 
introspection is observation. He f inds that in mind "Fancyp 
freed from the fetters of present bodily needs, presents us 
68 See above, 15-16. 
69 Montague, CSD, 54. 
I 
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with a world of waking dreams." 70 These "waking dreams," 
especially when they take the form of ideal value experiences71 . 
seem quite incommensurate with the forms of mathematical phys- I 
ics, even when our credulity and imagination are stirred by the 
idea of a four-dimensional space. 72 Montague would reply that 
nevertheless, 
What I, from within, would call my sensations 
are neither more nor less than what you, from with-
out, would describe as the forms of potential energy 
to which the kinetic energies of neural stimuli 
would necessarily give rise in passing through my 
brain. 73 
But the point is that "you, from without" miss what is most 
essential in the psychic life. A may describe B as the writer 
of a letter which A has just received. The description may be 
true, but is sure to be an extremely inadequate description of 
B, who does other things besides writing, and is far more than 
the writer of the letter in question. Just so a description 
of a mind as that which imposes a unique type of Gestalt on II 
I 
matter is true, but grossly inadequate, for mind is much more, /1 
as it knows by observing itself. Since }.J[ontague recognizes 11 
this fact, his view ought not to be called materialistic. 
/ 
he makes this recognition at the cost of a serious internal 
inconsistency. 
70 1•t'rontague, CSD, 55. 
71 Cf. Ibid., 88-89. 
72 Cf. Montague's statement in Fullerton, EPP, 105. 
73 Montague in Fullerton, EPP, 129. 
But I 
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c) Montague's Positive Argwnent for Immortality Is an 
Argument from Values. 
Montague's const r uctive argument for immortality, as 
229 
contrasted with his refutation of the psychophysiological ob-
jection, is essentially the now familiar argument from the 
objectivity of values. The physical terminology which he em-
ploys serves slightly to obscure, but does not fundamentally 
change, the character of the reasoning. Consider, e. g., the 
following passage: 
There would be more point in the continuance 
through eternity of the poor brute being who, despite 
the limitations of his mental span of comprehension, 
could go through pain and death for loyalty than there 
would be in the eternal continuance of the cleverest 
human rogue who ever lived. These ethical comparisons 
of animal and human values may not be so irrelevant to 
the hard world of fact as they might seem. For if we 
translate the idealistic language of evaluation which 
we have just been using into physical or materialistic 
language in terms of which our main discussion has 
been conducted, we can say that there well may be a 
chance that the moral qualities of a psychic field 
would be less easily reduced to mere material motions 
than would ~ie intellectual, and therefore mo r e likely 
to survive.l 
It will be readily seen that the ground suggested here for be-
lief in immortality is the possibility that ethical evalua-
tions Hmay not be so irrelevant to the hard wor l d of fact as 
they might seem," i. e., the possibility that ethical values 
may ·be objective. 75 The objectivity of values seems to remain, 
however, a possibility only. The only logical implication of 
74 J.;Iontague, CSD, 94-95. 
75 Cf. the definition of objectivity of value, above, 104. 
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i Montague 's argument, for our main problem, would seem, then,~~ 
I I 1 be I 
the possibility that immortality may be true. 
I 4. Idealism. 
a. What Is Matter? 
Throughout the present chapter we have spoken as if the 
material character of the body were too well known to require 
explanation. But when the question is asked what is meant by 
I ;matter, the answers are various. As Gordon says, 
I 
It is everywhere admitted that the material uni-
verse is not what it seems to be to the ordinary mind. 
In the process of analysis iL is transformed into the 1 
permanent possibility of sensations with lUll, into !, 
the Unknowable Poy;er with Spencer, into the Infinite 
Spirit with Berkeley, and into the manifestation of 
the Absolute, by a who l e procession of German thinkers. 76 
b. Matter as Will and as Order of Exp erience. 
Gordon proceeds quickly to his own idealistic explana-
tion: 
If the analysis is but thorough and consistent 
and intelligible, everything material dissolves at 
last in the Universal Will, as the falling snowflakes 
melt into the current o!' ·che stream. Matter becomes 
the popular na.t:ne for force, force the scientific name 
1·or will, and will the philosophical explanation, 
guided b y ·c11e analogy of th~ hurnan personality, ol the 
universe in space and ~ime. 7 
This will is known only as an order of data in our own con-
I 
I 
I sciousness: II 
The dee}) est account, so r·ar as it appears, that 
any man can give of his body is that it is a form of 
76 Gordon , INT, ~8 . 
77 Ibid., 38-39. 
I 
I 
I 
his consciousnees.78 
c. The Body as an Order of Communication. 
As for the human body, 
It can be no other than a forrn of mind, an 
attachment in the service of the human spirit from 
its IJ: :aker, a source of mental nutrition, an order 
which operates as receptivity wllen spoken to from 
without, and which acts as the medium of expression 
when addressed from within.79 
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d. Idealistic Refutation of the Psychophysiological Objection. 
If the above acco~nt is true, then the self's real de-
pendence is not on the body but on t he Cosmic Will. There is 
no reason to suppose that this Will cannot sustain and devel-
o:p mc;m' s Hi ind by any order of experiences other than those 
which we describe as physical sensations. Indeed, much of our 
experience seems quite independent of physical sensations.80 
And if it be replied that man is known externally, only as a 
:psychophysiological being, then two meanings of external must 
be distinguished. If external means perceptible by the senses, 
then obviously, physical senses can only receive sensations of 
the physical and hence can hardly be expected to acquaint us 
with minds except as they express themselves in the movements 
of matter. If, on the other hand, external knowledge means 
knowledge of other selves, then it is not certain that data are 
lacking for external knowledge of minds as minds, and quite 
78 Gordon, INT, 41. 
79 Ibid.' 40-41 . 
80 Cf. a.bove, 225. 
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apart from any bodily mediation. Th~ny data of the psychical 
research investigators which do not prove survival of death 
do seem to prove beyond reasonable do ubt that communication of 
minds occurs without physiological mediation.81 If religious 
experience is valid, it also bears testimony to mental com~uni-
cation unmediated by the physical stimulations of physiological :! 
. j! sensations. 
e. Lyman's Argument from the Psychophysiological 
Relation to Idealism. 
Idealistic metaphysics is discussed further in the final 
chapter, but one argument for idealism employed by Lyman82 is 
I based on the psychophysiological relation itself and so seems 
I 
I i appropriate here. He notices the evidence for an active rela-
! tion between the self and nature, which relation is not, of 
I 
I 
course, denied by such psychological dualisms as we have exam-
ined. This intimate relation, he believes, proves the funda-
mental unity of mind and matter. They must be ultimately re-
ducible to a common denominator. What matter is in itself we 
can only know by remote inference. But we know much more di-
rectly the nature of our own being. ~~atever else there may be 
in the world, there is consciousness, including such elements 
as memory and purpose. This time-transcendent, purposive 
consciousness cannot be explained in terms of a mere causal 
,, 
I 
I 
order of nature. But a causal order of nature, indeed all that j 
81 Cf. above, 80-82. 
82 See Lyman, MOS, 16-30. 
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\!, a time-transcendent, purposive consciousness. 
psychophysiological relation itself, taken in conjunction with I; 
jl 
I! 
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II 
11 
II ,, 
I, 
ii 
the undeniable facts of the mental life, imply, Lyman believes, 
an idealistic metaphysics. 
5. Conclusion: Further Metaphysical Implications of 
the Psychophysiological Objection. 
It should now be apparent that no decision can be il 
I i reached concerning t he psychophysiological objection without 
I 
I 
:J 
implying further metaphysical presuppositions. For if, on one 
II hand, materialism is true, the behaviorists' interpretation of \ 
II 
., personality seems to be a reasonable inference, and behaviorism ) 
I implies that immortality is impossible. If, on the other ! 
.I I 
I· hand, idealism is true, the psychophysiological ob.j ection is 
II 
:I 
ii II q 
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invalid. If neither materialism nor idealism is true, the 
issue would seem to be in doubt, though the evidence favoring 
psy chological dualism would greatly weaken the force of the 
objection. 
li 
,, 
0 2J 
Jl ,--==-- -==--=~ ~ 
i! 
,, 
!I ~ ! 
,; 
If II 
:! 
li 
li 
ll CHAPTER TEN '\ 
I! I ~I METAPHYSics AND Iw~mRTALITY 1 
:I 
il This is not a work on general metaphysics, and it would I 
II: I I be plainly impossible to make here any thorough study of the 
,, 1-~! various metaphysical theories. But we have found metaphysical I! 
ii issues underlying every significant argument concerning immor- 1
1
; 
I, 1 
1; tali ty . In the present chapter t he p rincipal kinds of meta- 1 
il 11 ~ 1 physical theory will be examined to find what bearing they haver! 
on t h ese issues, and hence what conclusions t hey imply concern- J 
i 
,, 
II 
!! 
., 
ing t h e problem of immortality. 
A. Uaterialism. 
,, 
·I 1. If :Materialism Is True Belief in Immortality Is Unreasonabl 
I 
! If all that exists is _matter, then it is unr easonable to 
I 
ii believe in immortality. For if materialism is true the psycho- ! d 
li physiolog ical objection is valid.2 Whether the materialist I 
!; considers man's present consciousness as non-existent,3 as a I ;, 
li 
I 
k ind of matter, an epiphenomenal product unworthy to be called 
real, a biological function, or a bodily state, 4 in any case 
his metaphysics would seem to forbid his entertaining though ts 
I 
1 Cf. Brightman, I PK, 4; Lyman, MOS, 1-3; Gordon, I NT, 46 ; 
Falconer, TWC, 3. 
I 2 See a b ove, 233. 
Il
l 3 Cf. Lyman ' s quotations from .John B. Watson, Lyman, MOS, 
4-5. 
'I 4 Cf. Eisler, W:SP , "M'aterialismus." II 
,J 
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:1 of a consciousness apart from the body. Lalande, after de-
il 
li 
fining ontological and psychological materialimn, adds sig-
ii nificantly, 
" II 
jl 
II 
li 
j! 
li 
li 
I! 
., 
Le materialisme sous ces deux formes exclut ... 
toute croyance a des ~es individuelles et s~parees, 
susceptibles de5preexistence, de survivance ou de transmigration. 
6 As we have already seen, metaphysical materiali~1 might be 
linked with psychological dualism. The materialist might be-
lieve that the epiphenomenon, illusion, or condition of matter 
which we call consciousness was dependent, not on the visible 
biological organism which decays after death, but on some 
I 
II 
II 
II 
li 
II 
ll 
. I 
ij 
I 
physical being which survives forever.? But there seems to be 
no evidence for the dependence of consciousness on such a be-
ing. There is much more reason to suppose conscious~ess de-
pendent on the human body than on any other physical being . 
Moreover, all the arguments for bnmortality which are based on 
I 
I 
~I 
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ij 
I 
:J value experience are invalid if materialism is true, for values 
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are then metaphysically irrelevant. The materialist would I 
I 
find, then, no cogent arguments in favor of belief in immortal-! 
ity, while the psychophysio l ogical objection would be for him 
reasonably decisive. 
2. A Discredited Theory. 
Regardless of their various judgments concerning immor-
5 Lalande, VTC, 11 :&/Ia.terialisme." 
6 Above, 210. 
7 Cf. 1~thews' view, discussed above, 208-210. 
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il tality, h owever, all the Ingersoll Lecturers who discuss ma- I 
'I I 
/1 terialisn1 regard it as a discredited theory. 8 Several Lee- / 
fl turers who uphold belief in immortaJ.ity explicitly recognize I 
;, the hostile implications of materia lism and urge various objec- IJ 
il 1.: 
j: tions to it. Bixler, who doubts t h e truth of i~~ortality, ~ 
1J joins in the adverse criticism of materialism. None of the 
/ Lecturers defend it. The principal criticisms urged are 
i 
!briefly outlined in the following paragraphs. 
11 I 
II 
li a. Cannot Account for the Existence of Mind. 
IJ p 
fl Not only is materialism incoherent with belief in the 
II 
!J permanent survival of consciousness; it is also incoherent with 
!/ belief in the existence of consciousness. Yet mind is here 
I! and seems to make a difference in the world. As Fosdiclc says, 
il 
' 
I 
I 
I 
I ~
il I. 
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lmn's sp iritual values are a matter of fact. 
They do exist. To say t hat they exist within our 
experience is not to diminish t he force of that 
statement. Our experience is a fact; that also 
evolved in and out or· this universe, is part and 
parcel of it, and is as truly t·actual as rocks or 
stars. Alpha Centauri is no more a fact than is 
Wordsworth writing the Ode on numortali~ .... 
~uantity and quality, physical fact a nd spiritual 
fact are both 11ere , organically part of one unified 
system, and t h e hmnan mind returns discontented 
from all endeavors to treat physical facts as regu-
lative, and spiritual facts as negligible, in the 
understanding oi' the system.9 
II i; Bixler adds, 
li The ability of the sel1' to transcend space and 
8 Ostwald's "energetics" is nearest to materialism, but he 
says explici~ly that "the matter-and-motion t heory (or scien-
tific materialism) 11as outgrown itself." IAI, ?. Cf. his 
GNP, 150-154, 18l-1bb. 
9 Fosdick, SV, 25, 28. Cf. Crothers, EL, 39-32. 
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time and to discover meaning is unpara..Lleled in our 
world. This it is which forces us to realize that 
states of mind cannot be the srune as states of matter 
in motion. "No physical explanation of the self," 
says Professor Hocking, "can alter the fay~ that the 
self is what it app ears to itself to be." 
23? 
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. I! Bixler also brings to bear against materialism evidences 
li of the kind we have already found favorable to psychological 
q d 1. il ua J.sm. 
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Recent research in neurology seems, if a layman 
can judge, to be undermining the assurance with vn1ich 
a materialistic view of consciousness was once held. 
The usual formula "consciousness is a function of 
neural processes, " wi tl1 tl1e precedence it assigns to 
the body, hardly does justice to the facts as we now 
see th~1. A theory of thoroughgoing correspondence 
between isolated mental activities and special areas 
of the brain is no longer tenable. Even if a complete 
diagram of neural paths could be drawn, we know that 
it would not give us a comprehensive picture of what 
goes on in the mind. The real condition of mental 
life is some kind of integration or formal organiza-
tion, not the mere existence of 1)rain structure or the 
mere juxtaposition of physical units. This, among 
other considerations, has made psychologists dubious 
about the right of anyone to reduce experiences . of 
meaning a nd value to mere bodily processes.ll 
b. Eventuates in Skepticism. 
If the materialist is right, then, observes Clutton-Brock, 
quoted by Bixler, 
The mechanical process is capable of knowing 
that it is one; a remarkable triumph no doubt, but 
one which necessarily must tempt it to the doubt 
whether it is a mechanical process after all. In-
deed the mechanistic explanation of the universe 
would be quite satisfying if only it were not we 
poor machines that had hit upon it. But the mere 
fact that we are capable of hitting upon it at once 
,,---------
10 Bixler, IPM, 15. 
ll Ibid., 13-14. Cf. Lyman, MOS, 9-16, 28. 
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'1 arouses a doubt of it in our minds .12 
I 
:1 This doubt seems to be justified. 
I 
If the mechanistic theory is 
·t 
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true, then causation is the only principle by which the world 
is ordered. Teleology is an illusion. 
change things, but actually does not. 
Purpose may appear to 
Man's thoughts, includ-
ing the materialist's theory, are effects of previously exist-
ing causes. They are not to be explained by reference to pur-
pose. But if this account be true, then there ia no rational 
advantage of one t heory over another. According to . materialigm 
1: the meaning of a theory must be exhausted in the tracing of the 
II 
! 
il 
'I I. 
I 
I 
psychophysiological causes which produced it. Judgments clash, 
and arguments have significance only when thought is viewed 
under the category of purpose, as an attempt to represent real-
ity. Apart from such intention reason and truth are meaning-
I 
' leas. 
!1 
If purpose is an illusion, knowledge is impossible. 
1 Materialism therefore implies absolute skepticism. It is com-
1 pletely self-destructive, since it denies the purpose in rela-
!i 
li 
reality . 1/ 
I 
I 
'I tion to which, alone, it could claim to be a theory of 
I 
c. The Barrenness of Mere Causal Explanation. 
E~ckenzie quotes Bertrand Russell's13 statement that 
man is the product of causes which had no prevision 
of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his 
hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are ~~t the 
outcome of accidental collocations of atoms. 
,, ______ _ 
·J 12 Bixler, IPM, 16. 
li 13 Russell is not, strictly, a materialist, but the specific theory which !mckenzie here criticizes is held in common by ma- ' 
; terialists and such naturalistic realists as Russell. 
;i 14 Mackenzie, :rvrcr, 81. 
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239 :1 
i! From this account of human personality, Russell infers that 
ii 
!I man is doomed to annihilation. But, :Mackenzie charges, 
I' il 
'I ,,
ii 
ii 
Philosophically his conclusion is drawn from a 
conception which is in its very nature unscientific, 
viz., the "accidental collocation of atoms."l5 
il This critic ism by 1.fackenzie calls attention to the barrenness 
II 
ii of mere causal eXI)lanation. Such explanation takes the mind i: 
" 
,, 
I; li on that endless will-a' -the-wisp chase known as "the infini te 
II 
1: regress." 
II 
A given event is explained as the effect of another 
. I I! 
I' 
li 
just p receding. That, in turn, is explained as the effect of 
another, and so ad infinitum. But no reason is given why any 
one of these events should be the cause of its successor. We 
simply observe that the one is followed by the other, and pos-
1 tulate the belief that it could not have been otherwise. The II 
1l events which are cited as explanation are in as much need of 
II being explained as those which are being explained. And the 
I, 
1
\ principle of connection remains in each instance an isolated 
·I mystery .16 Such explanation may be carried as far as anyone 
Ill cares to go, without adding in the least to the rational unity 
I
I 
,[ or coherence of one's perceptions .17 Or rather, to the aim-
JI 
,; less enumeration of data, the causal explanation adds only a 
I 
li 
i 
I 
I 
:, 
~ ! 
temporal order of arr~ngement plus the belief that every event 
which occurs must occur, and that the order of occurrence must 
be as it is. No insight is given into the character of the 
15 Mackenzie, lv!CI, 81. 
16 Cf. Ostwald, IAI, 25-26. 
17 Cf. Dole, HOI, 26. 
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It immortality, and which we e~ilined in Chapter Three, is, of ,, 
Indeed, he says explicitly that !! course, a form of idealism. 
II 
1! positive arguments for immortality 
j! 
li 
li 
ji 
I 
would require an elaborate and lengthy treatise of 
technical metaphysics, for they could only be proved 
by a demonstration of some ide~list theory of the 
fundamental nature of reality. 
II 
1, As a result of our examination of McTaggart's theory, it was 
II 
~~ concluded that 
li a human personality probably has a beginning in time 
11 and hence is a dependent being, i. e., that his ex-
,1 istence is conditioned by the existence of a prior 
I cause. ~2 
li 
We concluded further, 
If this be true, t 11en the question whether or 
not men are eternal depends not merely on their ovm 
nature but on th23character of the world which brought them into being. 
ii subsequent chapters have shown that there is reasonable ground 
i 
j for b elief in immortality only if the source or ground of that 
1 1Horld is some formof conscious experience, that is, if an ideal I, 
li istic metaphysics24 is true. For it has been found that every 
I~ significant evidence for innnortali ty presupposed the obj ecti vi tYi 
;\ of value. 25 Consciousness is the only bearer of value, 26 so 
II 
1: I! that the belief in the objectivity of value presupposes an 
" II I 
li idealistic metaphysics. We may conclude, then, that there is 1,1 
ij reasonable ground for belief in immortality if the basic postu-
1 
I 
,I 
li 
Gl McTaggart, IAP , 9. 
22 See above, 73. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Cf. above, 104. 
25 See above, 115-116, 141-142, 169, 170, 189-19B. 
26 See above, 144-146. 
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I 
\late of idealistic metaphysics is true, 27 and not otherwise. 28 
2. Idealism Is More Reasonable Than Materialism. 
If materialism and idealism were the only possible theo-
ries of metaphysics, the arguments against materialism which 
have been cited from various Ingersoll Lectures29 would seem 
to provide adequate rea son for believing in idealism. More-
over, those arguments for theism and for belief in the objec-
tivity of value which were not based solely on the presupposi-
tion of idealism, were also arguments for idealism. 
However, idealism is opposed not only by materialism, but 
also by realism in various other forms . 
27 I. e., if the theory is true "nach welcher die absolute 
Wirklichkeit idealer Natur ist, d. h . an sich Idee, Urgedanke, 
Vernunft , Geist, 'Fftrsichsein,' in irgendeiner Form, allum-
fassendes Bewusstsein oder eine ]mnnigfaltigkeit von Bewusst-
seinseinheiten ist." (Eisler, WPB, 11 Idealismus. " ) Cf. above, 
104. 
28 Cf. Dole, HOI, 19-20; Moore, PII, 15; Gordon , HTT, 16, 46; 
Braham, PIPK, 202-243; Snowden, CBI , 168; Ball, AII in toto, 
but especially 14. I am aware, of course, that some idealists 
deny immortality. And t here are elements in some specific 
idealistic theories which are inconsistent with belief in im-
mortality. But these considerations do not affect the conclu-
sion stated above. It must also be noted that while idealism 
II 
is logically presupposed by all arguments for liamortality, · 
i~nortality is not a necessary inference from idealism alone. I 
Idealism is, as it were, a major premise which may be comb ined 
1
1 
with various reasonable minor premises to prove immortality. 1 
The major premise is in every instance indispensable, but it is .I 
not conclusive when taken alone. Cf. above, 104, N. 24. 
29 See above, 235-239 . 1 
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C. Non- JV[a terialistic Realism. 
By realism is here meant any metaphysics which denies 
idealism, i. e., which asserts that the source or ground of 
reality is independent of all conscious experience. There have, 
of course, been many theories called realistic which would not 
fall under this definition. Indeed, as Santayana points out,30 
every metaphysical t h eory held by anyone can in some sense be 
called realistic. Yet the definition just stated seems to be 
fair to most contemp orary real i sms and to be one widely accept-
ed and jus tifiable use of the term. 31 
1. Realistic Metaphysics and Immortality. 
It is difficult to arrive at any general conclusions con-
cerning the implications ot realism for i mm ortality , 1·or even 
t h e realisms which are included with in our dei·ini ·non are of 
widely diverse l<:inds. Jvtaterialism is, of course, a kind of 
realism . Some other specific realistic theories have the same 
implications for i mmortality as does materialism. 32 
30 In Drake, ECR , 163. 
31 Cf . Lalande's definition: "Doctrine d'apres laquelle l'€tre 
est independant de la connaissance actuelle ~ue peuvent en 
r endre les sujets conscients; ~ n'est pas equival~nt a pe r - 1 
ci- i, m~e au sens le plus large qu 'on puisse donner a ce j 
not." Lalande , VTCP, "R~alisme." Cf. also Eisler's definiti on: j 
"Der erkenntnistheoretische Realismus im neueren Sinne ist der 
s~andpunkt, wonach es eine vom erkennenden Subjekt (vom Denken, I 
Erkennen, Bewusstsein) unabhangige, selbstseiende, in d iesem 
Sinne abso lut reale (nicht bloss ideelle) Aussenwelt gibt." \ 
Eisler, WPB, "Realismus ." 
32 Bertrand Russell's theory is an example of such a realism. 1 
Cf . above, 238 , N. 13. I 
I 
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!i But such implications are by no means universal. 33 Yet -;ome -~ - ---
1: implications concerning illllllortali ty would seem to be inherent I 
J! in the fundamental realistic postulate, as above defined. jl 
!i ,, 
,, 
II ,. 
li 
a. The Objections to Immortality of Doubtful Valid'i ty. 
If realism is true, the idealistic reply to the psycho-
I 
:1 physiological objection is, of course, invalid. But the other 
Jl replies, based on empirical studies of the relation between 
.J I 
!J body and mind would seem still to have force. The arguments I 
il of Bergson34 and 1't[ontague35 ought to persuade the realist, it 1· 
ij would appear, that the evidence for the existential dependence I 
J, 
' 
j·,: of mind on body is far from conclusive. He should agree with 
;
1 
Bixler when he says that in our experience, 
I~ What we call consciousness seems to be directly connect-
·' ed with neural activities. Wherever we come uu on it we 
11 1: find it intimately interwoven with a set of bodily as so-
U c i ates--that is about as far as our knowledge carries us. 36 1
1 
, , 1.,, 
11 The fact that the external senses fail to give any conclusive 
lj I 
,, evidence for the existence of consciousness apart from bio- 1: 
li ·I 
logical organisms will weigh more or less heavily with the il 
realist, according to the credence he gives to inferences from I 
ti ,I psychic phenomena and according to . the relative importance he 
I' 
,I 
!I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
ii 
I 
assigns to sense data. If he thinks sense perceptions the only / 
evidence worth considering, then he will be led to conclude 
that the doctrine of ~ortality is false, or at least that 
33 Cf., e. g., Montague, CSD and BU. 
34 See above, 216-220. 
35 See above, 220-230. 
36 Bixler, IP:M, 17-18. 
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\! there cannot possibly be evidence for immortality, in the 
,I 
il 
ii 
strict sense, though there may be evidence for the survival of 
ii death. But realism as such does not imply this exclusive re-
'i I! liance on sense data, nor consequently the validity of the 
!I 
II posi ti vis tic objection. 
II 
II ,, 
I ~ 
I' jl 
,\ 
ii 
i! 
il 
b. Realistic Metaphysics Implies That All Arguments 
for Immortality Are False. 
We have found t hat all significant arguments f or immor-
i! tality presuppose the objectivity of value. But since values 
'i 
1 
I 
I I 
! are borne only by persons, any realistic metaphysics would 'I 
i 
1 seem to imply the denial of the obj ecti vi ty of values. Real ism \ 
ll therefore u 71dermines and destroys at t heir foundation all posi- 1 
!1 tive arguments for i mmortality. It is not inconsistent for the j 
!I 
!! realist to believe that individual human experience, having 
l\ once emerged from i mpersonal sources, will continue forever. 
But h e seems to have no positive ground for such a faith. ~hat 
! ever hi s will to believe may a ssert in h is emotional and active 
; 
; life, h e would seem to be rationally justified only in present-
i ing, with Montague, certain "prospects for eternity that appear 
I 
jas p ossible alternatives to annihilation.n37 It is true that 
i some realists, such as Montague and S . Alexander, believe in 
~~ God. It mi ght t herefore appear that the t heistic arguments for 
)) i mmortality ought to be valid in their thought. However, in 
J 37 Montague, CSD, 97. S . Alexander, anoth er realist, t p inks 
!
' such speculation idle and even inconsistent. See Alexander, 
STD, 423-425. 
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I 
I' 
·I some instances, as, 1! e. g.' in the theory of Alexander, God is 
li conc eived as "neither good nor evil,"38 whereas, it will be 
,I p 
·: remembered, the theistic arguments for immortality presuppose 
II I 
I' 
II 
II 
the goodness of God. On the other hand, some realists con- jl 
.I 
cei ve of God as Himse11· an emergent from an impersonal source.39/l 
I jl 
,, 
:I 
I 
I 
I But then, in addition to the p roblem of human immortality, 
arises the problem o1· divine immortality. The theistic argu-
'i ments presuppose tuat I
' I 
God is t h e eternal, metaphysically inde - 1. 
i 
i nendent source of all reality. Any theory which grants this l ~ 
!i p remise is, of course, a form o!· idealism. 
li 
'I I, 
li 
D. Philosophical Method and Dmmortality. 
We have discussed the bearing oi' various metaphysical 
.I 
I ; 
i! theories on the problem of immortality. But, as some of the 
" I; 
,i Lec-r;u:rers point out, the methods as well as the conclusions of 
d 
" 
:; metaphysics have significant implications affecting beliefs 
!J concerning immortality. 
II 
il 
I! ,, 
1. Analysis and Synopsis. 
There are two principal methods of philosophy, whi ch may 
II 
Ji 
I 
': be designa·Ged as analysis and synopsis. The choice of one of 
!i these methods s ets a philosophy on the road to one of the two 
1 
.
1
·. main types of metaphysical conclusion. The dispute of realism ·l 
-' I 
1: 
'I 38 Alexander, STD, 412-413. Alexander's insistence that 
1 God's deity is " on the side of goodness" does not imply any 
: moral obligation of God toward the individual. See ibid. 
: 39 Cf. Montague, BU , and s. Alexander's conception of "Deity" 
I
I (in his view to be distinguished from "God"), STD, 345, 412-
! 413. 
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1 
I! and idealism is, 
:I 
consequently, to a considerable degree, a 
dispute concerning the proper method for discovering truth. 
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Brightman gives more attention than any other Lecturer to the 
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implications of this issue for the problem of immortality. 
explains, from the point of view of the idealist, 
The importance of logic for idealistic meta-
physics may be better understood if we recall Hegel's 
distinction between Verstand and Vernunft (understand-
ing and reason). The Verstand is what Hegel calls the 
abstract exercise of thought; it separates, defines, 
makes distinctions. The Vernunft is concrete thinking; 
it unites, brings together, grasps the object as a 
whole. The Verstand is analytic; the Vernunft is syn-
optic. Both kinds of thinking are necessary. The 
work of reason can be completed only after the work of 
the understanding has been done; but Hegel is convinced 
that reason is higher and truer than understanding as 
an interpreter of reality. 
This distinction of Hegel has far-reaching im-
plications. If the understanding is the guide to truth, 
then analytic method is the sole tool of science and 
philosophy; and if analytic method is the only sound 
method, the only sound metaphysic must be some form of 
atomism. Reality must be a collection of simple enti-
ties that cannot be further analyzed .•.• 
On the other hand, if Hegel be right, and reason 
is the guide to truth, then the ultimate method of 
thought is not analytic, but synoptic. Analysis is 
necessary, but is not sufficient. It must be supple-
mented by a. grasp of the object as a whole if that ob-
ject is ever to be understood .... The analytic method 
reaches its goal when it finds atoms. The synoptic 
method reaches its goal only when it finds an organism 
of some sort, a genuine whole to which the atoms be-
long and from which they derive their meaning. The 
understanding explains the whole in terms of the parts; 
the reason explains the parts in ter.ms of the whole.40 
2. Implications of Analysis for Dmaortality. 
a. The Very Conception of Immortality Foreign to Analysis. 
Analysis alone would never suggest, much less support, 
40 Brightman, IPK, 17-19. 
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/ 
i the belief in an infinitely long personal life. Analysis is 
II 
!! restricted to objects which have clearly defined boundaries. 
d 
1:.' It is t he method of "the average man 11 described by Crothers: 
The average man does not live habitually in the 
1j awed consciousness that he is in an infinite universe. 
'J He is dealing, as he thinks, with finite realities. 
11 He prides himself on his ability to see a l l a round a 
'j' subject and to exhaust its possibilities. He talks 
I, glibly of the beginning and the end of things. B:e has 
the ability so to concentrate his mind upon ~1single phase of the actual as to shut out all else. 
l The conception of immortality arises only when one notices the 
I 
~ incompleteness of man's earthly career, and thinks it r equires ·I 
1 for rational wholeness an infinite extension in time. Now, ob- 11 
1! vi ously, if one is not looking for rational wholeness, but for I 
ii irreducible simplicity, he will not be led to think of an in-
,. 
I 
:j finitely long life. Rather, he will break up the span of life 
,, 
'I 
11 he knows into t h e shortest possible temporal segments. Even 
li t hes e thin cross-sections he will find to be complex, and so he , 
'I 
iJ will f urther divide them longitudinally until he finds only 
:1 atomistic elements, absolutely simple beings of some kind. I 
:1 I 
!I An exclusively analytic logic will explain per-sonality in terms of its parts, whether they be Humean 
11 impressions, or more modern behavior segments , or real-
:' is tic neutral entities. such logic forbids the thinker ,, 
;: to look for any real and pe~~nent whole, and thus ve -
~~ toes i llllllor tal ity in advance. . II 
,,, 41 Crothers, EL, 4-5. I do not mean to imply, by the use of l; 
1
1 this quotation, that all realists are, like Crothers' "average 
1 man," shallow dilettantes with facile solutions for profound I 
!Problems. 1~ny are highly critical and arduous thinkers. 
I 42 Brightman, IPK, 58-59. 
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b. All Arguments for Immortality Invalid If Analysis 
Is the Only True Method. 
~ Moreover, if analysis is the only method for learning 
i 
1/ the truth about reality, then the positive arguments for immor- 1 
I 
: tali ty are all invalid. For all of these arguments we have 
1
1 
found to presuppose the objectivity of value. And the theories 1 
of value to which analysis inevitably leads 
either make value a passing biological incident in the 
universe, and so destroy any ground for personal im-
mortality; or else they make value cent~z and termi-
nate in the interest of the individual. 
I; 
11 In either case, value is not objective in the sense in which 
" ;I 
I' li 
,, 
we have used the term. 44 
If analysis is the only true philosophical method, then, 
,I 
1' there is no reasonable ground for belief in immortality . 
. I 
li 
.I 
II 
!I 
li 
li 
li li 
3. Implications of Synopsis for ~nortality. 
a. Synopsis Should Discover Indications of Immortality 
If Any F..xist. 
We have seen that the analyst attenpts to explain per-
' sonali ty in terms of its parts. The idealist, however, rely-
ing on the organic logic, believes he will find the secret of 
the part in the whole to which it belongs. Vmen he is con-
fronted with an experience which lacks self-contained unity, 
which contains elements obviously together but seeming not to 
43 Brightman, I~(, 57-58. 
44 See above, 104. 
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belong together, he seeks the explanation for these facts in 
some more comprehensive reality which will reveal their raison 
d'EHre. 
,i 
Even when he makes use of analysis, which he claims as i~ 
I! 
an important stage of his method, he seeks the parts for the I I 
I ' 
sake of new evidences they may give of connections wi th a whole l: 
more comprehensive and better integrated than any heretofore 
known. It is obvious, then, that if human personality does 
contain implications of an infinite supplement after death, it 1
1 
is the synoptist who should be expected to note these signs. I 
They are precisely the kind of thing he is looking for in his I 
analysis of experience. 
b. Synopsis Is the Method of the Supporting Arguments. 
Our analysis of the arguments for tmmortality in the 
Ingersoll Lectures has, in fact, sh own their synoptic charac-
ter. We have had occasion to note, several times, that argu-
ments for irr@ortality were reasonable if the coherence crite-
rion of truth were valid. 45 And especially clearly does the 
belief in the objectivity of values presuppose this cri terion:16· 
Now the application of the coherence criterion is simply the 
use of the synoptic method in the task of distinguishing truth 
from error. 
As Brightman says, then, 
It comes to this: if reason, as idealism under-
stands it, is trustworthy, then immortality is a fact. 
45 see above, 98-99, 177, 183, 185 , 188-189, 192-195, 
46 See above, 197-198. 
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If value is to be found in experience, even when ex-
perience is taken as cynically as it is by Schopen-
hauer, and if personality is a spiritual whole that 
!'inds value through its own membership in the uni ver-
sal order which includes but transcends all human per-
sons, there is substantial ground for reasonable hope 
of immortal life.47 
c. A Rational Faith. 
Dole says of the facts which point to immortality, 
They belong to a certain unity which you cannot 
break without doing violence to every essential part 
of the whole. Th e hope of immortality arises out of 
this unity of thought, feeling and conduct ...• That 
is really the same kind of reasoning that leads us to 
believe in the wonder and mystery of a physical uni-
verse. We do not believe in this wonderful u nity be-
cause we can wholly demonstrate it by physical evi-
dence .... Our faith in a universe is not merely the 
outgrowth of the observation of outward phenomena; it 
is also a sort of intellectual and spiritual necessity, 
without which the mind is baffled and stupefied. So, 
too, we find that the hope of immortality belongs to 
that deeper unity of thought and conception, of which 
our interpretation of t h e outward na ture is merely an 
image.48 
251 
such a rational faith in the method of synopsis and in hmuan 
immortality is confirrned by the results of our investigation. 
I' 47 Brightman, IPK, 60. Cf. Ba l l, AII, 14. 
!! 48 Dole, HOI, 57-58. 
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COHCLUSIOl'TS 
1. Immortality is the everlasting duration of the hw.nan 
II :p ersonality, the identity of which consists in the continuity jl 
ji 
II 
II 
II 
I I 
,: 
I 
I 
of t h e memory system. 
G. The procedure of analyzing all argilluents for and 
against immortality, in order to discover the ulthQate p re sup -
positions of each, is one which throws light on the problem 
of immortality. 
3. The historical prevalence of belief in i mmortality, 
[I 
11 t11e causes or actual belief, and the impossibility of describ-
rl 
I 
1 ing the ruture life in detail, are all indecisive considera -
tions. 
4. Belief in the metaphysical independence of the human 
I 
1 personality implies the t heory o1· human pre~xistence, which 
I 
ll 
II 
li 
rl 
is h ighly improbable. 
5. Psy chic phenomena give some evidence, though not con-
elusive evidence, of p ersonal survival after death, but no 
evidence of everlasting survival. 
II 
il 
:i 
I 6. 
I All significant arguments for immortality presuppose 1 
I 
: belief in t h e universal validity and metaphysical relevance of 
I 
,, 
I 
:/ 
II 
ri 
li 
ideal values. 
7. Such belief implies same form of idealistic meta-
physics. 
,I 
II 
I 
I 
:/ 
II 
: I 
1
1 I 
ii 8. The psychophys~:logic:l :~~ :cti_o_n_~-o 1-.n:m-•lortality ::3 !I 
i: conclusive only if a materialistic metaphysics is assumed , and 1,1 
J! this assump tion is unreasonable. ., 
1
,, I 9. If analysis is the only trustworthy philosophical 
I! I method, there is no reasonable g round for belief in immortal-
/! 
~~ i ty. 
I !I 
,, 10. If synopsis is a valid philosophical method, the 
!! 
Jj belief in i rnmortali ty can be reasonably established. 
:, 
" If 
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S UTvTh:tARY 
The problem of this dissertation is to discover the 
/I 
II fundamental issues which ultimately divide the various theories II 
;! 
11 concerning immortality in the Ingersoll Lectures . 
. , 
I! 
I 
Lmmortality is defined a s the everlasting duration of 
!! human personality. 
I' 
This is the immortality discussed in most 
i: of the Lectures. ,, Other concep tions prove on examination to be 
il either specifications of this one, inadequate notions, or 
:I !1 figurative substitutes. 
1: 
1/ Some arguments are confused or rest on postulates em-
~~ played to bette~ effect in other reasonings. The ;_>rgumentum ~ 
1 e consensu gent1um, e. g., is invalid unless it is assumed that J I -· -
I the widespread belief in immortality results from reliable in- /1 ij 
tuition or cogent reasoning. Intuition as a ground for belief 
I 
1/ is a problem for special study , and the reasonableness of be-
l! 
il 
I' II 
I 
,, 
I 
i! 
i! 
I 
i 
I 
i 
I 
II 
1/ 
lief is the subject of the entire investigation. Again, in 
tracing the psychological histories of social and individual 
belief in immortality, one must carefully avoid the confusion 
of psychological causes and logical grounds. Such confusion 
underlies the attempts to discredit belief by tracing its 
origin to dreams, by showing errors in its traditional 
tions, and by pointing out the inf luence of desires on 
associa- / 
actual I 
belief. A similar confusion is present when the difficulties 
'/ I, 
II 
,, 
,, 
I' 
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i! met by the imagination in attempting to picture the future 
,! 
ii 
I 
I 
life are urged as reasons for disbelief. 
The Platonic arguments for i mmortality are all uncon-
The doctrine of the pre~xistence of the human soul 11 vincing . 
I! 
i/ 
is p robably f alse. The only cogent arguments for this doc-
trine, if any such arguments ex ist, are t h e metaphysical evi-
dences for personalistic pluralism. If p ersonality begins in 
time, as is probable, then the problem of immortality concerns 
t h e character of the i ndep endently ex isting reality which I 
I brought man into being . The main issues of immortality must, 
t h en, be metaphys ical. I 
!/ p 
!I 
'I I, 
The positivist objects to t h e assignment of the problem J 
of immortality to the metaphysician, who~e inquiries he regards !! 
I! 
I' 
a s vain sp eculations. For, he says, t h e onl y trustworthy evi-
,, ,,
II 
I 
dences concerni ng reality are the sense data of the empirical 
'I 
He assert s that there are no such evidences for i m- I! s c i ences. 
i 
Some p sychic phenomena have not been adequately ex- ' mortality. 
p l ained excep t by the hypothesis of cormnu nication with persons 
1 who have survived death. But t he evidences are not compelling 
,I 
1J a nd mere survival is not immortali t y. The positivist's crite-
I • 1: 
/! r i on, h owever, is unreasonable, and would logically lead to 
I complete sk ep ticism. 
I Intuition a nd religious expe r ience strongly favor immor-1, 
' I tali ty i f the intui tions of ma n a t h is moral best are more re-
I 
,, 
,, 
li 
'I 
ii 
liable than other int uitions. It is reasonable to ma ke this 
assump tion if values are objective and if an idealistic meta-
,, 
li 
:I 
'I ,, 
:I 
ii 
:i 
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:J physics is true. 
'; 
; i 
!I 
1: 
Some pragmatists argue that immortality is desirable 
256 
1i and hence true. 
ti 
II 
While certain conceivable k inds of immortal -
il i ty would not be desirable, others would be. But the mere 
!I fact of an object being desirable does not prove that it 
,, 
1l exists. The p eculiar kind of desirability possessed by im-
1' 
.! mortality, however, makes disbelief incompatible with any ul ti-
I! mate optimism. The questi on whether belief in immortality is 
II 
1
;useful is debated. Intelligent belief, however , provides a 
'i large bal ance of value. Yet many useful beliefs are untrue, 
land the will to believe is no solution for a problem of truth. 
I 
I 
lHowever, if truth is more useful than falsehood, then the 
I 
!superior usefulness of a belief, demonstrated in many times and 
I 
liplaces, is evidence for its truth. Belief in the superior use-
'· 1jru1ness of truth implies the objectivity of value and would 
' 
!receive support from idealism and esp ecially from theism. 
I I 
I Theism implies immortality, and theism is more reason- I 
I I 
liable t han any contrary view if values are o b.j e c ti ve . All argu- I! 
lb ents for the goodness of God must assume the objectivity of 
" !! value. The problem of evil, while strengthening the t heistic 
;l argument for irrunortali ty, also undermines it, as well as weak-
" :I ii ening t h e grounds f _or t heism itself. The most reasonable solu-
~ I 
J, tions of t h is p roblem, however, are theistic, and include the 
,I 
II 
li belief in immortality. il 
~~ It h as been found that all significant arguments for im-
:\mortali ty p resupp ose the obj ecti vi ty of value. Exp eriences of 
ji 
I' 
I' II ,, 
I! 
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/! aesthetic, moral, intellectual, and religious, values all imp ly 
I! obj ecti vi ty, which may therefore be regarded as a reasonable 
1: 
/! postulate. A contrary view results from exclusive use of the 
II analytic method, and the question concerning the adequacy of 
:/ analysis must therefore be a crucial issue in the p roblem of 
I
[! immortality. If values are o b j e c t i ve, there are cogen t rea-
.i sons for belief in immortality. The objectivity of value im-
11 p lies an idealistic metaphysics. 
:; 
/! The apparent dependence of the mind on the body is a 
Jl serious objection to i rnmortali ty, an objection long recognized 
,I 
II but strengthened by modern p syehol ogy. The rep ly that the 
:: mind also :p rofoundly affects t h e body does not prove the mind 
// independent of the body, though it does refute any epiphe-
!! nomenal t h eory of consciousness. Anoth er reply is the doc-
'' lr /! trine of bodily survival, but this is an unreasonable view. 
1: James, :Bergson, and Montag ue attempt to refute the p sycho-
I 
/physiological objection by affirrning a relative psychological 
i 
J! dualiSEl . .James's t h eory is ill-supported and ambiguous in its 
II 
11 implications, but Bergson and Montague effectually refute the 
I! 
!
'/ argument that the existential dep endence of the mind on t h e 
l body has been demonstrated. Metaphysical idealism also consti-
11 
11 tutes an effective reply to the objection by construing the 
j
1 
body as vvill and as an order of experience. 
li 
i 
I 
,I 
II 
,, 
II 
II 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
If materialism is true, be l ief in i mmortality is unreaso 
1 ,: able. :But materialism is an inadequate and self-destructive 1 
II t h eory. Idealistic metaphysics refutes the objection s to im- /, 
II 1 
=4 
1: 
d 
I 
I 
I 
i 
------ -=== 
implied by 
11 
arguments. Realistic metaphysics leaves the ob.j ections to ~~ 
ii immortality in doubt but implies that all affirraative argu- 1 
I! 
11 ments are false. The di:rferences between idealism and realism 
1/ 
I! result largely from their dif f erent philosophical methods. 
I 
II The 
d 
d 
'I and 
I 
very conception ot immortality i s foreign to mere analysis 
all argwnents for inunortality are invalid if analysis is 
j the only true method . Synopsis is the method of all the sup -
!l porting argurn. ents and its use seems justifiable. 
'· 
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New York: The Macmillan Co.~ 1913. AOI 
Popular in style, but thoughtful and generally valid 
in content. 
Frank, Henry, Psychic_Phenomen~, Science and Immortality. 
Second Edi tion. Boston: Shen~an, French, and Co., 1916. 
PSI 
Presents a physical conception of the immortal self, 
somewhat like Montague's, but less convincing. 
Franz, Shepherd Ivory, Persons One and Three. New York: 
vTI1ittlesey House, 1933. POT 
Account of a multiple personality, case of Faulting-
Poultney. 
Frazer, James George, The Belief in Lmmortality and the 
Worship of the D§_ad. 2 vols. London: 1,1[acmillan and 
Co., 1913, 1922. BII 
Authoritative description of beliefs concerning immor-
tality among modern uncivilized peoples. 
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Frazer, James George, :r.ran, God, and Immortality. new York: 
The ;,racmillan Co., 1927. MGI 
Historical survey of religious doctrine. 
' ~ 
Fullerton, ~eorge ·Stuart, Ed., Essa~hilosouhical and 
Psycholog~cal. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908. 
EPP 
Contains l!Iontague' s essay, "Consciousness a Form ot· 
Energy," an earlier, partial exposition of the theory 
set forth in Montague, CSD. 
Galloway, George, The Idea of Immortality. Edinburgh: 
T. and T. Clark, 1919. IOI 
History of belief and of philosophical theories con-
cerning immortality, followed by critical state~ments of 
ethical and religious arguments for imnortality. 
Gordon, George A., The Witness to Immortality_ in Literature, 1 
Philosophy, and Life. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1/ 
1893. WTI II 
Beautiful popular interpretation of the great works on 1 
immortality, and presentation of "The Grounds of Faith I 
Today." . 
Griffin, Nathaniel Edward and Lawrence Hunt, The Farther 
Shore. Boston: Houghton :Mifflin Co., 1934. TFS 
"Anthology of World Opinion on the Immortality of the 
Soul." Selection based on quality of literary style 
rather than validity of content. 
Harms, Ernst, Hrsg., Jahrbuch fftr die Idealistische 
Philosophie. Zftrich: Rascher and Cie, 1934. JFI 
Includes contributions by philosophical idealists 
of various countries, rumong others Brightman's 
"Immediacy?" 
Hartmann, William c., Hartmann's International Diredtory 
gf Psychic Science and Spiritualism. Jamaica, N.Y.: 
The Occult Press, 1930. HID 
Contains an inclusive but promiscuous bibliography 
of works on psychic phenomena. 
Herrmann, Eduard, Unsterblichkeitsbeweise Gesammelt und 
Erl~utert. Leipzig: Strauch, 1920. UGE 
"Es gibt keinen Tod! Intuition, Philosophie und 
Psychische Forschung best~tigen es." Christian faith is 
repudiated and psychic evidence urged as a substitute. 
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1Aacmillan and Co., 1906. POR 
Religion interpreted as faith in the conservation of · 
values. Immortality denied as "irreligious. 11 I 
Holmes, John Haynes, Is Death the End? New York: G. P. II 
Putnam's Sons, 1915. IEE 
Able semi-popular defense of belief in immortality. I 
The author concludes that the basic issue concerning immor-
tality is the i s sue of philosophical materialism versus I 
idealism. 
Holt, Edwin B., et al., The New Realism. New York : The 
Macmillan Co., 1912. TNR 
Hdgel, Friedrich, Friemann von, Eternal Life. Edinburgh: 
Clark, 1912. EL 
An arduous historical, theological, and philosophical 
work, eventuating in affirmation of an endless lffe of 
man. 
James, William, The Meaning of Truth. New York: Longman's, 
Green, and Co., 1909. MOT 
Memories and Studies. New York: Longman's, 
Green, and Co., 1911. 1•.IJAS 
On pages 143-206, Jrunes discusses psychic research, 
which he considers thus far j_nconclusive, but promising 
for the future. 
The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy. New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 
1897. WTB 
Kant, Immanuel, Grundleg~_ur ii.!Letaphysik der Sitten. 
Hrsg. Karl VorHtnder. Leipzig: Felix J:.l[einer, 1925. 
GMS (PhB ) 
Srumntliche Werke. Hrsg. K. Rosenkranz and 
F. w. Schubert. Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838. SW 
Tr~ume eines Geistersehers. KBnigsberg: 
Johann Jacob Kanter, 1766. TEG -
An essay on Swedenborg and spiritualism. Unlike Kant's 
better known writings, it is sometimes playfully fanciful 
and sometbnes ironical, so that his real view is often 
obscure. 
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Keyserling, Hermann, Graf von, Unsterblic~1kei t. Utlnchen: 
J. F. Lehmann, 1911. ·· U:HS 
Not the individual, but the onward march of life itself 
is immortal. The meaning and goal of life are insoluble 
mysteries, experienced but inconceivable. . 
Lalande, Andre, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la 
Philoso~hie. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1926. VTC 
Lamont, Corliss, Issues of Immortalitl. New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1932. IOI 
Problem similar to that of this dissertation. In many · 
respects an able work, but marred by amazing over-simplifi-
cation of essential issues and by confusion of popular 
wants with philosophical criteria of truth. 1. 
Leete, Frederick DeLand, Christianity_ in Science. New York: 
The Abingdon Press, 1928. CIS I
I 
Comprehensive survey of positive religious beliefs of 1 
scientists. 
Leuba, James Henry, The B~lief_ . in God and Immortali tl. 
1 Chicago: Open Court Publish ing Co., 1921. GAI I 
One-sided psychological investigation. Positivism 
1
, 
assumed throughout. 
Lodge, Oliver Joseph, Man and the Universe. Sixth Edition. 1/ 
London: M:ethuen and Co l , 1909. MAU 
Interesting chiefly for the discussion of future 
possibilities in abnonnal psychology and psychical 
research. 
The Survival of :Man. New York: 
Uoffat, Yard and Co., 1909. SOivi 
Accounts and interpretations of various abnormal 
phenomena. 
Lotze, Hermann, Uetaphysic. B. Bosanquet, Ed. Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1884. ME 
:McComb, Samuel, The Future Life in the .Light _of Modern 
Inquiry. Ne~ York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1919. TFL 
Popular but reasonable apology for belief. Psychic 
evidence interes tingly presented and favorably evaluated. 
McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis·, Human Dmnortali ty and 
Pre-Existence. Lo ndon: E. Arnold, 1916. IAP 
Immortality and pre~xistence defended. The author 
believes pre~xistence to be implied by any valid argu-
ment for immortality. 
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Marchant, James, :B;d., Immortalit;y. London: Putnam's, 1924. 
HIM 
Essays by various men and of unequal worth. "The 
Philosophy of Imm.ortali ty" by George Galloway is s ound 
but too brief to contribute much to the field. 
:Mill, John Stuart, lifature, The Utility of Religion.! and 
Th eism. Lond on: Lon~1an's, Green, Reader, a nd ~yer, 1874. 
NUR 
Concerning immortality Mill concludes t hat there are 
no valid arguments either for or against it "apart from 
express revelation." 
A System oJ:_Logic. London: Longman's, 
Green, a nd Co., 1886. SL 
Uontague, vVillian1 Pepperell, Be:pef U!?-bound. 1-Tew Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1930. BU 
Chief relevant interest is Montague's exposition of 
a doctrine of a finite God. 
Moore, Cliff ord Herschel, Ancient Beliefs in the Immortality; 
of t he Soul. New York: Lon~nan's, Green, and Co., 1931. 
ABI 
Brief treatment of some ancient views and their contribu-
tions to modern t h ough t on the p roblem of immortality. 
iltinsterberg, Hugo, Psy chology and Life. Boston: Boughton 
l.'Ii f f lin Co., l i:5 99 - PAL 
Contains a deta iled t heory of t h e depende nce of mental 
functions on cerebral convolutions. 
1Iyers, Frederic William Henry, Human Personal~ ty and Its 
Sur-vival o1· BQ..<;iily Death. New York: Longman's, Green, 
a nd Co., 1903. HP 
Psychic evidence we1ghed and found sufficient p rooi' 
of immortality. One of the best worlcs representing this 
point or v1ew. · 
Ostwald, Wilhelm, Grundriss der :Haturphiloso_J2hi_~- · IJeipzig: 
Philipp Heclam, Jun., 1908. G~~ 
The distinguished chemist and Ingersoll Lecturer 
I expounds his theory of "energetics." 
I
ll,! otto, Ruuolf, The Idea of the Holy. London: Oxford 
,, Un iversity Press, 1924. IE 
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PaJir1er, Frederic, The Winning ur IllJIDor·taJ.l ty. 
T. Y. Crowell and Co., 1910. WOI 
Argument for inm10rtali ty as "not inherent 
Popular in style. 
New York: 271 11 
but p ossible." j 
Perry, Ralph Barton, General Theory of Value. l:Tew York : 
Lone;Ha n 's, Green, and Co., 1926. G1'V 
A nee-realist's analytic explanation of value as 
interest relation. 
Plato, Phaedo. 
All quotations from Plato, Greek and English, are from 
t h e Loeb Clas s ical Library. 
I 
Phaedrus . 
Republic. 
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Pratt, Jat:les Bissett, lra t ter and Sp irit. New York: The 
1viacmillan Co., 1922. lviAS 
A dualistic t heory expounded and defended. 
~he Psychology of Religious Belief. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1 907. PRE 
Historical and psycholog ical . Characterized by 
sympathetic understanding of religious exp erience . 
Prince, Morton, The Dissociation of a Personality. 
New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 1906. DOP 
The famous story of Jl}[iss Beauchamp and "Sally." 
Pringle-Pattison, A. S., The Idea of Immortality. Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1922. IOI 
Critical examination of the historical theories and 
arguments concerning irmnortali ty. Thorough and valuable. 
Viewpoint idealistic. Conclusion affirmative. 
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. 40 vols. 
r~ondon: Triibner and Co., 1883-1932. Proceedings, SPR 
Vols. 13 and 21-25 are of greatest interest. 
Randall, John Herman, The New Light on Innnortality. 
New York: The Uacmi 11an Co. , 1921. NLI 
A popular but sensible treatment of psychical research, , 
its material, t heories of explanation, and probable future, J 
followed by a religious interpretation of the i nterest in /1 
psychic phenomena. ! 
Rohde, E., Psyche; the Cult of Souls and Belief in 
Immortality Among the_ Greeks. London: K. Paul Trench, 1/ 
Authoritative and well documented. ! 
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complete and detailed form. 
santayana, George, Skepticism and Animal Fc:dth. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924. SAF 
The brilliant epistemology of a materialistic critical 
realist. 
Scholz, Heinrich, Der Unsterblichkeitsgedanke al:s -
Philosophisches Problem. Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 
1922. DU 
Criticizes chiefly the views of Plato, Kant, and Lotze, 
the last being most highly evaluated. Finds belief in 
irr~ortality untenable unless theism is also true. 
Sidis, Boris and Simon P. Goodhart, Multiple Personality. 
New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1905. MP 
Contains the account of the famous Hanna case. 
Simpson, J. Y., Man and the Attainment of Immortality. 
New York: George H. Doran Co., 1 922. :MAI 
An account of the rise of man from sub-human levels, 
and an optimistic interpretation of the progress of his 
ideals and value-experiences. Point of view that of a 
Christian anthropologist. 
Slater, John Rothwell, Living for the Future. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916. LFF 
"A stud)- in the ethics of immortality." 
Snowden, James Henry, The Chr~stian Belief in Immortality 
in the Light of Modern Thought. New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1925. CBI 
Popular but thoughtful apology for the Christian doctrine 
Sorley , W. R., Moral Values and the Idea of God. N"ew York: 
G. P. Putnam' s Sons , 1919. 1WG 
Argument for the objectivity of value (defined somewhat 
differently than in this dissertation), and hence for 
theism. 
streeter, B. H., Immortality; __ an Ess~ in Discover~, 
Co-ordinating Scientific, Psychical, and Biblical 
Research. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917. IED 
A symposium, with essays of varying worth. 
Tsanoff, R. A., The Problem of Lmmor~ality. New York: The 
Macmillan Co. , 1924. POI 
Critical, thorough, philosophical. Affirmative 
conclusion. 
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Unamuno y Jugo, Miguel de, The Tragic Sense of Life in Men 
and in Peoples. London: Macmillan and Co., 1921. TSL 1 
Reason, the author says, proves that death ends all, but 
life proves that it does not. Th e problem i~herefore 
1
, 
insoluble, and it is good that it is so, for by the con-
flict we live. 
Watson, John B., Behaviorism. New York: The People's 
Institute Publishing Co., 1924 . BEH 
Exposition of behavioristic p sychology. 
Wiedemann, Alfred, The Ancient E~~an Doctrine of the 
Immortalit~_ of t h e Soul. London: H. Grevel and Co., 
1895. 
Good h istorical descrip tion. 
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